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ABSTRACT
Property tanka, Instead of acquiring capital through
the cash sales of* stocks, obtained their capital by a band
loan secured by mortgages on tangible properties provided by
the stockholders.

These mortgage banks were chartered by

several Southern States to assist planters in dlsposing of
their crops and to aid in the development of incomeproducing properties*
People purchased stocks of these concerns by giving
in exchange mortgages on their property, and tha stocks en
titled the holders to obtain loans from these banks upon
placing their stocks as collateral for such loans*
Bonds were issued by the property banks to acquire the
necessary capital.

Mortgages served as security for these

bends, accompanied in many instances by a state pledge or
guarantee*
The underlying principle of this system of banking was
that the basis of all value is property
ciates in value*

and that it appre

Some increase in value of land occurred as

a result of this system of credit extension, but loans by
these tanks to individuals were based upon the appraised
value of the property when offered for mortgage, not on any
appreciated value occurring thereafter.

iv

During the 18309s and the early X840fs no leas than
mlas Southern States established such Institutions to develop
agriculture and for improvements.

Louisiana was the first

to employ this system and other states tended to model their
system of mortgage banking after it.
This treatise is a case study of Louisiana9a three
mortgage banks— The Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana incorporated in 1827, The Union Bank incorpora
ted in 1338, and the Citizens9 Bank first incorporated in
1838.

A large portion of the data comes from documents,

manuscripts, end records of the concerns under observation;
the remainder, for the most part, is derived from government
documents , laws, records, reports, contemporary newspaper
articles and periodicals, and Louisiana court cases.
Chapter II gives an historical background for the evo
lution of property banks in Louisiana and describes in some
detail the theory and general principles of mortgage banking.
Chapter III is a ease analysis of the Consolidated Associa
tion of the Planters of Louisiana, the first property bank,
and it is based largely on the bank9s records now deposited
In the Department of Archives and Manuscripts at Louisiana
State University.

Chapter IV deals with the Union Bank and

emphasizes the Baglish brokers9 manipulations of the bonds
of this eeqpany.

Chapter V is concerned with the Citizens9

Bank. This ease provides an excellent 11 lustration of the
complicated end intricate practices of speculation rife at

vi
the time*

Chapter VI weaves the three experiments into the

general pattern of banking in Louisiana , the South, and the
Nation by indicating the relative importance and Influence of
these particular oonoerns in agricultural developments and
internal improvements*

Chapter VI also presents a picture of

the role played by these mortgage banks in the construction
of the international credit bridge.

The last chapter, Chapter

VII, shows that while the system of mortgage banking could not
of itself cause a spiral Inflation, once the spiral was Intro
duced by outside factors, it could and did contribute to the
existing inflation.

This chapter presents the probable major

causes for the failure of property banking in Louisiana.

It

also completes the discussion on the theory and principles of
mortgage banking Introduced In Chapter II.
Throughout the entire study particular emphasis is
placed upon (1) the circumstances under which the various
specific bonded debts contracted by the mortgage banks and
underwritten by the State were incurred; (2) the inducements
held out to the investors; (3) the difficulties encountered
by the lenders and borrowers In attempting to understand
each other during alternating periods of Illusory and enthu
siastic optimism end of pessimistic depressions; (4) the
efforts of the State to rid Itself of a contingent liability
and to reform the banking privileges and restrictions; (5)
the part played by the debtor and creditor in aiding or ob
structing thS debt settlements; and (6) the economic effects
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and the international repercussions of these almost forgotten
debt controversies.
The major contribution of this study, probably, is the
presentation of additional ibcts and information of a phase
of Anssrioan economic and financial history.

This study is of

Louisiana's experience in banking during an era of optimistic,
speculative and inflationary developments; and it reviews the
controversial and prolonged settlements of the bonded debts
incurred by the State for property banks.

CHAPTER I

ucraoDVCTioN
A little mo re 'than a century ago property banks were
peculiar to the South, During the 1 6 3 0 ’s and the early 1640*a
no leas than nine Southern States followed Louisiana ’a ex
ample and established property banks in an effort to entice
foreign capital for the purpose of developing agriculture
and internal Improvements,1

The securities of many of these

property or mortgage banks were endorsed by the States. The
amount of available local capital funds was insufficient to
foster a rapid expansion of agriculture and to facilitate
the sale of the products to distant or foreign markets,
therefore, the States created banks for the avowed purpose
of securing the necessary capital through the sale of bonds,
«nd these bank securities had to have the States9 endorse
ments to make them marketable in foreign money markets.

The

influence of property banks in the economic, financial, and

^Davis R. Dewey, ^Bonking In the South,M The South
In the Building of the Nation (Richmond, Va.: The Southern
Historical" Publieation, 1509) , Vol, V, pp. 461-474; hniery
Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York; Prentice-Hall»
1954), p. 563.
1

2

political affairs of the Nation was considerable, but the
history of the important role they played in the development
of the South during the nineteenth century has been neglected,
if not almost forgotten.
Students of economic and financial history have neither
overlooked, nor neglected, the role played by foreign capital
ists in supplying credit to Amerloan promoters and speculators.
The services and functions of international bankers have been
presented with precision and clarity by a few industrious re
searchers and authors# Nevertheless, most of their studies
have failed to give adequate stress to the theory, structure,
operations, influence, and importance of property banks, espe
cially with reference to the part they played in the develop
ment of American resources, commerce, trade, and finance in
relation to world needs and international investments. This
treatise, therefore, attempts to give a more complete analy
sis of those enumerated phases which have been insufficiently
studied# It is an attempt to accomplish the task by reviewing
Louisiana 9s experience with property banks. This utate was
the first to institute the system of mortgage banking, and it
had three such Institutions; its experience should be repre
sentative •
A large portion of the data for this study comes from
documents, manuscripts, and records of the banks under obser
vation, and the re‘winder of the information, for the moot
part, is derived from government docuuonta, laws, records,
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®nd reports. Only necessary secondary sources of* i n f O T O tion are included*
The treatise approaches the problem of determining
and explaining the role and importance of property banks by
first discussing the theory and principles involved; then it
undertakes to present o historical analysis of the specific
organisation and operation of each of the three mortgage
banks in Louisiana; and finally it attempts to indicate the
importance and influence of the particular experiments and
to dree specific conclusions on the soundness of the theory
and the principles involved.

Chapter XI begins by giving an

historical background for the evolution of the establishment
of property banks and continues by explaining the theory and
general principles of property banking.

The writer antic

ipates part of the ensuing analyses in this chapter In order
to give the reader an understanding of what follows, but no
speolflc case illustration is given; that is left for the
three chapters dealing with the experiments*

Chapter III is

a case study of the Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana, the first property bank,

and It Is a detailed

analysis based cm the bank's records now deposited in the
Department of Archives at Louisiana State University. Chapter
IV deals with the Union Bank of Louisiana, and it emphasizes
the Sngllsh manipulations with American securities. Chapter
V is concerned with the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana.

The

stress in this chapter is chiefly on the complicated and In-

4
trieste practices of speculation at th@ time.

Chapter VI

weaves the three experimente into the general pattern of
banking In Louisiana, the oouth, and the Nation, by Indicat
ing the importance and influence of the property banks In
agricultural developments and internal imp rove roen ts.

It gives

also a concrete picture of the role played oy the mortgage
institutions In the construction of the International credit
bridge.

The last chapter, in order to complete the discussion

introduced in Chapter II, presents conclusions pertaining to
the theory and principles of property banks.
briefly, the study deals with the technique employed
In placing and liquidating specific bond issues by the Louisi
ana property banks on the European money markets--the English
money market in particular.

It Is an analysis of the proced

ure followed by the individual property banks to negotiate,
transmit, refund, and redeem bonds issued in their favor and
endorsed by the State of Louisiana.
The period covers a span of seventy-five years, it
begins with the inception of the Consolidated Association of
the rlanters of Louisiana in 1837 and extends to 190E when
the bonds issued for the Citizens* Dank were finally liqui
dated.^
The treatise considers the circumstances under which
the various specific debts underwritten by the atate were

^Eeporb of the Louisiana btate Auditor, 1914, p .78.
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incurred; the inducements held out to investors; the difficul
ties encountered by the lenders and the borrowers in attempt
ing to understand each other during periods of illusory
and enthusiastic optimism and of pessimistic depressions; the
efforts of the State to rid itself

of

a contingent liability

and to reform its banking privileges and restrictions; the
part played by debtor and creditor in aiding or obstructing
the debt settlements; and, finally, the economic and inter
national repercussions of these almost forgotten debt ccatroversies.

Emphasis, however, is placed upon the economio, fi

nancial, and political effects of the property banks upon
the people of Louisiana in general, the cotton ani sugar
planters in particular. The outlook is that of the oltlzens
of Louisiana, not that of the foreign financier, but the in
tention is to be unbiased and unprejudiced. The aim is to
adhere to facts in every instance.
Particular stress is placed upon the statistical data
acquired from the available banking and other records. Such
data, however, are evaluated, because not all of the existing
data give true facts. Indeed, if all the figures were taken
at their face value, utter confusion would result. Only
through the appraisal of certain data is it possible to de
termine the profits and losses of the marketing firms, to ob
tain the contractual relationships and obligations, and to
assess the influences of the transactions.
While, it is advantageous and necessary to oite orig-
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Inal material* the process of footnoting is difficult and
quite complicated. The manuscripts are so varied and numerous
that a complete description of each document would b© cumber
some and not too helpful* Therefore, some simplification in
the process of footnoting is in order* Thus, at this point the
author takes the opportunity to state how he proposes to in
dicate the source of his infomation; it is a codification of
the data that serves as a basis for the treatise:
GAHL
Any citation with this le: ter grouping means
that the Information is to be found in the
Consolidated Association of the Planters of
Louisiana Collection of Miscellaneous Letters*
These letters are chronologically arranged in
corrugated boxes placed an shelves in an airconditioned room of the Department of Archive©
and Manuscripts at Louisiana State University.
With each citation is included the name of
sender and receiver, the place of origin,
and the date*
CABUE*
This group of letters refers to the Collection
of Bound Miscellaneous Letters of the same
company
CABtf
Citations with these letters refer to the Con
solidated Association Books of Minutes* There
are numerous volumes of theee, but the collec
tion is not complete, and, furthermore, some of
the existing volumes are partially destroyed*
Therefore, no volume number Is given with the
reference* Only the date for the minutes of a
Directors* Meeting is given.
CABL
A reference with these letters applies to the
Consolidated Association Letter Books* These
books contain transcribed copies of letters sent
by the company and other reports which were mail
ed or delivered by the officers of the bank* There
are several Letter Books, but th© same situation
exista with these as with th© Books of Minutes*
Only the dnte and th© naraes of sender end receiv
er is stated*
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CASS
This group or letters refers to the Consolidated
Association Stock Books*
CAGLB
Citations with these letters refer to the Con
solidated Association General Ledger Books.
CHIC, 1838.
This is an abbreviation for a special paraphlet
entitled, "Report of the Consulttee of Investiga
tion (selected from the stockholders} Appointed
by the Direct ore of the Citizens* Bank of Louisi
ana, in Conformity with the Resolution of the
Board of 18th October, 1 8 3 8 /
(Hew Orleans;
R. Join and Co., 1339}•
GBXC, 1843.
Shis is an abbreviation for a similar pamphlet
entitled, ""Rapport du Comite d*Investigation—
Somme par les Aetionaires— de la Ban qua des
Citoyens le premier aout 1843, aoumis le 7 novsmbre aulvant." (Hew Orleans: Xmprimerle de
L 1Abel H e , 1843).
CBB4C, 1843.
This is an abbreviation for an independent manu
script published in 1S43. It refers to the "State
ment of the Board of i&nagers of the Citizens* Bank”
(no publishing company, and no date of publica
tion) .
C a W , 1844.
A citation of this sort refers to a report sent
to the President of the State Senate, February 8,
1844* It Is a printed oopy of the report with
out a specific title.
UBFC
This is an abbreviation for a special report en
titled, "Report of the Joint Committee, on the
Affairs of the Gtolon Bank of Louisiana,1833."
UBAR
A oltation with these letters refers to a print
ed copy of the act of incorporation, along with
the rules and regulations. The pamphlet la en
titled, "Act to Incorporate the Subscribers of
the Union Bank of Louisiana with Rules and Reg
ulations of the Company."
(New York: Clayton
and Van Norden, 1833).

8

La* Ann*
Each citation with this abbreviation ha a a num
ber before and after the abbreviation, for exam
ple* 4? Lb * Aon* 43£* The abbreviation stands for
Louisiana Annuals which include court decisions.
The number before the abbreviation Indicates the
volume, and the number following gives the page
of the case being cited.
la * Acts
Whenever this reference is made It applies to the
Aota of Louisiana* Th© year that is included
wTST the abbreviation indicates the volume where
the particular act is to be found.
Leg. Doc.
This is an abbreviation for Louisiana Legislative
Documents. The year included represents the vol
ume. A word of warning must be given about this
source* however* The documents now included in
fc*3* Louisiana Legislative Documents were previous
ly part of either tt© Louisiana Lena to or House
Journals* Vhen the last two mentioned were re
bound by the Louisiana State University Library,
the reports that were included in the appendix
were bound separately. Therefore, if the reader
does not find the source in th© Leg. Doc.. he
will find it in either th© Senate or Louse Jour
nal for the particular year. The title of th©
document is the guide.
House Jour.
This abbreviation represents the Journal of the
House of Representatives of Louisiana* TE© year
Included in the citation gives th© volume.
Sen. Jour.
The abbreviation stands for th© Journa 1 of th©
Senate of Louisiana * Th© year stated represents
the volume.
House Deb.
This citation refers to the Debates of the House
of Representst1vea of Louisiana.
Sen. Deb.
This citation refers to the Debates of the Uenate
of Louisiana *

Yte ether r e f t m e t s or citations g l m

in this trea-

t l M do not M o d to to codified. A bibliographical note at
the end of this etxi&y gives a detailed description of the
prtaary oonreoa of Inforation.

CBAi-T&R IX
THE THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY RANKING

Property banka were established In Louisiana in order
to entice foreign capital funds that would serve the purpose
of extending credit to Individuals for developments beneficial
to the State. It was the continuation of an effort that had
become prevalent In every State In the Union after 1812. It
was part of a contest that had been going on between this
country and Great Britain since after the War of 1812; the
American object was to secure a market for its production,
while the English aimed to defeat our tariffs devised for
that purpose in order to maintain and Increase their markets.

1

An Economic Background
Shortly after the \Var °f 1812, the United States em
barked upon a vast program of internal development, especial
ly in the fields of transportation, agriculture, and natural
resources. At first, the Federal Government, as well as the
States of the Union, took active part, but soon, however, the
United States Government was forced to curb Its extensive ac
tivities because of a Supreme Court Opinion on the oonstltu-

*Cf. Leg. Doc., 1843, "Report of t h e Board of Currency.
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t i o a a U t y of Its undertakings. The decision* nevertheless*
instead of noting as a deterrent* stimulated the States to
g
foster expansion and development with relentless fervor*
Hew York initiated the large-scale movement in 1817 by proTiding the funds for the construction of the Erie Canal.
Other states were not backward in following the practice.
Prior to 1815* banks* trunpik© companies, bridge compa
nies, insurance companies* jrfe cetera * had been incorporated
by several States* mostly Eastern States* but it was after the
ear when such enterprises appeared in profusion* At first*
eueh improvements were undertaken with the use of local cap
ital* Soon* however* developments became too great In scope
to be financed by local funds* Larger undertakings had to be
financed from larger money-markets such e.s New York and Phila
delphia. Banks and investment houses in these centers looked
favorably toward the corporation shares* Corporation stocks
and bonds sold as well as government shares* and the yield of
corporate certificates was higher. On the other hand* London
and other European money-markets preferred government bonds or
government pledged securities to the more speculative corpo
rate shares* for the obvious reason that distance added more
-

-

Cf. L . L. Bogart * Economic History of the American
People (New York: Longmans-Green „ 19 £6")’* p • 3&5.
J* Shultz and M. R. Caine* Financial Development
of the United States (New York: Prentice-Ha 11* 1937), p. 190.

IS
diffieultiea to th© collection at corporate shares than it
did to securities or the government.

Difficulties arising

from distance, however, were not so troubles am© to th© domes
tic investment houses

as they were to the foreign investors.

On this account, large Eastern banking establishments invested
in corporate enterprises for themselves in order to acquire
larger incomes and acted only as Intermediaries In th© sale
of government bonds.
The development of th© South and Southwest was different
frost that of the Bast. After independence was achieved in 1783
and the recognized boundary became the Mississippi River, the
frontier settlers advanced more aggressively through the Alle
gheny barrier. Waves of pioneers settled in the fertile plains
of the great valley.
ed from Trance

4

Yhen the Louisiana Territory was acquir

planerring began in the Mississippi Valley in

the West and in the South. The opening of the Croat River and
its tributaries to transportation did much to foster migration
to and within the new region. Furthermore , th© increased de
mand for cotton after the War of 1812 and the invention of the
cotton gin did much to open a new theater for rapid expansion,
and the new South and Southwest were well suited to th© growing
of cotton. This meant, however, that unlike the Eastern States

*Henry C . White, "The Expansion of the Area of Cultiva
tion, 1783-1865,’ The South in the Building of the Nation.
(Richmond, Virginia: The Southern Bis torlca1 Tublloatlon
Society, 1909), Vol. V, p. 41.

13
vdiere most of tbs agriculture was for home consumption , the
newer regions "were glean over almost entirely to the production of a single crop for sale In a distant market*;

and

only through a foreign martoet could these newer sections profit
from the Increased production in agriculture , because they had
no t o m or domestic non-agriculture 1 population to demand their
6
products •
Furthermore, the newer regions were not suited as
was the East to the creation of corporate enterprises*

Bf forts

by the people of the new Southern States were bent mostly

to

ward agricultural Improvements which did not lend themselves
to the corporate form of organization*

Eastern capita lists,

therefore, could not be persuaded to Invest in such endeavors,
especially when more lucrative opportunities existed much closer
home*

Profits resulting from the sale of staple agricultural

products were not as lucrative as the profits realized from
industrial and commercial enterprises in or near their vicinity.
Xa the newer regions the income from the sale of
crops enabled the plantation owners to secure slave laborers
seeded and much of the clothing and food for these laborers,
also mules and supplies.

The proceeds, however, were far too

^Hatthew B. Hammond, "Agriculture 1 Credit and Crop Blortgages in the South." The South in the Building of the Ha tion.
OP* clt ** P • dSV.
omy,

*Cf *. John Stuart Hill, Frlaolplea of Polltloel Econ
Vol." I , Bk. I, Chapter VIlTy P* M g x a p E 3.

14
amall to meet the planters* ambitious needs and desire®.
Furthermore, the development of the system was hindered by
the lack of capital; very little of it existed in these newer
regions, and capital was essential for rapid development and
international trade. Individuals had none and very few bank®
existed because capital was required for their inception. Some
schema, therefore, had to be devised to entice capital from
those who possessed it. That scheme was the property bank.
Banks in Louisiana Prior to 1627
Before property banks were introduced in 132?, there
were, or had been, several banks In Louisiana , and their struc
ture should be reviewed in order that the reader may visualize
sore clearly the evolutionary process of mortgage banking.
Louisiana, like most States of the Union, had its share
of bank® created for the purpose of development. Even though
the first bank ever to be created in Louisiana was established
In 1804, five were chartered between then and 1827, there
being three still in existence in 1827. The amount of funds
rendered available through these early institutions was consid
erable, but not sufficient for the ever-optimistic speculators
end over—zeelous legislators.

By 1827 the potential capital

of State banks had reached the total of v G ,500,000; the

15
population m i lews than £00*000.^
The Louisiana Bank* — On the twelfth of March* 1804*
Governor Claiborne granted a charter for the first bank ever
to exist in the territory*®

The charter incorporating the

Louisiana Bank was signed by the Governor after receiving a
petition for such an Institution from the leading citizens of
Hew Orleans and vicinity*

These leaders wanted a bank because

they thought it would serve to unify the three national groups
a
— the French, Spanish, and American. President Jefferson was
of the same opinion and he approved Governor Claiborne*s action*
After

the charter was granted, however, Madison, Secre

tary of State, and Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, were
opposed to the Governor’s move*

They were opposed because they

were anxious to establish a branch of the Bank of the tJhlted
States in New Orleans. Nevertheless, the bank was established*

ID
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The three banks were: the Bank of Louisiana with a cap
ital of £4*000*000, the Louisiana State Bank with #8*000*000,
sod the Bank of Orleans with $500,000* (Of* Leg* Poe*. 1843,
"The Report of the Board of Currency*; the Sen* Jour*. 1857;
and 1n f w p p . 17-19). According to A* Q,. Hawk, the population of Louisiana by 1830 was £15,739 (op* olt.« pp. £18-819).
It should be noted, however, that the banks of Louisiana
served as a banking and trading center for a large portion
of the South, Southwest, and the New Middle West.
®Dunbar Rowland, The Official Letter Book* of W. C. C,
Claiborne (Kedlsoa, v;isconains Democratic Printing Pres*.
19 1$3, Vol. II, pp. 29-34.
9Ibld.. pp. 22-23.
l0Ibi4

The massee were not In favor of the bank; In their
minds the lnetltutlon could have no other purpose than to
Issue paper money*

To them It could only result In an expert

eaee similar to that experience with the French "Kings Money"
leraed in the 1750 *s, or with their more recent experience
with the Spanish "li bronzes •"

They felt the bank to he an

American scheme to legalise robbery. Nevertheless, these peo
ple believed In their leaders and they abided by their decis
ions*

They accepted the bank, therefore, and slowly became

sceustemed to It, along with the branch of the Bank of the
11
Baited States established In New Orleans January, 1305*
The Planters* Bank and the Bank of Orleans* — A defi
ciency of currency was being felt seriously In New Orleans
during 1811, partly as a result of the expiration of the char
ter of the Bank of the TJnited States, and partly as & result
12
of as increase In business.
To alleviate the scarcity the
State Legislature granted two bank charters; 'Hie Planters*
Bank on April fifteenth, and The Bank of Orleans on April

Of* H. £. Chambers, A History of Louisiana {New
York and uETc&go: American His¥ortoai Society, I n c 1925),
Vol. I, p* 444; N. M. M. Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana
Paring the French Regime* 1 6 9 9 - 1 7 (New York; Columbia Universit y T r e e s , 1 6 16), p. 124; Aieee Fortier, A History of
Louisiana (New York: Century Historical Association, 1914}*
Vol. flT7 p. 16: Charles Oayarre, History of Louisiana (New
Tort: Harpers, 1861), Vol. IT, p. I K
12
Victor Debouckel, Hlstolre de la Louie lane Papula
les Premieres Pecouvertes Jusqu*on 1640 (New Orleans: y. y*
Lellevre, 1841), p * 112 .

1?
thirtieth.
wab
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The authorised ©apital of the Planters * Bank

$600*Q00 to bo procured through the sale or shares at

♦300 each, payable In specie.

The primary purpose of the In

stitution was to meet the needs of the agricultural Interests
of the Territory; that is* the bank was /oainly concerned In
discounting praaissory notes which were agricultural in charester* and in advancing credit for the iniprovesaent of agri
cultural p roperty.^

The charter was granted for a period

of fifteen years* hut the bank became Insolvent prior to 1826*
without having been too successful in accarapllshing the de
sired aim,15
The Bank of Orleans was incorporated with an author
ised capital of $500*000. Its shares were ^100 each* payable
in money or notes. This bank was primarily for comereial
purposes * but it dealt* also* in agricultural endeavors*

Its

original charter was for fifteen years, but in 1323 the State
Legislature extended It to 1347* for which the State was to
*.
16
receive a bonus of $25*000.
*^Mfts of the Territory of Louisiana, 1811* pp. 86-100
and 164-1787"
Attention is called to the fhet that another bank Is
sometimes referred to as "The Planters* Bank.** That bank is
the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana*
incorporated In 1827 (see next chapter)* They were both agri
cultural banks* but they were different in their structural
nature* and * therefore* should not be confused.
**Benry Right or* A Standard History of Mew Orleans.
Louisiana (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co., 1900)* p. 565.
**Sr. Debouehel, io e .elt.
“ l*. Acts. 1623* pp. 66-6©.
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The Louisiana State Bank* — By 1818 the people of
Louisiana had become thoroughly accustomed to banking, and
they no longer resented the "money creators•"

Furthermore,

the creation of banks by the ■various State Legislatures had
become the vogue in every State after the closing of the
first Bank of the United States, and the fervor had not sub
sided with the chartering of the second Bank of the United
States*

Louisiana took action in 1818 by providing for the

establishment of the Louisiana State Bank with an authorized
capital of $2,000,000; and, fearing that this capitalization
might not be adequate, it further provided that. With legisla
tive sanction, the capital of the bank could be increased at
the rate of $400,000 a year, the total never to exceed the sum
17
of $4,000,000.
For granting this generous oharter, the State
reoeived a bonus of $100,000 and subscribed to the bank's stock
18
in the amount of $500,000.
The bank was a sucoess even though
it was found expedient to discontinue the branches in all the
19
important centers, except the St. Martinvilie branch,
which
of course was done

with the consent of the Legislature.

The Bank of Louisiana. — The first bank to receive di
rect aid from the State was the Bank of Louisiana, incorpora
ted April 7, 1824; the State issued bonds for and in favor of
17
18

Ibid.. 1818, pp. 78-90.

Franooia X. Martin, The History of Louisiana includ
ing The Annals of Louisiana by J*. T. Oondon (New Orleans: J .
A. Gresham, 1882*7, p. 414.
l$L a . Acts, 1825, pp. 6-8.

this hash in payment for the bank stocks purchased*

so

This

institution was incorporated with a capital of $4, 000,000*
ha IT of which was subscribed by the state. To pay for its sub
scription, the State Issued bonds for the bank to a total of
$£,400,000, and pledged its faith for the payment of the
principal and interest thereon. That amount of bonds was is
sued for the $£, 000,000 of shares because it was known that
the bends would not sell at face value. It was felt, however,
that the bonds would sell above 83 1/3 per cent of par* Any
amount obtained on the bonds above $£, 000,000, therefore,
was t o be distributed as dividends among the stockholders.

21

The bonds Issued in favor of the bank were sold to
Thomas Wilson and Company of London

22

and the negotiation reeg

suited in a profit of $321,822 for the bonk;

and this was be

cause the bands sold at above 83 1/3 per cent of par expected
by the State.
The law provided that the profits should be distributed
as dividends, and this the bank did.

The method employed,

20

Ibid. , 1824, pp. 72-132; Y. Debouch© 1, op. olt. . p. 139
E. C . McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American Btate Debts
(Xew York: M e e m lllanV19351 » p p . 168-173; F / Q,. Hawk, op, clt.,
pp. 359-360.
Because the State issued bonds for this bank as it did
later for property banks, some (i.*®.** H* C. MeGmne, op. clt..
p. 168) have placed th© bank in the category of property or
land banks. The Bank of Louisiana, however, was not a property
bank .
* *
la. Acts, 1824, op. cit.. sec. 5.
22f
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\

A. Xrufant, "Review of Banking in New Orleans,„
1830-1840," Louisiana Historical Review {Louisiana Historical
Society). Vol. X, pp. 25-40.
A. Fortier, op. clt.. Vol. I, p. 60,

ISO
h o w w

waft to be a subject of much caatrowray.

The dis

tribution favored the stockholders, but not th© State*

In 00

fhr as the Incident illustrates the flagrant abuses on the
part of the bank

of the privileges granted, It will be help

ful, therefore, to explain what actually took place with respect to this new method of securing profits.
The policy followed by th© bank In th© distribution of
the profits from the sale of the bonds was on the basis of the
fhee value of the stock subscript lens and not on the amount
actually paid In for the shares*

Inasmuch as half of the

14 9000,000 stock capitalization was subscribed by the state,
the remaining ? S,000,000 was to be subscribed by Individuals*
Nevertheless, the law provided that only one-fifth of th©
amount subscribed by the individual stockholders, or $400,000,
had to be paid at the time of the bank’s inception* Of that
initial subscription payment, however, only *133,640 was act£4
uelly paid In*
Thus it was that the stockholders, not in
cluding the State, received one half of the profits realised,
or 1150,911 on an act m l paid-in investment of $133,840-— a
profit of 1X5 per cent*

Naturally, th© State as a stockholder
S3
objected to th© method employed for the division of profits*
24
6

55

La * Ann* 645, Louisiana v* Bank of Lout a l a m *

Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2935), ppV
44—45*

SI
0& $2,400,000 of obligations for *2*000,000 of stocks,
the Stats was receiving $160,911, while the other stockholders
were receiving the same amount of profits on en actual com
mitment of $138,840*

That was not nn equitable distribution.

When the matter was brought to court, therefore, the State
secured a dec la ion requiring the profits to be divided on the
26
basis of paid-stock, saving the otate more then £140,000, while
still granting a profit of 14 per cent to the individual stock27
holders.
With the profits belonging to the State, the bank was
ordered to purchase State bonds, such bonds to be placed in a
sinking fund for the redemption of bonds originally Issued in
28
fhvor of the bank.
Two years later, in 1829, the court’s
order had not yet been put into effect. The State Treasurer
reported to t#he House of Kepresentatives,
... I requested the President and Cashier of
the Bank of La* (they being with the State Treas
urer, Administrators of the sinking fund) to unite
with me to carry said resolution into effect. As a
preliminary step, we applied to the Board of Direc
tors of said institution, to ascertain whether an
amount of the profits made on the sale of the State
bonds, proportioned to the stock of the Bank owned
by the State would be by them paid over to us as
such administrators••• »
26

6 La. Ann. 645, State of Louisiana v*_ Bank of Louisiana
~
'
’**’
"*
S. A. Caldwell, loc.clt,

28
La. Acts, 1827,
29

pp. 180, 182.

Beton Rouge Gazette,
ment? February 2 8 ,1829.

"Report of the Treasury Depart

zz
Apparently* hoiatep, tbs opftep of the court was never com
plied with* Aleee Fortier relates:
The order to buy beads for the sinking; fund
wee evidently not comp lied with, for on March 7,
1S54, the attorney-general of the State was direct
ed by act of the general assembly to 'institute
suit without delayf against the Bank of Louisiana
bo compel said bank to place to the credit of the
State as available means on July 1 next the amount
the State was entitled to in &*ins or profits made
by the bank on the sale of State bonds; such por
tion as the State might be entitled to in the bal
ance of the profit and loss account; and any other
claim end amount which the attorney-general might
think was due the State
The bank appeared to have good management and It pros51
pared*
The interest payments of 5 per cent, payable semi
annually, were met, and the bonds were reimbursed an the
maturity dates, 10, 15, EO, and 25 years from July 1, 1324.
The Bank of Louislane, therefore, while not a property
beak in structure, had some characteristics which were soon
to be Incorporated by che property banks. One important
characteristic was that the capital of the bank was acquired
from Europe through the sale of bonds. The bonds, however,
were mot assured by mortgagee* Rather they were secured by
the bank9s assets and the State fs pledge* Therefore, when the
property bank scheme was introduced, it was not a radical
c h u g s * Instead of the bonds being secured by the general
assets, they were secured by a multitude of mortagoa sup
plied by stockholders.
*°A. Fortier, op* clt., Vol. I, p. 60*
g*Cf* ffllea Weekly Register. Vol. XXXVIII,

p. 35.
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The Theory and Principles
Property banka, sometimes improperly named ’land banks’,
were banks of loan, deposit, and discount, not mere banks of
note issue*

They were similar to State or regular stock banks

exoept in organization*

Their capital funds, instead of being

acquired through a sale of stocks, were obtained by means of a
bond loan*

Mortages which were supplied by the stockholders

served as security for the bonds*

Xn essenoe Immovable

tangible property served as a basis for an acquisition of credit
and specie*

The scheme was an elaboration of the "John Law”

idea*
In 1650 William Potter in The Key to Wealth: or a new
way of improving Trade * stated that the greater the quantity
of money the more prosperous was a nation’s trade*

As a means

of obtaining more money Potter proposed to Issue bills drawn
on the security of land and other property*
of John Law’s monetary doctrines*

This was the core

It was the idea behind

colonial *land banks *.
According to John Law in Money and Trade Consider’d
with

Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money:

Domestick Trade depends on the Money: A greater
quantity employs more People than a lesser quantity*
A limited Sum can only set a number of People to work
proportion’d to it, and tis with little Success Laws
are made for employing the Poor or Idle In Countries
where Money Is scarce; good Laws may bring the Money
to the full Circulation ’tis capable of* and force it
to those Employments that are most profitable to the
Country: But no law can make It go further, nor can
more People be set to Work, without more Money to

£4
to circulate so, as to pay wages of a greater Number.
They may be bought to Work on Credit; and that is
not practicable, unless the Credit have a Circulation,
so as to supply the Workman with Necessaries; if
that9s suppos’d, then that Credit is Money, and will
have the same effects, on Home and Foreign Trade.32
John Law accepted silver and gold as money, but criti
cised both as an adequate standard of value.

Paper money,

Law claimed, was a more stable measure of value, and his es
sential idea was that money was only a voucher for buying
goods.

Money was not the value for which goods were exchanged,

but the value by which goods were exchanged.

He believed in

stability and security, provided the supply of money was
adequate to meet the needs for money.
In L awvs estimation, land gave the ideal stability and
security to money and still enabled a country, irrespective of
its geographic location, to have an adequate quantity of these
vouchers for the purpose of exchanging goods.

Furthermore,

land, besides existing in adequate quantity, had intrinsic
value, and a value which would be enhanced by the issuance of
money having this land as security.

His idea consisted in giv

ing notes to anyone who was prepared to mortgage his land or
to sell it to a public body created for that purpose.

The idea

is a familiar one, and it had its first application in this
country with the "colonial land bank."
Colonial land banks were simply note-issue banks.

They

were designed to issue "batches" of paper notes on the security
of real estate mortgages.

Since currency w a s scarce in the

colonies, several of the residents in a community devised a
*>^Qp. cTt., p • 11

plan for note-issue purposes; they "created" a bank and
subscribed to It by giving mortgages on their real ©state*
The bank, using these mortgages as seourity, issued its own
notes*

These notes the subscribers acquired from the bank

and used them in the daily trade*

An agreement was made to

keep the paper money in circulation in an amount proportional
to their subscriptions.

No capital funds were required.

There was no reserve backing the notes, and there was really
33
no redemption.
Like the colonial land banks the property banks adopted
the idea presented by Potter and law that land had intrinsic
value, but it was not for the purpose of issuing money or
circulating oredit-notes as was done by the
banks.

colonial land

Instead, it was for the purpose of procuring credit

and specie from another locality, not for the mere creation
of money or circulating credit; this was a point of departure
from the John Law scheme and a difference from the

colonial

land banks.
The financial structure of property banks was different
from that of the colonial land banks,

Mere paper money could

not satisfy the needs of the people of the South.

For Instance

specie and credit was wanted In Louisiana because commerce, or
exchange, was not local in character. If the securing of equip
ment, slaves, and markets for their products— sugar and ootton-

f. K. B. Westerfield, Money. Credit and Banking
(New York: Ronald Press, 1939), pp. 345-346; DavTs R. Dewey,
Financial History of the United States (New York:LongmansGreen, 1924), 9th. ed., pp* 19-21.

had been loetl la character, "batches*9 of paper mo m y might
hare suftie«d> hat the equipment and slaves had t o he bought
frtffi the outside, either front the Seat, the older South, or
abroad* Product© had to be sent outside the community for
sals. Gold, silver, bills of exchange, credit, et cetera*
were essential, and individuals by themselves could not read
ily obtain t h e m , ©specially in a vicinity where little cap
ital funds and credit wore eve liable locally* They could not
persuade outsiders to accept local "batches" of paper money,
premises to pay, mortgages on their individual property, #t
cetera,

la payment for the things they did need. Individ

ually, they could not bear the expense end time of the spe
cific transactions In international trade* Only by collective
action of some sort could the endeavor be rendered feasible.
Banks, therefore, were brought into the picture* Because
there existed vary little capital in the community, banks
were to be the means of enticing specie and credit in from
the outside* Any plan of this nature, furthermore, had to af
ford stability and security. Otherwise the bank could not get
p*qoh capital* Through the medium of th© property banks, the
legislators were informed that all problems would be solved
m©

rapid development and prosperity would result*
Credit for origins.ting the underlying theory of prop

erty banks Is given to a Mr* Mouasler of New Orleans; it 1©
M i d that he introduced the idea of establishing a system of

collateral 9«oaritl«® teat Xoauae.3*

This Idea was adopted

mteii Louisiana, Misnissippi, izte&sas, the Florida Territory,
aad otter Southern State# granted ohortora for the establishseat of property banhe in aid of agricultural and cotton
dev* lepaen t s .35
JShe financial structure of property beaks consisted of
a pool of mortgagee to form a collateral trust, much like the
present practice of pooling a multitude of real estate mort
gagee and issuing trust certificates or bonds* Property banka,
therefore, represent a aidesy point, or a second stage, be
tween the colonial ‘land*’ banks and the existing Federal
3d
Land Saaks,
a step of departure from the John Law scheme
and a step toward sounder banking practice*
Mortgages on agricultural properties s e r w d to purchase
stocks in a property bank* A cotton or sugar planter, desirous
of besoming a stockholder in a property bank chartered by the
State for agricultural developments,

acquired

the stock with

mortgages on the plantation, not necessarily v lth money* The
property banks took these mortgages and placed them in their
vaults to servo as security for the bonds lesued for sale*
tecs sold, these bonds obtained for the banks the funds
essential to do business*— capital funds for loans to clients*

Citizensf Bonk and Trust Company of Louisiana (Mew
psrspETErr T s rrF )T p \ i 4T '
S«R. Cw. Hawk, op, clt* * pp. 303—368*
36s. 3. Sparks, History and Theory of Agricultural
Credit in the United States tN evT7 ork‘; C r O:rwe il.Ite £ £).
p* 83.

£8
Xnneasteh as tl» stockholders warn to be the clients of
ttie banka as well as o a a i s 9 ttere remained a problem to be
solved* ffca client-stockholders

bed already siren their only

security— mortgages— to aoqulre the stocks and had nothing
left la the form of security for loans from the banks except
the stocks themselves. Property banks, therefore, accepted the
stocks of their banks as collateral for loans granted* It may
he M i d , therefore, that th© agricultural land owners were per
mitted to "lift thenselves by their awn boot strops."
Becoming a stockholder in a property bank, nevertheless,
c m not a simple matter. Not everyone could become a stock
holder* Generally, only those with fixed tangible property of
a certain nature could qualify. A qualifying applicant desir
ous of becoming a stockholder

bed to meet additional re

quirements and his application had to be approved by the di
rectors of the bank. Pirst, the applicant signed the stockbook of a property bank, stating the amount of stock desired
j
aid the type of property offered for mortgage. Then, investiga
tion was made by the officers for acoeptano© or rejection of
the prospective subscription. The institution*a attorney in
vestigated all the titles of the properties offered for mort
gage; he ascertained the amounts and nature of any mortgages,
privileges, and other charges with which the properties might
be incumbered; and ho affirmed the affidavits filed and pre
sented by the prospective subscribers*

The agents of the bank

ing firm made a thorough and detailed evaluation of the prop-

£9
ertles ottered for mortgage; and they presented a sworn es
timate-oe rtifio&t© to the attorney for approval*

If th© stand

ard sat by the charter was met, th© officers so advised the
subscribers tod Issued in their names the sx)©clf led stocks of
tbs corporation*

When issued, these stocks permitted the hold

ers, if and when they desired, to make use of their account at
the bank; that is, they were granted a loan after the bonds
were sold and the funds were available at the bank*
Nevertheless, a stockholder was not permitted to obtain
e loan equal to the par or face value of the certificate* Most
regulations required that only from one-half to two-thirds of
37
the face value of the stocks could be had as a loan*
There was a specific reason for a limitation being placed
es the amount a stock certificate could serve as collateral for
a loan, and that reason was that the State and the organizers
of property banks wished to have more than adequate security
behind any credit extended*

Based on the same belief John

Law had, It was thought that twice th© property value was a
double assurance that there was adequate security*

Besides,

the limitations restricted the amount of credit the stockholders
could obtain below the amount that was secured by the sale of
bonds, and this permitted the banks to have enough funds to
carry on other business activities; that is, if a property

The Louisiana property banks specified that a loan
Could be granted up to one-half the par value of the stocks*

30
bank, for Instance, had sold §2,000,000 of bonds mad bad
issued $3*000,000 of stooks, the limit of credit that could
he extended cm the stocks would be §1,500*000 at most, leaving
$300,000 for other busies os endeavors and opera tion costs .
So similar to Lawism were property banks In some respeets, that the question arises, V^hat about in flat ion V

Did

property beaks have inflationary characteristics a
Uhlik© the earlier John Law schemes, property banks
were not intended to foster, encourage, or accentuate infla
tion. theoretically, there were to be no inflationary effects
free the establishment of property banks. There was to be no
spiral rise in the value of land as a result of these banks.
Increases in property valuation were not to affect the status
of the mortgaged property as far as an individual property
bank was concerned. Once the property was evaluated it became
the basis for the mortgage. If the value of the land Increased,
and it was firmly believed that land always increased in value,
the amount of the mortgage did not change. It was necessary
for the mortgage to remain the same , and no new mortgage could
he obtained on. the added value.
To illustrate the above, let ua take a hypothetic© 1
ease: /or instance,

A

is a planter with agricultural property

worth ^500,000. Ho subscribes to the extent of "200,000 in the
B

property bank by giving a mortgage on his property for

that amount. How, he ban not hypothecated

his £>roperty for

stocks to the full amount set in the evaluation; that Is,
there is a value of §300,000 on his property that is unincum

31
bered. Xf b# vanned ibt and If th# subscription book of the
institution permitted i t , he oould become a stockholder for
1300,000 more.

Let us say that

A

waits a yea r or two be

fore he decides to Increase his holdings in the bank*s stocks,
in the meantime, for some reason or other, the value of land
la general has increased, and at the end of th© interim his
lead is worth f 600 fOOO. According to the principle involved,
X

oould obtain but $300,000 in stocks and not $4-00,000; that

is, he could obtain additional stocks on the basis of the orig
inal valuation and not the new. Under such circumstances

no

lnflatternary boom of a spiral type can be fostered or encour
aged by action of the bank.
Nevertheless, in actual practice,

sole©

degree of infla

tion. alight have bean possible in a cQfiumnity like New Orleans
share more than one property bank existed, "or example, where
severe! banks of this nature were situated In on area, it
some time s happened that property owners were stockholders in
more than one property bank, and, as the restriction on val
uation mentioned above did not apply beyond the sphere of the
individual bank, there might have been a possibility of some
Inflation, unless e further restrictive measure was

taken

into consideration. That measure was that whenever property
was offered for mortgage

which was elrendy incumbered, twice

the amount of the incumbrance was deducted from the valuation
for purposes of issuing stock certificates on the remainder
of

valuation.

52

jo roturo bo ©up

X o&sfl i I f » instead, of fit*

tempting to increase hie stock holdings in the
hanky A decides to subscribe to stocks in the

B
C

property
property

baaky there arises e different situation; and the difference
is that the original valuation is not extended beyond the
province of the Individual firm.

Once the valuation of a

piece of property is determined and declared by a firm It re
mains fixed during the entire period and it serves as security
ea the mortgage given for the purchase of stocks.

This does

not lean, however, that other fires ere bound to accept the
same valuation on this property as that accepted
bank

by property

B when it is Involved in transactions with the prop

erty owner A.

For instance, when planter A subscribes for

stocks in property bank C,

he presents the titles on the

property and specifies to what amount the property is incum
bered*

Then the appraisers of bank C determine the valuation

of the

property independently

of

any appraisal made previous

ly by any other bank. Such a procedure, therefore, leaves open
a possibility for an inflationary practice; that is, if the ap
praisers declared the property to be worth f 600,000 instead of
#900 ,000, it Might permit some spiral inflation to the extent
of f 100,000 as far as the valuation on that particular prop
erty is concerned, if it were not for a further restriction
that has not been introduced In our illustration*

That re

striction was that at least twice the amount of the debt
had to be deducted from the appraised valuation before the

35
remainder b«eaa» employable on hypothec for the purchase of
dteeke* The net result m s ,

therefore, that the valuation of

the property had to increase considerably before inflation
resulting from the bank's action could have ^ny effect in
causing an upward spiral in prices or property value®; that
Is, the restriction had as its

purpose

Q check to the pos

sibility of Inflation.
frO® the above illustration there m?:y prise a question
as to whether or not a property owner at * later date might
obtain a mortgage on the basis of increased valuation

if his

property were already fully mortgaged, Th® answer to the ques
tion has been given and it is repeated: it is ^ 0/

it is

not sseessaxy that property be mortgage-free for the purpose
of offering it for mortgage, but a mortgage could not be
granted on what was already hypothecated. Thus, if a property
owner had a mortgage covering his entire property, he could
not obtain & second mortgage on the sane property, or on the
increased valuation* All a property owner could hypothecate
was the uruaort^gsd portion of his property; and If the prop
erty was

partially incumbered, twice the amount of the in

cumbrance was deducted from the appraised va luation before
a mortgage was granted on the remainder.
Another question ia that of transferability of stock
certificates of a property bank, and that question might have
perplexed n»ny.

V ith property tied up with stocks

ficult

to visualize how the stock® of the property

perhaps

it is dif

34
banks could be transferred from one Individual to another*
Impression must not be had, however, that "once a stockholder
always a stockholder” prevails until the expiration of th©
corporation•

Transference was possible, even though it

was

not as simple a matter as It was for common stock bank certif
icates purchased with specie, other money, or notes.

To sell

a stock of a property bank, permission from th© institution
was essential*

Furthermore, the new owner had to supply

property to be mortgaged which was equally as satisfactory as
the one it replaced; the directors of the corporation had to
be assured that the position of the bank with respect to the
total of mortgages held was not altered*
sush a policy m s

nud the idea behind

to protect the security of the bonds issued

by the bank.
3SWlll* permission was essential for proper transference
it was not always sought by the seller and buyer of th© stock*
For instance, there is evidence from the records and manu
scripts of the Consolidated Association of the Planters of
Louisiana that several transactions in stock ownership occurred
without the knowledge of the institution* During the later
years of the firm9s existence, during the long period of liqui
dation, the matter of stock ownership became very confused and
complies ted because of this; and when assessments were declar
ed on the stockholders, it was found that some planters had
purchased property mortgaged for stocks in the corporation
without even knowing that such a mortgage existed and that
they were owners of stocks in the corporation*

The individual mortgagescould he changed, but the
total had to remain intact until the expiration of th© band
Obligations; that is, the ratio of mortgages to bonds had to
remain equal* If the bank redeemed a portion of its bonds, it
could reduce by a like amount the mortgages It held as secu
rity for bonds, but it could not reduce the fund of mortgages
until this was done, and it could not reduce the fund by a
larger portion than the amount of bonds redeemed*

35
Sush a policy ac described a boro was sound as far as
%%

tout It o s r l o o k e d certain conditions which might have

impaired the security.

For instance, when a transaction took

place, the terms or exchange were agreed upon by the buyer and
seller,

either the seller or the stocks settled his account

with the hank ir he had a loan on the stocks, or had it trans
ferred In the m s s

or the new stockholder*

If it was

the

latter, there was not much danger of Impairing th® security.
But if It was the former, there was some danger If the settle*
went was in the form of a

note*

The best way to indicate

the difference is by illustration:
Xn Case I, A, the old stockholder, decides to sell his
property worth #400,000 to B, the new stockholder, for £400,
000, the amount of the mortgage fcr which £400,000 of stocks
were received.

A had obtained a loan of #300,000 on his

stocks, $10,000 of which had been repaid*

The agreement

reached is that B shall assume the loan A had on the stocks,
paying A the difference**#210,000*

Under such conditions,

the same property serves for the new mortgage replacing the
eld. The stocks and the loan are now in B fa name Instead of
in A*s name*

B is not entitled to an additional loan, ex

cept on the £ 10,000 that has been repaid, because his stock
serves as security for the loan he has assumed from

A*

Under this sort of a transaction, therefore, the pool of
mortgages is not impaired.
Xn Case XX

the same conditions apply, except that B

pays A the full amount and does not assume A fs loan, that

feeing settled fey A himself*

If

B

pays

A

in money end with

this money A settles his account, it leaves B with the priv
ilege of securing a lean up to $£00,000 at the bank, but it
dess not impair the pool of mortgages more than doss Case X *
If, however, B pays A with a note secured fey the same property,
or its agriculture 1 productivity, the situation is different*
To clear his account on the loan
the bank*

A discounts B 9s note with

Thus, while it appears that the security of the

bondholders is unimpaired because of the pool of mortgages
feeing intact, the security is not the same because in effect
the bank has resorted to loaning to the full amount of the
stocks*

Indeed, the bank has granted a second mortgage on

property already mortgaged, and

theoretically

were to be protected from such a practice.

bondholders

Heedless to say,

however, both the bank and the stockholders favored the
latter type of transaction mentioned in Case IX*
Soundness of the Theory and Principles
At the time of their inception, property banks were
balled by many as e worthy innovation and a salvation to the
needy agricultural people of the South* The soundness of the
reasons given for their inception was questioned by many
others, especially fey those who witnessed the deplorable «xparlances with these institutions, mostly during the latter
years of their existence*

Some indications have already been

given to substantiate both views, depending on the outlook*
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H o thorough aaalysis ]»« boos mads as yet, h o w e o r , to pro
vide a basis for judgment on the soundness of the theory and
principles Involved , and it la not the purpose of this chaptor to do sof especially whan specific case histories have
not boon m i n o d .

the task at present m e t n e e e m r l l y he

limited t o the presentation of additional phases playing a
part In determining the soundness of the theory and princi
ples of property banks, or what Is a system of collateral
securities for the purpose of acquiring loans* a conclusion
can he drawn only after certain fee tors ha ire been conaidared rather carefully.

For Instance:

1* The method of evaluating property requires sound,
scientificp and skillful Judgment on the part of
appraisers*

In the case of property banka, however,

there Is no definite guide for evaluation*

Evalua

tion was a guess— e t best, an inaccurate guess*
Furthermore, the firm belief of the adherents of prop
erty banks was that land had intrinsic m l u e in Itas If and that value invariably augmented with time
and progress. Such a method of evaluation and such
a concept of value, therefore, might easily lead to
over-valuation and it might stimulate

boom' prices

of land— inflation.
8* ran cost of obtaining capital must not exceed the
revenue to be received therefrom* Ph«t Is, the Incame
derived from the capital must be adequate to meet the
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fixed semi-annual interest and current costs*
Besides, there should be enough funds available
by the time of the maturity of the bonds to redeem
the obligations in full

plus other costs involved,

irrespective of the amount received at the time of
the sale of the bonds*

In other words, the bonds

mast not be sold at too great a discount and with
a rate of interest which is excessive*
S* The date of maturity of the bends must be distant
enough to permit the funds to yield a revenue in the
meantime*

Irrespective of the fact that bonds are sold

at a low rate of discount and with a small interest
rate, it will not be profitable to obtain this cap
ital if there is little time given for it to yield
an Income*
4* The capital obtained from the sale of bonds must not
exceed the needs of a community*

Appropriate capital

funds foster business activity and development, en
courage an increase in land valuation, and accentuate
a general rise in prices*

Sxcessive capital for

credit purposes, however, may be expected to foster
speculation and may cause inflation*
5* Ho theory or principle can be expected to operate in
practice if there axe flagrant abuses and Intentional
circumventions*
limitations
to*

Buies, regulations, restrictions, and

are intended to be abided by and adhered

Good, sound, and honest management is essential*
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Ho Institution should be permitted or encouraged
to prostitute end violate laws pertaining to it,
the specifications guiding its behavior, and the
limitations restricting its operations*
The succeeding chapters reveal in part the information
necessary to formulate some conclusions pertaining to the
soundness of mortgage banting, although they should not he con
strued as presenting adequate material to disprove and reject
conclusively the theory and principles applicable to prop
erty banks In general •

Conclusions that may be drawn from

the ease studies that follow apply to the specific experiences
la Louisiana and not to all mortgage banking experiences* Only
in so fhr as it is possible to give a deductive analysis of
the general principles can it be permissible to venture into
a broader generalization **°
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The theory and principles described in this chapter
ere based on the manuscript material of the three banks
studied in the next three chapters*

CHAPTER III
THE CONSOLIDATED ASSOCIATION OF THE PLANTERS OF LOUISIANA

The creation of the Bank of Louisiana in 1324 was of
considerable assistance to conmaorcial endeavors, but inad
equate for the agricultural needs of the State* About four
and a half per cent of th© State's population were engaged in
soaneroe of some sort*1.

On April £1, 1617, Judge Dominick

A. Ball of the United States District Court for the Louisiana
District rendered a decision which broke the Fulton-Liv lugs ton
£
monopoly of steamboat trade on the Mississippi Hirer*
This
m s seven years prior to the famous case of Gibbons vs, Ogden *
On account of this decision steamboat traffic brought a rapid
increase in New Orleans comneree*

From 1821 to 1825 commer

cial exports for the State had increased from 17,272,172

to

^There were in Louisiana by 1620 some 153,407 inhab
itants, of which 6,251 were engaged In commerce* (V* Debouchel f
o p * olt*. p. 139.

Z

The Hon. J. Fair Hardin discusses this decision of
Judge Hall on the case of Heirs of Fulton and Livingston, cit
izens of New York vs* Henry Shreve, citizen of Kentucky, In
an article in the Louisiana Historic© 1 Quarterly (October,
1935, pp. 822—829) •
3
S. A* Caldwell, "The New Orleans Trade Area," Bureau
of Busjaeas Research, Bulletin No. 1 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
state’ university Press, 1936) , p. 3*
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fl£,S3£,9£4,

and to this increased commerce the Bank of

Louisiana turned most of its attention, thus leaving agricul
ture without an adequate supply of banking facilities* It was
ffclt, therefore, that agriculture needed more financial en
couragement, and that such encouragement would further
increase exports.
CHART A
EXPORTS FROM HEW QRil ANS, 1821 to 1827

Tears

Domestic

4 6,907,599

1821
1822

7,303,461
6,769,410
6,442,946
10,965,234
9,048,506
10,602,832

less
1824
1825

1826
1B27

4

$

Foreign

Total

364,573
675,184
1,009,662
1,483,874
1,617,690
1,235,874
1,126,165

i 7,272,172
7,978,645
7,779,072
7,920,820
12,582,924
10,284,380
11,728,997

Alexander Trotter, Observations in the Financial Posi
tion and Credit of Such of the States of the North American
Union as have C ontracts d~Pubiio Debts TNew Yoikand London:
Longman, Orss, Brown, Green, and Longmans* 1839), p. 393.
SIbld.
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Sugar had been introduced In Louisiana as early as 1744
by the Jesuits from St. Domingo,
tured as early as

and it had been manufac7
1794 by Etienne de Bore. Nevertheless,

sugar had not come to be of* great importance in Louisiana
until after the introduction of steam power to operate the
sugar mills, the first of which was introduced by Mr* Coiron
in 13££*

The early engines for the manufacture of sugar, how

ever, were very expensive* They had to be imported (through
A. Gordon, S* J. Forstall and Company) from England at a cost
of about f IB,000 per engine. Later they were manufactured in
9
this country at from 45,000 to &6,000.
Not many planters,
therefore, could afford to make such heavy expenditures; but
those that could did, and soon they were reaping handsome
10
profits, which motivated a financial plan. The scheme called
for State assistance*
A

Joseph Y*allace, The History of 111inois and Louisiana
Under the french Rule (Cincinnati: R. C. Glarke, 1893), p.
£97; Alcee Fortier, op* clt* * Vol. Ill, p. 228.
7
Albert Phelps, Louisiana, a^ Record of Expansion (Bos
ton and New York: Houghton-Miff lin, 1905), pp~ 199-200; W* C.
Stubbs, "Sugar Products in the South,” in The South in the
Building of ^a Na tl on, op * cit *, pp. 184-197.
Rightor, op* cit. » p. 668.

9ibia.
10

C f . Niles Weekly Register»

Vol. XXXV,

p. 355.

43

CHART B
PRODUCTION OF SUGAR CANS IN LOUISIANA
18 S3-1836

Year

Tons

Year

1823
1824
1825
1626
1827
1828
1829

17,249
13,223
17,249
25,873
40,824
50,599
27,599

1830
1831
1632
1833
1834
1835
1836

Tons
42,700
42,000
40,243
41,980
57,500
17,249
40,24911

Cotton did not yield as high profits to Louisiana plant
ers as did sugar, but the profits from the sale of ootton were
substantial, especially with the ever-increasing demand for
eotton by the manufacturers ,***2

The cotton crop of Louisiana

exceeded 100,000 bales for the first time in 1824; cotton
sold for 23 to 25 cents a pound in New Orleans during 1825^3
a proof that cotton had profitable prospects.

^ Louisiana Sugar Cane Industry Year Book. 1929, p. 97.
Humphrey, An Economic History of the United
States (New York: MoGraw-Hi 11, 19 £7), p. 201.
L. Watkins, King Cotton, A H istori oal and Statistical Review. 1790-1908 (New York: I. L. Watkins ani Sons,
1908), p. 192.
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CHART 0
COMMERCIAL COTTON CR01S OF LOUISIANA, 1820-1837

Tear
1630-1
1831-3
1822-3
1623-4
1824-5
1825-6
1826-7
1827-8
1828-9

Bales
54,500
69,221
55,000
60,159
101,133
138,777
121,795
100,748
95,000

Year
1829-0
1830-1
1831-2
1832-3
1833-4
1834-5
1Q35-6
1836-7

Bales
106,207
117,743
89,062
121,580
156,857
186,238
164,617
243,77414

Both sugar and ootton oould be grown throughout a
large portion of the State.

Still more advantageous was the

fact that these two crops oould be grown interchangeably.
Furthermore, the cotton ginning mills could be turned into
15
Sugar mills without the need of incurring excessive costs ♦
Both sugar and cotton planters* therefore, strove to
obtain State assistance for the purpose of getting the cap
ital deemed necessary to develop their plantations.

Late in

1836, the farmers presented to the State Legislature a peti
tion, asking for relief from, the oppressive interest rates
charged for funds and from the shortage of available capital;
and this petition the Legislature presented to a committee

l^Xbld.. pp# 191, 194, and 195.
C. Stubbs, op. cit*, P* 190; and 1 • L. Watkins,
Op.pit., p. 193.
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for study. The findings presented were in the form of a hill
16
proposing that a Planters* bank be chartered*
A bill with the title

wAn act to incorporate the sub

scribers to the Consolidated Association of the Planter® of
Louisiana" was passed by both houses of the Legislature,
17
Sfereh 16, 1827.
The declared purpose of the act was specif
ically to help and protect the hard-pressed agricultural
groups, reduce the excessive burden of high interact rates on
money, and remedy unforeseen accidents which might cause ex
cessive suffering to these laborious and re commendable plant13
ers.
Organization of the Bank
According to the Act of 1827, the Consolidated Asso
ciation of the Planters of Louisiana was to be capitalized at
$2,000,000 to be raised by mean® of a bond loan. The stock
holders were to be planter® exclusively in need of capital,
and they were to be permitted to subscribe to uha brink*®
stock to a total of £2,500,000, each aha re being of $500 de
nomination. The shares were payable in mortgages on immovable
16

House Jour., 1827 {Fr.}, p. 28; and Sen. Jour. 1827,
p. 69. Mr. Pierre Landreaux guided the bill through the House
and Hr. Charles Berbigny through the Senate. Both these men
later took an active part in the af faira of the bank*
17lM. A.ota , 1827, pp. 96-lie.
CABfef, "Project of the letter to be sent to Stephen
Girard of iiiiladelphia" (Fr.).
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property, provided the lead wee in the state of cultivation*
fhe mortgages held by the bank, in turn, were to serve as aeeurity for the bonds to be Issued*

The bonds were to bear

five per sent Interest per year payable semiannually, and
they were to be Issued la equal series of 5, 10, and 10 years,
respectively*

The sale of the bonds was to be limited in price

to not less than 05 per cent of par

payable In New Orleans,

where the interest and principal were to be paid*
sale of these bonds

After the

the stockholding planters were to be en

titled to a loan, or credit account, on their stock

up to

one-half the face value of the certificates*^
the name of the bank as incorporated was "The Pres
ident, Directors and Company of the
of the Planters of Louisiana,**
fective until April 30, 1343*

Consolidated Association

and its charter was to be ef
Under that name it could buy,

receive, and possess all kinds of property, either movable or
inevable; and it could loan, negotiate, sell, grant, alien
ate, demise, and dispose of the same*

It was permitted, also,

to take mortgages and pledges, and to discount, according to
accepted banking principles on such credit and on such secu
rity as might be deemed advisable, providing the discounted
paper did not exceed in value the double of the capital*
The administration of the bank was to be conducted by
IS
■■dwr Aot£, 1087, Pp • 96—116
80
Ibid** section 7.
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seven directors elected yearly by the stockholders of the
institution*

No stockholder, however, could become a director

without being exclusively a planter, a citizen of the United
States, and an owner of a least ten shares bought on mort
gages Intended as a guarantee for the reimbursenebt of the
bonds *^
Dividends to the extent of the profits could be declared
by the company and deposited in the name

of the stockholders.

Before any dividend oould be declared, however, yearly reports
showing a detailed statement of affairs had to be made to the
government; and, furthermore, no dividends were to be paid
out until the expiration of the charter*

This provision was

intended to act as an added protection for the bondholders .22
The firm was not to charge more than eight per cent
per year on notes discounted or money lent out.

No more than

six per cent was to be charged on any loans or discount made
on notes at order, payable within four months after the date
of making.

These provisions were to guard the clients of the

bank against any unduly high interest charges .23
In order that the State Government might have some con
trol over the bank, it was provided in the law that a comptrol
ler for the institution be appointed by the Governor with the

^ljbld* * sections 6 and 12.
22Ibid*

, sections 12 and 13-

23Ibid*

* section 12.
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advice and consent of the Senate, and his term of office was
for two years* His duties were: to submit to the firm any
legal adtiee necessary to guide its operations, to report to
the Legislature from time to time on the state of affairs of
the bank, and to propose any legislation, if needed, to enable
24
the tetter end more efficient operation of the company.
Subscription in the bank’s stocks started on Ifey 1,
1827, and as soon as a thousand shares were subscribed an
£5
election for directors was held.
The directors then pro
ceeded immediately to undertake plans for negotiating a loan
through a sale of bonds, and they selected a committee to
prescribe ordinances and regulations for the institution.
The coKfiittee, appointed to advise on the means to ne
gotiate a loan, recommended the nomination of one or more
agents to act for the bank.
24

The loan, they suggested, could

Ibid.. section 18.

2b

GAHM, June 21, 1827 {Fr.}.
The election of directors
was held June 18, end Manuel Andry,Hon ore Landreau, Louis A l
lard, Zenon Roman, Manuel Alls© Jhsoalas, Trancois Insealas,
Xaeestlere Volant Labarrcmet were elected. They met in
the presence of Hughes L^vergne, comptroller who was appointed
by the Governor, on the 21st. They were sworn into office by
Judge Bermudez.
28
Ibid., June 25, 1827 (Fr.) The committee in charge of
ordinances and regulations did not present any rules until De
cember 16, 1828. Only a brief plan was offered by the committee
in charge of hegotiating a loan. And after their June 3C meet
ing, the directors did not assemble at ameeting, outside of
a single brief meeting in January, 1828, until March 3, 1Q28.
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be obtained in the North of the United States, In England,
or elsewhere, but they indicated preference for the United
States if it was possible*

The comptroller and the attorney

were to prescribe the exact terms of the loan project *27
The project that was presented by H. Lavergne, comp
troller, and C* Derbigny, attorney 9 contained two vague
plans: one was to authorise the agents to negotiate a loan
at par with five per cent interest, the other was that the
commissioners negotiate the loan at as low as ninety-five per
cent of par*

In either case, they were to attempt to obtain

the loan at less than five per cent if possible*
Obviously, if the loan was to be obtained in the United
States, the two plans were not too difficult to understand.
Selling the bonds at par with five per cent Interest would
naan, most likely, that the bonds would be sold at their face
value, or, as it was, $1,000 each, the bank paying interest
of $50*00 theron*

A sale of bonds at ninety-five per cent of

par would mean a sale at a discount of five per cent, or at
$950 for each $1,000 bond*

In both cases, the sale would be

at $950 per security*
On the other hand, if the bonds were to be sold abroad,
there arose another problem*

The question is, what did the

comptroller and attorney mean by parv

27Ibld..

June 27, 1827 (Fr.).

That question cannot be

so
answered at this point, but evidently

the intention wee to

leave vague the terms that would be acceptable by the bank
lu order that the agents might have a freer hand when they ne
gotiated with the purchasers of the bonds*
Accompanying the two plans were further instructions:
the payment for the bonds was to be mode in New Orleans at the
expense of the house or houses entering; into tlio contract; if
this payment was to be made in bills of exchange, the bonds
were not to be delivered until after the bills were converted
into redeemable money; and, furthermore, $ 50,000 in drafts
were to be demanded, if practical, for surety of the fulfill
ment of the contract or contracts entered into with the com-

gQ
pany for the purchase of the bonds.
Messrs. Lavergne and Landreaux were appointed agents
for the company to negotiate the £ 2 ,000,000 loan, and they at
tempted to obtain said loan In the various parts of the United
States and Surope without success.
According to E# S* Sparks, "The Private company was un
able to sell its bends probably because of the Lack of local
capital and foreign credit."

A more probable reason for the

failure of a negotiation, however, was that the bonds of the
institution lacked the appeal to entice capital.

£aibld■■ "Project of Instruction for the Negotiation
of the Loan^ {F r .) .
Loc* cit *. p. 84.
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Tke Consolidated Assoc let Ion m s

of ferine for sale

bonds which had maturity dates not very distant from the time
of issuance*

Those of the first series, for instance, were to

mature within five years frost the date they were to be issued.
They were act the kind of investments to attract Investors
who looked for an assured Iseosse over a relatively long period
of tine;

and they were not the kind of instruments that would

arouse the Interest of speculators who looked for a substan
tial profit from their investments in a relatively short time,
simply because the nature of the business did not land itself
to quick profits*

Furthermore, neither the investors not the

speculators could be convinced of the institutionfa ability
to obtain enough revenue from the loaned funds to effect pay
ment of the bonds at maturity*
Mortgages presented by the Stockholders served as the
sole security for the bonds.

Such collateral trust certificates

could not instill confidence with those investors beyond the
political entity where the bonds were issued*

These mortgages

did not appeal to the foreign creditors and Investors beenuse
the laws under which the mortgages were granted were different
from their own.

Furthermore, the creditors were not in a posi

tion to ascertain the value of the lands offered on mortgage
or the Integrity of the would-be borrowers.

Foreign creditors,

naturally, would insist upon a pledge from a better-known entity,
one they could more easily and less expensively call upon in
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ease or default.
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Pressure, therefore, was brought to bear In the Legis
lature by those Interested In the bank to hare the State
assist the bank

by Issuing bonds In Its favor.

The State

was asked to pledge Its faith to redeem and pay interest on
the bonds in the event that the private concern should fall
to do so*
Strong protests arose on such a proposal in both Houses*
however* In the House of Representatives a minority group
opposed the move and gave for its reasons:
1 • That the subject natter and provisions of the said
act, are not within the legitimate scope of legisla
tion; inasmuch as it is a mere contract by which the
State Is bound as security for a certain class or
description of citizens, to enable them to borrow
money for their exclusive use and benefit, without
any corresponding advantage to tha public, or ad
equate security against loss*
Zm Because it is a useless -nd prodigal use of the name
end credit of the State, for particular advantage,
which name and credit might be more beneficially em
ployed, in procuring funds for general improvement,
In which all portions and classes of the community
might partake.
3. Bees use by thus pledging the faith of the 3tate for
so large a sum., in the manner and for objects aforesaid, its means are diminished, and its credits are
exhausted for objects not public.
30

Had the bonds been bought, in case of default, the
bondholders would have found It necessary to take action
against the bank and force liquidation and collection on the
individual mortgages* 3uoh a procedure would have been
lengthy and expensive, wit:-out too great assurance that
their claims would be recognized and honored by the courts
and the laws of the borrcaver’s country and state.

4. Because 'the Institution created by the Act* to
which the act aforesaid, la a supplements ry, doea
sot In its nature, and the means provided for Its
administration * afford a sufficient guarantee for
its ultimate compliance with the contracts it is
authorized to make, or the acoampllshmant of the
ends proposed by it; and in oase of failure or
misfortune, the State will, in consequence of the
act, aforesaid, be oompromitted to an extent, much
beyond its means to meet; and the citizens in gen
eral, involved in great distress, and exposed to
great and heavy burdens, by reasons of an cot,in
the anticipated benefits of which they are not to
partake.
5* Because the passage of said Act has in the opinion
of these protestants, a direct tendency to infuse
r
..
.
d to embarrass it

The minority group in the State Senate expressed its op
position to the measure in similar terms, they voted against
the bill, they said:
1. Because we do believe it highly improper for this
body to pledge the eredit of the State to any body
of individuals whatever, it being out of the range
of Legislation, except especially required and di
rected by the people.
2. Because we believe that the security is insuffi
cient to protect the State in case of loss.
5, Because some of those who voted for the bill are
signers, and belong to the Association, and we con
ceive are interested, when our rules forbid any
person to vote oa any question in which he Is im
mediately interested.
4. Because the State has already borrowed two millions
of dollars, and the above act adds two millions five
hundred thousand dollars more, which w i n ga against
securing the credit of the State, and may put itgOut
of their power to borrow money in case of need.
Baton Rouge Gazette. February 16, 1828, and H ouse
Jour.. j^g&8 , p.
Sen. Jour., 1828, p. 28.
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Bespit* these protests, however, and despite the refusal by
the Governor t o affix his signature to the bill, an act to
amend the charter and t o assist the Consolidated Aeaocia*
tlcn passed, February 19, 18S8.
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The amended charter increased the bank's capital from
$1,000,000 to $2,500,000 and increased the stock authorizaties from $£,500,000 to $3,000,000, and the corporate life of
the bank was extended from June 30, 1842, to June 30, 1843.
According t o this bill, the State agreed to issue its own
bends for the property bank, and the pledge on these bonds
engaged the faith of the State for the reimbursement end for
the payment of interest In the event the bank failed to do so.
The bonds were Louisiana State Bends in favor of the Consoli
dated Ass Delation and they were secured by mortgages held by
the hank. All the State guaranteed was payment on the claims;
it acted as e co-signer; end its liability was contingent.
Stipulation was made in the act, however, that all sums
34
be paid and received in Hew Orleans.
For the privileges granted the State vm& given bonus
stocks in the institution to the amount of >1,000,000, on
which it could be granted a credit of $250,000 at the regular
rate of interest* Furthermore, the State was to appoint six
35
of the twelve directors*
33

La* Acts. 1828. Ho. 19. on. 20-36.
Ibid.

•KA--------

35

'

Under the original charter the corporation elected
seven directors and the Governor appointed tho comptroller.
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The new directors held their first meeting, March 11 ,
182S, and again resumed plans to negotiate a loan and form
ulate ordinances and regulations for tbe administration and
operation of the business affairs .**6

Mr. Felix de Armoa,

spokesman for the committee appointed to formulate plans for
the negotiation of a loan, presented two plans

for the pro

curement of a loan, both similar to the first two plans pre
sented a year earlier, and he proposed secret instructions
and letters of credentials for the agent to represent the
Institutions In the sale of the bonds.
The ordinances and regulations adopted for the con
duct of the affairs of the bank were specific and rigid. Only
the more Important rules are given at this instance, and in
an abridged form. The major ordinances establishing the
rules for the administration of the bank were:
1« Three stockholders, other than directors, were
to be selected each year to act as judges over
the election of directors.
2.

Notices of the elections were to be sent out thirty
days prior to the election and were to be published
weekly in two New Orleans papers for the month proceding the election.

CA3?T, ztitrch 11, 1828 ( i T r . ) . The six directors ap
pointed by the State were: Messrs. Villere, An&ry, Kaucher,
Bronaxd, Dupl&ntier, and
(record destroyed}. The six
elected by the stockholders were: Messrs. Lsndroaux,
Allard, Zeriegne, 1. Pascal©, Labarre, end Peschapelle.
37
Ibid.t and o f . . supra , p. 49.
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5* The Judges were t o report the results of the
elsetions to the president who was to a&tify
eaoh elected director to meet at the hanking
house the following February 1, at 11 A. M.
for the purpose of selecting a president•
Am The President, Directors and Company were to
have charge of all monies* notes, *md other mo
bile or Immobile properties.
5* Money and notes were to be received without retribu
tion and all deposits were to be remitted on de
mand*
6*

The properties offered for mortgage by subscribers
or others were to be evaluated by appraisers se
lected by the Direction. Each parish was to have
three such ap; raisers selected flora stockholders
or other planters within the parish. Their duties
required specific and detailed reports. They had to
submit the certificate of estimation as follows:
re the undersigned____________ and stockliold
ere of the Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana , residing in the Parish of ________
and being Commissioners named by the President, Direc
tors* and Company of said Association for the purpose
of apprsising the properties of said parish* do swear
and affirm to the best of our ability and conscience
that we estimate the property of ___________________
inhabitant residing in this parish at the aura of
&
conforming to the detailed information following, viz.:
_______ ___ Arpens of land facing the Mississippi
Hiver with a depth of ___
arpens, of w h i c h _____ _
only are today under cultivation in
»
the surplus being standing timber or brush. The quan
tity or arpens we estimate in total to be _________
worth
....... ......... ........ .
$►___________
______ Slaves of both sexes* named
{name and ago) estimated In total at.
_______ _
_________ Horses and _ _ mules at ... * y____________
Pairs of oxen a t ...........i __________ _
Buildingsestime ted in total at ....... 4 I ~ ^ __
Total of our

a p p r a i s a l ........ *

___________

We further declare that our above appraisal was
made In full to the best of our ability and knowl
edge.
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In faith of all the above , we have sworn anti af
firmed our ordinary signature in the presence of the
honorable
, Judge of this parish, the
.
day of the montk' of
, in the year
(signed)

___________, commissioner
. c o m is si oner

(Judges * signiture)
7. 5a oh year the president was to transmit to the commis
sioners in the parishes th© total of the profits and
the percentage of increase in dividends for each
stockholder* The commissioner was to transmit the In
formation to the stockholders*
8*

The method of transferring the stocks was to be ac
cording to specification. Ihen a stockholder wished to
transfer his stocks, or part of them, he was to present
to the Direction the titles of the properties of the
plantation owner whom he wished to have replace him
for the total or part of his stocks. If the Direction
judged the securities offered In exchange to b© equal
in all respects to those of the stockholder wishing to
seke the transfer, It was to accept the mortgage pre
sented and free the former or part of It. In the case
of dividends under such a transfer the transactors
were to roach an agreement between thence Ives if pos
sible, in order that the Direction might make the
transfer of a h dividends to the new stockholder. If
such were not done, however, the old stockholder was
to be credited on the books for the dividends declared
up to that time, and h© was to be paid these dividends
at the time of the expiration of the charter.

9. If a stockholder were to find it necessary to suspend
payments cm a loon obtained the Direction was to ad
vise a means of assistance if possible. If such were
not possible the Direction was to obtain a reim
bursement of the funds by means oompatable with the
interests of the stockholder. The dividends due the
stockholder until the time of the suspension, If any
should have been declared, were to remain on deposit
with the bank of the Association until the expiration
of the charter to be paid then to the rightful owner
of the stocks after the Institution had been paid all
due it on such stocks. The Cashier was to announce in
the newspapers the number of stocks to be tran®fared
by roe eon of default, avoiding, If possible , to men
tion the name the Individual Involved.
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10* Proper precautions e w e t o be t&kea in the printing
and issuance of paper notes In order to avoid
fraud and counterfeiting.
11. In vice of the fact that the bonds ware to be reim
bursed in three equal payments, maturing June 30,
1853, 1838, and 1843, it was to follow that the loans
osstde to the stockholders were to be repaid in yearly
instalments of such portions to effect the full pay
ment within the maturity limit of the bonds. For In
stance, a loan and® prior to June 30, 1829, would be
payable in 14 instalments, one priox' to June 30, 1Q30,
but after June 30, 1829, in 13 payments, etc. “
The regulations for the cenduet of the affairs of the Consol
idated Association dealt with: officers, elections of officers,
and the duties of officers; hours of business, method of busi
ness activity, and the terms fear engaging in business transac
tions; discounts, terms of discount, and tho types of paper
acceptable on discount; credit, procedure for obtaining
credit, and the collateral acceptable for credit, et cetera.
A few Important rules rerc;
1.

Kach subscriber had to be a planter ana had to fur
nish mortgages on plantations in the state of cul
tivation and producing revenues, slaves and animals
attached thereto, and the buildings that were part
of the estate* /s soon as he was directed by the
Direction the subscriber was to furnish; the title
of properties, the certificates declaring already
existing mortgages, privileges, or other incum
brances, the certificate of estimation, and an
affidavit declaring:
(1) if he was e curator or executor,
{£) if he was or had been married,
(3) If he had wedded a widow having one. or more
children,

GASB, December 16, 1828 (hr.).
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(4) if he was or had bean a curator or executor
for a minor,
(5) if ha had bean a curator Interdict or absentee,
(4) if, without being a curator or executor* he had
taken part in the administration Of the affairs
of a minor, either interdict or absentee,
(?) if he was or had been a witness of some executor,
curator, or other administrator appointed by law,
(8) If an inheritor, if he had been given charge by
inventory of the affairs of some succession,
(9) if the property he wished to mortage came from
a succession partition,
(10) if the property carra from a succession where the
legacies have not been paid,
(11) if he was a creditor or debtor of the State,
a company, or corporation,
(IB) if he was or had been guar&ien ox' the acquired
properties by legal authority.
B. When the subscriber had fulfilled all the require
ments specified and had met the approval of the Direc
tion he was to receive stock certificates properly
endorsed by the officials, and immediately a credit
account was opened for him, equal to one-half the
total face value of the certificates in his name.
This credit he could make use of at will.
3. Wcn-subsorlbers wishing to obtain a mortgage loan
from the bank had to follow the same rules and pro
cedure pertaining to mortgages as a subscriber
desiring to purchase stocks.
4« Payments on mortgage loans by non-stockholding
planters or other individuals was to be by fifths
from year to year until the end of the fifth year,
when the mortgage would be cleared.
4* The Association was not to charge more than eight
per cent per year on loans and discounts, not more
than six per cent on any loan or discount made as
a pay-to-order note payable in four months from
the date the loan or discount was made, and no
simple note payable or mortgage note oould be dis
counted without the concurrence of three-fourths of
the Directors present. Interest was to be deducted
an all loans and discounts accorded to stockholders,
plantation owners, or other individuals.
6*

The total of notes discounted to effect payment of
notes or other obligations due the Association was
never to be applied for other uses.

7* All negotiable instruments offered for loan or dis
count and drawn by individuals residing outside the
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limits of Mew Orleans were to be mad© payable to
the Consolidated Association, or to some domicile
within tixe limits of the city corporation*3®

negotiations with Baring Brothers
After receiving instructions frooi the new Board of
Directors and with new facilitating provisions for effecting
a lean, Mr* lavergne once more set out on his mission to sell
40
beads* He spent a few months
in the financial centers of the
Berth— New York and Philadelphia**but his attempts to 3ell
the bonds were unsuccessful* Xhus, upon advice from Mr* Stephen
Girard, a Philadelphia financier, he proceeded to England*
In Liverpool, Mr* Lavergne contacted Mr* Alexander Gor
don, associate

of the business firm Gordon and Forsta 11 and

Company of Sew Orleans* The two went to Baring Brothers and
Company of London and had several interviews and conferences
concerning the loan* At first, Baring Brothers did not sp*
pear to be too Interested, but finally an agreement was
. 41
reached*
A contract for the sale of &he bonds was entered into
with Messrs. Baring Brothers and Company, September 13, 1826*

M ...Ibid.
— ...
From April to August, 1828*
41
Consolidated Association, Miscellaneous Letter's
(hereinafter referred to as CABL), La vergne to Andry (Pres*
ident of the Consolidated Association), Liverpool, August 14,
1S28, end Lend ox, September 6, 1626 (Fr.).
Ibid* * Load cm, September 14, 1828,
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What tiie exact terms of the contract were cannot be
ascertained definitely because the contract, or its duplicate,
has not been found amongst the records and manuscripts of the
43
Consolidated Association.
Nevertheless, there is enough
supplementary information available to enable one to formu
late the approximate terras of the contract.
From all appearances the stipulations of the contract
entered Into between Baring Brothers and the Consolidated As
sociation were not unfavorable to Baring Brothers. They, Baring
Brothers, were to buy outright in their name 750 bonds of
£1,000 each at the rate of ninety-five per cent of par; pay
ment was to be made in London after delivery of the bonds pur44
chased.
The remainder - 1,750 bonds - wus to be consigned
to this same firm in sum of 50,000 pounds sterling

or in

amounts of 250 bonds - from time tc bine after March 1, 1829.
3seh consignment, however, was to require the consent of this
London house. The payments of interest and the principal on
all bonds were to be at the sterling rate of exchange, 4
shillings 3 pence on the dollar, the American mint ret© of ©x45
under the bimetallic standard established in 1791.
43
In the "Report *1 rendered by Alexander Cordon and
Hughes Lavergne to the Consolidated Association, September 23,
1326, it is stated that a duplicate copy of the contract is
ettached. Ho such copy was found, however, while conducting
the research. The re may be a copy among the papers of the
Bering Brothers Collection deposited at the Federal Archives
of Canada, Ottawa, but the writer did not go there to invesIt was later agreed to make payment In Hew Orleans
as specified by the charter.
4 ^The current rat© of exchange was 4a. 6d.
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All l & j n a t s by the C one oXldated Ass oo let ion were to be made
effective at the counting house of Baring Brothers In London.
Itar selling the bonds of the Consolidated Association* Baring
Broths re were to receive a oossalsslon of two per cent. For
handling the affairs of the bank, Baring Brothers were to
collect a fee of one-half of one per cent, that is, the fee
was to be charged on the sterling amount of die interest paid
and the reimbursements made* By the terms of the contract
Bering Brothers did not bind themselves to sell the Louisiana
bonds of the Consolidated Association at a specified rate;
they reserved for themselves the right to sell the bonds at
any price they deemed proper in order t o protect themselves
46
froa possible loss.
Furthermore, they woulu not agree to
have their name included on the Louisiana bonds
47
sired by the bank.

%as de-

The fhTorableneas of the contract for the Consolidated
Association is not quite evident. The Comraisaloners, however,
attempted to make it appear advantageous in their letter and
43
report of the negotiation.
When they first notified the
46CAJCL, Lavergne to Andry, London, September 6, 14, and
23, 1838 (7r.).
^ Xbld.. Baring Brothers to Hughes Lavergne, London,
September 15, 1828, viz.:
take this ojport unity of repeat
ing that in declining to adopt the form or endorsement sug
gested by you for the security of the Association we were infinanced by the absolute necessity which wo felt imperative
wader any novel mode of introducing our names on the certif
icate likely to attract notice as contrary to the usages to
which mercantile people are accustomed.
vergne to Andry, London, September 14,
1828, and September 23, 1828 (Fr.j.

Association concerning the contractual agreement, they
stated that the organisation would receive $235,000 on Decem
ber 51, 1328, upon remittance of $500,000 of bonds, $427,500
an February 15, 1329, tapes another $450,000, and roughly
$$22,000 a®. March l, 1829, from the consignment of $250,000
Mere bonds.

That was a lose of $65,500 on a million dollars,

bat the Cornells si oners felt that the amount would be less
because part of tbs payment by Baring Brothers was to be in
the f e n of credit upon which the beak could draw bills of
esrehange, and bills of exchange were then sell lag at eight
per cent premium. Bills of exchange would give the bank a
profit of $17,760, according to the calculations presented,
and that would reduce the loss to $47,740; a million dollars
of bends would, therefore, yield 19 52,260, a sale at above
49
95 per cent of par. Unfortunately, however, the Commis
sioner misrepresented the contractual terms and reported
antieipated returns not borne out by the contract. Had they
reported properly, the results might have been more favorable.
The detailed report on the oontraot Indicates still
more favorable c end it ions for the bank.
means

Through dubious

the Commissioners made it appear that tie bonds sold

at better than 97 per cent of par and that the consignments
were at above par. First, they established the results of
their negotiation* on the assumption that the average

49

pLbld..

September 14, 1828 (Fr.)*

maturity period for the bcnAs was a Ins and a bftlf year a bew

w

« * -third of the hoods matured In June, 1833, one-third

JUae, 1858t and one-third, Jims, 1643, or four end a half,
miss and a half, and fourteen and a half years, respectively.
3ecoedf they based t heir calculations on the assumption that
the differanee between the contract rate of exchange and the
current waxiest rate

of exchange wan in the favor of the bank

Third, they included in their calculations fictitious profits
arising oat of losses.
On the sale of $730,000 of bonds to Baring Brothers,
the net loss reported was $33,313, and the general reasoning
employed to get this figure was:
(1) To sell $750,000 of bonds at a five-per-cent dis
count is to incur a loss of 1 37,500*
(3) This loss of $57,500 is insaediate; therefore, the
bank is deprived of its use for nine and a half
years. If the bank had this sura at its disposal, it
could earn six per cent compound interest for nine
and a half years. Thus, the loss is really $65,£52*
(3) To pay for the $750,000 will require only $708,333,
because the rate of exchange is 4s* 3d, and not
4s. 6d.
(4) To pay $703,333, however, will require the purchase
of bills of exchange and these sell at eight per
cent premium, a cost of $56,667 ( slo. $54,666.64 }•
(5) This cost of $56,667 for the purchase of drafts,
nevertheless, occurs only in nine and a half years;
in the meantime, that sum can be used by the bank
to yield a revenue at six per cent compound interest,
thus giving a sim of $98,604.
(6 ) From this $98,604 revenue mu3t be deducted the cost
of purchasing drafts. The net revenue, therefore,
is $41,937.

«’ W

tl» t m i « at $41,987 and the „
leea et $66,888, the final net loss is #85,316.80

that loss on #760,000 neast a sale at about 97 per eent of per,
interest payable in Fngland.
Qa the consignment of the $ 1,750,000 of bond a, the cal
culations were ssore weird and were made to show the sale et
per. the Commissioners deolded that £1,750,000 la beads sold
et 95 would yield |l,662f500.
eeialgned bonds

Since in all proba bllity, the

would be M i d in fourteen or fifteen mouthe

after March 1, 1829, the period in between would permit the
last 1tut 1 m . to gain $133,000 on the $1,662*500 in bills of
exchange which it could drew against Baring Brothers and
could sell on the market at eight per cent premium*

This

profit would reduce the loss Incurred from the sale of the
consigned bonds, figured In the same manner as for the £750,
000 sold outright, to sale the final net loss negligible,
51
or what would amount to a sale of bonds at about par*
The distortion of facts and figures presented by the
Concessioners on the results of the negotiations are obvious,
first, the basic assusptlon of an arithmetic mean feu* pur
poses of computing compound interest is a serious error; it
docs not give the seme result as compound Interest computed
on the separate series of bonds as would be done on an

9° m & *, September 23, 1828 (Fr.)
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actuarial derivation*
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Second, the a asuiapt ion that the

ooatxact rate of exchange of 4 shillings 3 pence in compar
ison with the current ® rket rate of exchange of 4 shillings
6 pence gave the institution a 3 pence advantage is a mis
statement • t!hlle It may appear that there is an advantage.
It must be remembered that the British were buying the bonds
in t e n s of the sterling, not dollars, and the Interest and
reimbursement was

to be paid in England in sterling, not

dollars* Talcing a contract rate of 4 shillings 3 pence in
stead of 4 shillings 6 pence meant that the Baring Brothers
were overvalueing the sterling and not the United States
money: they were taking the value of the American monetary

38
The mathematical difference can be illustrated as
follows:
Compound interest on the three separate series on
the $1 basis:
compounded at 6# for 4| years =
1.3048
$1 compounded at 6$ for
years as 1*7535
jl compounded at 6% for 14% years
» 2*3565
$3 on the three series totals

5*4148

Compound interest on an arithmetic mean on the &i basis:
$3 compounded at
for
years =
5*2305
The difference amounts to *1543 on the £3*, or *0314 per $1,
or $5*14 per $100* The error is over 5
Thus, for the
compound calculation on the £37,500, which is £65,315,
a sum must be added of £1,927*50*
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unit to bo worth loss than a dollar* not equal to a dol§s
lay.
Third* the assumption of profits ho tag realized from
an eight par cent premium existing on bills of exchange is
•creating" profits where profits do not exist*

Because it

wee necessary to purchase bills of exchange to effect a re
imbursement,

and because in all probability these bills

would hare to be acquired at a p rami tan, it did not moan that
the bank could enjoy an income from the expense in the mean
time*
The calculation of a loss of $37,500 on the $750,000
bead sale was correct because the contract price was spec
ified at 95 per cent of par* Unfortunately, however, par did
53
Tbs British monetary system is:
the pound sterling (£stg)
~
4 the shilling (s)
=
• • the pound sterling
=

so shillings (s)
12 pence (d)
240 pence (d)

Most likely the Commissioners presented their argument by the
following method:
Under a ratio of |1 = 4s 3d ■ 51d .".
the pound sterling, or 240d ~ $4,70588
Ohder a ratio of $1 = 4s 6d » 54d -**
the pound sterling,or 240d = $4,44444
But the above calculation is cm the assumption the $1 = $1,
The case in question is different in that it takes the ster
ling as fixed instead of the dollar: the dollar is the variable.
Thus, if they say that their pence is worth $.01960 in American
aoney { $l*51d) when it is known to be worth $,01337 on the
market,
{ $l*54d) they are overvalueing their pence by $.00123.
The way to find the value of the dollar under such conditions
is to find the cost of the three additional peace® required,
figured at the current price (3d x $.01337), and it is $.05511.
The dollar, then, is worth in terms of the sterling $, 94489—
94/ cents*
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aot mean tha face value of the bonds. Par meant the oonver-

a i m rate of money between the two countries

based on the

defined legal metallic contents of each standard monetary
salt. Therefore, a conversion of English sterling Into Amer

ican dollars meant another loss of approxImtely ■£39 ,569,
despite the Casenlaslcnera* calculations. Thus, the immediate
lose suffered was more nearly $77,069. This loss can be in
creased by figuring that the bank had to forego the opportu
nity of reaping a revenue on the sum

at the rate of six per

oent compound interest during the period the bands were out
standing, but it must be calculated an an actuarial basis.
Nevertheless, to take the $56,667 draft purchase expense
that occurs at the time of the maturity of the bonds

and to

figure that that amount was earning the bank a six per cent
compound interest for the entire period prior to the pur
chase was a misleading and erroneous profit fabrication,
which should not be considered as reducing the loss incurred
from the sale.

Furthermore, to say that the bank would have

to reimburse but $706,533 on the $750,000 was a reversal of
the facts. According to the terms of the contract

Baring

Brother* were loaning $708,333 and were being repaid

$750,000.54
The calculations pertaining to the results to be ob
tained from the consignments of bends are erroneous and false
also. The Ccommissioners employed the same methods as was em
ployed in the sale in order to obtain favorable results* More
over, they added a profit to be realized on the consignment
because the payment by Baring Brothers for the bonds was to
be in drafts, and drafts sold at a premium. The fl ,750*000
consigned bonds at 95 per cent of par would yield #1,662,500

S4Tbe computation of the Commissioners, evidently, was
The market rate of exchange of the dollar in
terms of sterling was 4 shillings .6 pence*
Therefore: #750*000 at 4s 6d (54d) is equal to
40,500,000d*
Hie contract rata of exohang© was 4 shillings
3 pence. Therefore: #750,000 at 4s 3d (51d)
is equal to 38,250,000d*
The difference is 2,250,000 d. Therefor©:
2,250,OOGd c onvert ©d into dollars on the basis
of the current rate of 4s 6d is equal to #41,667*
Therefore, if the bank sells #750,000 of bonds
and is paid in sterling, the bank receives
40,500,G00d. On the other hand, th© bank will
pay back this loan in dollars converted Into
sterling at the rate of 4s 3d, or at #41,66?
less than the amount received (#750,000 £41,667 « 1708,333)*
The actual terms of the contract did not state anything of
that nature. Instead it 3aid that the dollar was worth 4a 3d
and, therefore, only 4s 3d would b© given on each dollar of
tbs bond loan* Further, it said that the loan would have to
be repaid in sterling, and for each dollar of debt 4s 6d
would be required.
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pimm eight per cent on the letter suoif or $133,000, and by
figuring the compound Interest as was don© for th© sal© of
bonds* the net loss would be reduced to almost zero—

a con

signment sale at par.
Without going into the details and the false calcula
tions pursued by th© Commissioners, however, it is possible
to approximate the eost of the sale and consignment of the
bonds. First* there was the discount of five per cent on
$2,500,000, say #125,000. Second, there was the loss result
ing from the differences in the rates of exchange, say
$150,000. Third, there was the two per cent commission charg
ed sat the negotiation, say $50,000* Those three items alone
amount to $325,000, and a loss of $325,000 on $2,500,000 is
thirteen per cent, or a negotiation at 8? cents on the dollar.
This, however, does not Include the interest lost while the
funds were in transit; it does not include the eost of pur
chasing bills of exchange; and it does not include the nu
merous other items which could be brought into the picture.
Before going farther with the negotiations, the theory
concerning monetary standards should be examined in order to

get a fuller understanding of th© terms of th© contract.
Boom might say that Baring Brothers were very exacting in
their terms, that they were taking advantage of th© borrower*
Close analysis, however, will show that they ware not to be
blamed for the position they took, and that they could have
had the same terms in effect without having a c ontract with
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specifications thereof. The American monetary standard
entitled and g&ve them those terms.
England was on a gold standard* Th© emit of mousy w s
the pound sterling (fc stg.) and it contained 113*0015 grains
of pare gold.
The lilted states had a double standard, gold and sil
ver* or shat Is eoamoaly called a bimetallic standard, That,
a l t of money was the dollar, which contained either 24.75
groins of pure gold, or 371,25 grains of pure silver; and

that ratio m s decided upon after a close observation of the
relationship of the prices of the metals on the market: their
relative values as ccemodities in the state of the arts. Based
on the existing market ratio,* therefore, the mint ratio m s
established by law at 1 to 15.
On the market, however, the ratio does not remain fixed
because prices are not fixed. Without government or other in
terference prices fluctuate freely to adjust theus elves to the
supply and demand, Soae times the individual prices move har
moniously when general prices fluctuate as a whole; sometimes
the prices of individual commodities fluctuate without an ap
preciable fluctuation In the general price level; and some
times individual prices fluctuate at the same tin© that the
general prices fluctuate. To the advocate of bimetallism,
however, the prices of gold and silver were not viewed from all
those angles. If the price of silver Increased, that of gold
decreased, end vice versa:

end the reason was that if there

7Z

was a greater demand Tor silver, for Instance, there would
he lees of a demand for gold, and the price of silver would
rise while that of gold would fall* a s the price of silver
Increased, people would be willing to purchase less of th©
met&l and would look for another metal - gold - which would
serve the purpose at a lower price, the principle of sub
stitution* The net effect would be to decrease the price of
silver and increase the price of gold*

^Compensatory action”

is the term used to describe th© behavior;

and because of

the

compensatory action, the relationship of thetwo metals

has

the tendency— in the long run— to remain th© same, not

only within a nation, but throughout the world*
Thus, when it was
silver to gold was 15 to

found in 1791, that the ratio of
1

on the world market, it was thought

that if established by law at the same ratio, both metals
could be used as a standard, without difficulty arising from
divergence of the two ratios*
According to the theory, If th© market acute changed
from that of the mint, compensatory action of the two metals
would re-a lign ^h© ratios. For Instance, if the market ratio
went to 16 to 1, gold would leave the mint and go on th© market
because it was undervalued at the mint* Once on the market,
however, this gold would increase the supply and thereby reduce
the price until the market ratio returned to that

of the mint*

Compensatory action would, in the long run, keep both ratio©
in line; and because of this, a monetary unit based on b.t-
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astalllsm would h&vs a double footing.

It would not be a

monetary unit with one metal as a base at one time and on an
other one some tine later, depending on the fluctuations in
the market prices of the metals used as a standard.
There are several hypothetical assumptions and imny
important emissions to the above theory, but as far as the
logic is concerned, the conclusions are sound in theory* The
economic historian, however, sees the flaws* One of the as*
sumptions is that ell the nations have a bimetallic standard.
To limit compensatory action to one nation is erroneous.
There is some compensatory action between gold and sil
ver on the world market and there is a definite ratio between
gold and silver*

Nevertheless, habits and customs change,

and because of this— among other things— the ratio does not
remain fixed. There is, also, some compensatory action be
tween the mint and the irarket operating through the compen
satory action of gold and silver on the market* But the mere
fixing of a ratio by a government, even if based on the ex
isting market ratio, does not force the world market ratio of
the two metals to remain in harmony with the legal ratio es
tablished by one nation* That would be possible to a greater
degree only if all, or a majority of, th® nations adopted a
bisMBtalllc standard with an identical ratio, or approximately
so* To repeat again, there is some compensatory action, but
it is not national in scope. It applies to practically all
goods for which there are substitutes, end it applies
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everywhere in the world* It Is not necessary to have a legal
money standard for It to operate* its operation, however,
does not guarantee a fixed relationship *
Be it as it say, the fact remains that soon after 1791,
the market ratio ohanged, and the coapersatory action did not
bring it back in line with the established mint ratio» The
market xatlo changed from that of the mint; it went to some
where around 15*5 to 1 and 16 to 1, and remained there for
forty years or so*
That meant that at the mint you were given 24.75
grains of gold for every dollar* On the world market, however,
more than one dollar was offered for the same number of grains
at gold* SaharaUy,it was profitable to buy gold from the mint
and sell it on the market.
Let ns see what a Britisher could do* His monetary unit,
the pound sterling, had 113*0016 grains of pure gold* The ster
ling rate, or par, of exchange, therefore, with the dollar on
a mint basis was in terms of the metallic

contents of both

units; that is, the pound sterling eq.ualed $4,444, or to re
verse it, the dollar equaled 4 shillings Z pence* On the
market, however, his pound sterling was worth 44.71* or there
abouts, or the American dollar was equivalent to 4 ah ill ings?
6 pence* That, on the surface, may appear to be

to the ad

vantage of the American, but let us examine closer.
Suppose a Britisher cams here and bought something.
If he obtained JB4 .76 grains of gold fron his bank, or govern-
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meat, and presented It to the American mint In order to get
dollars to pay Tor the goods, he would lose money because
1
®

could get the same amount of dollars on the market for less

grains of gold; he could get approximately &1.Q6 on the mar
ket for the cams amount of gold* Where did he buy the dollars?
naturally

it m e

on the market.

fhe analysis so far, howaier, still leaves a wrong Im
pression, the impression that gold was flowing into th© coun
try. Siat was not the case, and soon we shall see why.
Assume that the 'Englishman has a choice of paying sil
ver or gold aad hie choice was silver. If he took 371.£5
grains of pure silver to the mint, he received one dollar;
*

but If he took the same grains of silver to th© market to ac
quire dollars, he could not get one dollar for that number
of silver grains; he would receive about 94 cents for his
571.25 grains of silver. Naturally, his choice was to get the
dollar at the mint. Nevertheless, that was not th© roost prof
itable thing he could do.
Suppose that he goes to the mint with his silver as Il
lustrated above, but instead of getting dollars he obtains
gold. He would be given 24.75 grains of gold for 371.25 grains
of silver, and he could take the gold to the market and get
about 11.06 for It. As far as the Englishman was concerned,
such an undertaking was the best of the choices

If he had to

use metals to effect his payments. Nevertheless, It was not
necessary for him to use metal, or to go through the process,
to get the same results*
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Th* British buyer had starling notes backed by gold
"England m s

can a gold standard— and anyone who possessed

the money could get gold for it as defined by law. Therefore,

he did not hare to gat gold to buy dollars, but he received
more than $4*44 for it. If the Americans did not grant him
approximately #4*71, he could revert to th© gold transaction
and gat that mush* The effect, therefore, vm n that th© Eng
lishman received one dollar*s worth of goods for 4 shillings
9 pence.
The question now arises as to what happened to the
American buying in England; the picture was reversed* If the
American offered to pay #4*44 for a pound sterling fs worth
of goods in England, they would not accept it* They would
demand that he pay them approximately #4.71, or 115*0016
grains of geld* The American, of course, found it cheaper
to ship the grains of gold because he could get them at the
United States mint for #4*44* The effect of this was that
the American paid 4 shillings 6 pence

for on® dollar’s

worth of goods* If the American owed a dollar debt to Eng
land, he had to pay 4 shillings 6 pence to cancel It*
Baring Brothers did not have to specify the two rates
in the contract in order to get them, our monetary standard
did that* The rates were stated to remove doubt, and to avoid
possible losses from changes of the market ratio of the two
metals and the two monies*
The Commissioners who were negotiating with Baring
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Brothers understood th© principles involved— at least in
part— and showed s<xm of their effects under a camouflage.
Because it was easy to be misled by the complexity of foreign
exchange , however, they chose to obtain an erroneous conclu
sion

in an effort to falsely convince "someone” that they had

made a sale of the bonds at a good price, a price that was sd5S
ventageous to tbs bank.
Th© Board of Directors approved Stir. I.avergne’s negotia
tion and seemed well pleased.
Several months after the contract was signed

the Asso

ciation attempted to have Baring Brothers revise some of the
provisions. It asked to eliminate the clause requiring the re
imbursement of the capital in Ragland. It wanted to eliminate
the provision whereby Baring Brothers to protect their ad
vances reserved the right to sell the Louisiana bonds of the
Association at any price. It made known its de&Ire to have
57
the funds from the sale of bonds before March 30, 1830.

®®The matter of par and nmrket rate of exchange was a
serious problem for many States. Some States repudiated their
debts on the ground that par had been violated by the banks
and the Xngllsh financiers. Alabama, Mississippi, Florida,
Michigan, Illinois, etc., had many long and bitter debates in
their Legislative halls on this very point* The general feel
ing was that they had been Ttrobbed.”
There was some Justifi
cation for that feeling too because most of their bonds were
sold after 1834 when the mint ratio was changed from 15 to 1
to 16 to 1, and because English financier© continued to hold
to.the 1791 par of exchange after It was changed by law in
this country. That, however, does not apply in the present
ease because the date is prior to 1834.
^CABM, December 2, 1828 (Fr.).
®^CABL, Aiidry to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, April 7,
1889 (fr.}«

Baring Brothers, In answer to the desired changes, remarked that an alteration la the provision for the payment
of capital and interest in England
bonds their principal merit

would take away from the

which gave them an advantage

over all other American stocks* The con tract rate of exchange
payable In London made the reimbursement a fixed sum, which
no variation of the market rate of exchange could effect. Any
ohsnge would decrease the price of the bonds on the market*

50

They made no comments pertaining to the other desired changes
but they consented, hcwever, to confirm anything that would
be agreed upon with Mr. Thomas Baring, their representative,
while he was in America

to complete the minor points that
RQ
had remained unsettled in the September contract.
Learning of the arrival of Mr. Thomas Baring in the
United States, the Directors passed a resolution authorizing
the comptroller (now Mr. Thomas Forstall) to propose to Mr.
Baring to allow a further advance

of one hundred thousand

pounds sterling on the consignment of a proportional amount
of bonds and to reiterate the demands already made to Baring
60
Brothers and Company.
60
It should be noted that the contract rate of ex
change was based on the 0,3. monetary law of 1791, where the
£stg equaled $4,444. The government had undervalued gold,
therefore, it was on the market at somewhere around &4.8€> to
the 1sti* but it fluctuated. It was not until 1634 that the
gold was redefined.
S&CAML, Baring Brothers to An dry» London, toy 29, 1829
6QQ&8M, June 20, 1829 (Fr.).
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Dfoea approaches, however, Mr* Thomas Baring refused
to consider the proposals on the grounds that he was not ac
quainted with the mission at Mr* Allard who was than in New
York trying to negotiate another loan on the American market*
Moreover, he considered the September contract no longer in

^

force

61

because of this a t t e m p t * negotiation*

The Directors of the Consolidated Association felt
rather indignant about Mr* Baring's letter and statement that
he considered the contract terminated.

They challenged his

contention that the terms of the contract had been violated*
The President made a strong plea in defense of the "Actions of
the Association."

He even agreed to recall Mr* Allard and re

voke his powers on August 15 if he had not bean successful in
negotiating a loan by that time.
63
promise*

Mr* Baring would not com-

Mr* Thomas Baring would not accept the Association's
proposal to recall Mr* Allard and to terminate negotiations in
the United States*

He refuted, also, the Directors' arguments

cm the contract not being abrogated by Mr* Allard's negotia
tions.

Tor him the contract had ceased to operate.

He wrote:

... the situation of my house with regard to
the Association has much to tend with, and it Is in
my opinion that as long as the idea of a negotiation
61
CAML, Thomas Baring to Allard, Saratoga, N* Y* ,
June 8, 1829 It t . F T
®®CA.HL, Andry to I. Baring, Hew Orleans, July 11,

1829 {7r.).
®®Ibid.. Andry to Allard, Hew Orleans. July 11,
1829 (FT.?.
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is the United Stated continues to be entertained
It would be neither prudent* advantageous* nor
creditable for my house to continue its advances
on the bonds of the Association* There is* to my
mind* a thinking difference between the situation
of agents of the institution with the knew ledge
that its Interests were Intrusted to us without re
serve or division and that of supplying its wants
until others carae forward* and at th© very moment
when It la in negotiation with other capitalists.
•.
The termination of the contract* however* did not mean
that Baring Brothers wished to cease all other negotiations
with the bank.

They simply wanted the additional consign

ments at more favorable terms. Therefore* as a substitute to
the former contract* Mr* Baring offered a plan for a new ne
gotiation if the Association wished to cease its negotiations
with other capitalists* namely:
That Baring Brothers and Company shall buy for
their account from the Planters Association of Louisi
ana* a further number of five hundred (500) Bonds of
tlOOO each* say 168 of the first series* 166 of the
second series* and 166 of the third series* of the
seme tenor and f o m as those already sent to London
and with the dividend coupons not yet due; to be
delivered to them in London, and for which they
shall pay the drafts of th© Association at 60 days
sight at tie London rate of eighty-eight per cent
(80$) • Therefore* the Association may draw $19©
sterling against each Bond and the sum of £
99*000 sterling against the whole. The Association
shall take proper care that the Bonds corresponding
to these drafts ar° in th© possession of my house
at the time of the appearance of these bills. In
ease the Board of T)1rectors accepts this offer* I
authorize the Association to commence their drafts

^ b l d . . T. Baring to T. Forstall* Montreal* August 3*
1829 {translation) .

01
when they think proper, and to continue them to the
amount of ninety-nine thousand pounds sterling, upon
the oompllanoe with the above conditions* Should
the Board contemplate any change in the date of the
reimbursement of the first series, it will then
send to my house, 250 of the second series and 250
of the third series; but you will see that* should
that not be the case, I am ready to meet its views
by taking a full proportion of those of the short
date. v:hsn you deduct two per cent (2$) commission
for the sale, which the institution would have to
pay for consignments, the price of 88> corresponds
with its limits of 90/6; the only difference being
that the interest from June thirtieth, Is Included
in our purchase, whilst, upon the sales from the
Association, it would not be included in its
limits, I suppose
Xn the event that the organizatian did not accept his
offer, Thomas Baring authorized the Direction to draw on conslgmasnt another fifty thousand pounds sterling after they
had received notice that the previous bonds had been sold* If
it did accept, however, he expected to be accorded terns
similar to those of

the former contract, in order to dis

pose of at least part of their existing purchase. Vhat he
meant by this was that the Association not draw on Baring
an
Brothers until January 1, 1630.
This new offer was Iter more unfavorable than the Lon
don contract in many ways.

First, it did not grant any of the

institutionfs demands, not even the request that all the bonds
be sold before March 30, 1830.

Second, it dia not po Trait the

Direction to draw on consignments as freely as before.

Third,

65
Ibid.. (translation).
ftA
I bid. . Saratoga, N. Y. , August 15, 1829 (F r .) ,
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It only agreed to taka 500 more of the Associationfs bonds,
and at 88 par cent of par, including interest coupon©— 7 per
cent lass than the London contract• It is evident, therefore,
especially in the light of the analysis of the first contract,
that Baring Brothers had a very profitable affair in the new
contract* For the Association, however, it meant a sale of
bonds at 77 or 78 per cent of their face value.
The Directors of the Consolidated Association met in
an extraordinary session in order to study the offer and they
decided that such a negotiation would cause a loss to the
Association of $12,650 on $500,000 of brads* As they figured
it, it was a loss of 8 and 7/10 per cent from the former price*
nevertheless, they felt it necessary to accept the offer in
order to satisfy the stockholders*
The first sale on the bonds consigned March 1, 1829,
took place November 15, 1829, the date when Be ring Brothers
68
announced the disposal of ^64,000 worth of bonds,
the price
they claimed to be at about 97 per cent of par.
later, November 20,

Five days

they sold & 156,000 of bonds. By November

28 they reported that they had sold the entire amount of th©
69
$234,000 of bonds that had been consigned to them; their re
port shows the sale in 21 days.

The 234 brads yielded a cred

it for the Association ox M9,673* 9. 3., ox* approximately

67CABii, September 17, 1820 (Fr.).
bjbl

GAML, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Asaociation,
London, Novemoer 20, xt*29.
69
Ibid* * November 20, 1629.
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#280,771, the interest coupons being included as part of the
sale.
The question arises, naturally, Why did the bonds not
sell until November and why were they sold so rapidly when
they did start selling?

The answer, most likely, is that

bonds were not offered for resale until after the details of
the eon tract formulated by Thomas Baring were completed, and
70
then only to chosen clients•
That, however, was not the
only answer. A letter on December 11, 1889, gave the clue:
The present time appears indeed so favorable
for the realization of the remainder of your stock,
that we eezmot but feel stronger regret than ever
that your charter should have prevented your trans
mitting your Bonds without previous payment in ?Iew
Orleans, and should thus, perhaps, from unavoidable
delay, prevent your profiting of these advantageous
circumstances. If, however, we understand the acts
of your legislature rightly, the Association has
new completed the security required by the State
and is at liberty to send its bonds forward without
previous payment, and in such a case we should reocssnend the board of directors to transmit the re
mainder as soon as possible for sale here
Innocent as their stateaaent may appear, it is of great signif
icance. Baring Brothers, by selling the £34 bonds were meeting
the eharter requirements of the Association. As a result they
70

The reason for making such a statement is that Bar
ings wrote, saying, ’This stock does not take well with the
public, and It is only among our immediate friends that w©
have been able to place any...." (CkiuL, Baring Brothers to
Consolidated Association, London, October 20, 1829).
71
G&ML, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association,
London, December 11, 1889.
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would not have to mate Immediate payment for the 500 bonds
they were about to receive as agreed to in the August c m traet • Furthermore, if this token sale met with the security
required by the Association, th® entire amount of the bonds
could be shipped to them without immediate payment being
necessary•

It would be nice to receive interest on bonds

without having to pay anything until they were sold*
the London ~oaey market, which Baring Brothers claimed
so active in November to permit the sale of bonds, continued
to be very active throughout the winter months. After the
rapid November sale, however, no bonds were sold until March
72
82, 1850*
Thereafter, there was a regular market for the
bonds at a good rate until July. In April the Louisiana bonds
were at 102* By May the bonds were up to 103 and 1/2*

And

in June they reached the peak of 104*
An explanation Is necessary, however, on the hifh price
of the Louisiana bonds of the Association* Some indications
have already been given

in the discussion of the contracts,

but there remain a few points to be cleared*

The simplest

problem to be cleared in an attempt to understand per as in
terpreted is that the quotations at above or below par

in

cluded the accrued Interest on the bonds from the dote of
issue*

Thus if customer

B

bought a bond In June , 1850, he

bought the bond with all the Interest coupons attached* On

72
Ibid** March 22, 1830
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the coupons from th© date of issuance, January, 1829, to
X\m&, 1830, interest was eollectable even though
the comer of the bond before June, 1830*
be willing to pay more for the bond
est due.

B

Naturally

was not
B

would

if it included the inter

The price he paid for it should not be understood,

however, as the price from part the amount paid for interest
should be deducted from the price to ascertain the variation
froci par.
A solution of what constitutes par is not too satis
factory. Par, you will say, is th© face or stated value of
the bond*

In other wards, #1,000 must be received for every

1 1,000 bond sold to he repaid at #1,000 in order to have a
par sale* Thus, if the bonds had sold in this country, par
would have been relatively simple to ascertain; the currency
received would have been the same as the currency paid*

Ne

gotiations, however, were with a foreign country. Two dif
ferent currencies were Involved* Furthermore, to complicate
matters more, the United States had a legal currency system
which was not In harmony with the existing state of affairs
in monetary exchanges* On a gold and silver basis as defined
by the Banking and Currency System, the British pound ster
ling was equivalent to #4.44, but on the current market rate
of exchange there was an advantage in London4s favor of as
much as 10 to 14 per cent; the pound sterling sold at some
where around #4*86.

Under such condition, was the mint rate

of exchange or the market rate of exchange parV
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What constitutes par is discussed in the Reports of
03

the Illinois General Assembly, 1839*1840.

That body gave

the different interpretations of par as viewed by the Amer
icans and the rnglish.

In the United States the argument fol

lowed Albert Gallatin in his "Considerations on the Currency
and the Banking System of the United States” i
Being obliged to refer to the rate of exchange,
it must be recollected that what Is universally
meant by par is the promise to pay, in another
plaoe, a quantity of pure silver or gold equal In
weight to the quantity of pure silver or gold con
tained in th© coins with which the drawer of th©
bill of exchange is paid*7*
In England they followed a somewhat different reasoning. Forttms’s

Epitome of the Stocks and Public Funds „

the stand

ard of the London Stock Exchange, considers par as "the equiv
alence of a certain amount of standard currency of the one
eoimtry In the standard currency of another. 1 That was differ
ent, however, from th© course of exchange. Course of exchange
"is the current price between two places ... which is always
fluctuating, being sometimes above, and sometimes below p&r,
according to the circumstances of trad®, and the consequent
ty e.i

debt due to or from one country, from or to the other.*
The Americans were talking of a difference in the metal con
tents

of the currency. ¥hat they considered a difference of

exchange the British conoid©rod a course of exchange.

To

_

E. Adams, (ad) Th© Writing of A lbert Gallatin, Vol.
Ill, p.. 270.
75Cited in R. 0 . licGrone, pp. olt,.

,

pp. 7-8 (footnote).

a?
til* British th* par was th* practice that evaluated the
pound to he worth $4*44 in American money* Actually, it was
worth 8,73 per oent more under coinage laws he for© 1630,
and 9,46 end 5/8 per cent more after 1830, because of the
change in the iaarket ratio.

The American interpretation gave
76
way, however, to that of the British*
Both sides contin
ued to argue, but "per*1 resained a question, with tbs Eng
lish imposing their interpretation.
The Consolidated Association Louisiana Bonds continued
to be sold by Baring Brothers throughout 1830, although with
less activity because, as they claimed, there was a deprea7?
sion in the London money market.
May, 1831, however,
waited the end of sales by Baring Brothers of the consigned
bonds of the Association*

It appears from the records that,

from 1329 to 1831, Baring Brothers and Company sold a total
of f1,882,000 of bonds consigned to them by the Consolidated
78
Association*
It will be remembered that Baring Brothers had agreed
to purchase on their account a total of 750 bonds by their
79
first contract and 500 bonds by their second.
Had such
6* Myers, The Hew York Money Market» Vol. I,
p. 72.
The t, stg* was approximately $4.71 prior to 1830
end |4.86 afterwards*
^CSAML, Bering Brothers to Consolidated Association,
August 6, October 6, and 30, November 6, 13, t«n& 29, Eeoeiaber * and 14, 1650.
78
Ibid* * and reports on sales from November 28, 1829,
to Mhy 30 " 1851.
79
Supra, pp. 61 and 80.
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agreement been fulfilled and had Baring Brothers resold

$1,882,000 or consigned bonds, the sum of bonds outstanding
would haws been over $2,500,000. It must be assumed, there
fore, that Baring Brothers purchased less bonds for resale
than they tad agreed to and accepted more on consignment
than was specified in the contracts.
From the date of the contract until May, 1831, the Con
solids ted Association paid $62,500 ( % 14, 132 stg*) every
June 30 and December 31* That meant that it was paying the
semiannual interest on the entire $2,500,000. Not all the
bends were outstanding, however, during the period from Jan
uary, 1829, and May, 1831. Bonds were oassigned to Baring
Brothers from time to time after notice was given by Baring
Brothers that the previously consigned bonds had been sold;
the Consolidated Association

did not have use of the funds

from the sale of bonds during the entire period*

Baring

Brothers were receiving, therefore, the accrued interest on
the bonds it had in its possession for sale plus the interest
on the bonds which tad not yet been delivered by the Consol
idated Association; it was receiving interest on instruments
which tad required no disbursement whatsoever*
It is conclusive, therefore, that the bonds sold at s
discount which exceeded the legal limits specified by the
80

This conclusion is derived from the letters and doc
uments . Cf * * CABL, GABM, CAML.

m
State Legislature. The actual lose sustained by the sale
and consignment of beads m s sot revealed in the bank's rec
ords, but it appears that the loss m s as high as twenty
per sect,if not more. It m s

very difficult to ia&ke a profit

fro* capital the eost of which was so excessive*
Sarly Operations of the Bank
The Consolidated Association opened for business in
January, 1629, two years after the original charter was grant_ m
ed.
The sale of BOO bonds to Baring Brothers, effective
December 30, 1828, gave the bank a credit account with the
London house upon which it could grant loans to its custom-

fhe first stock-lean was granted on February 19, 1329;
end during the several ensuing days, a number of loans were
unde. It appears, however, according to the records, that the
majority of the early loans were granted to the directors,
61

The original charter was granted March 16, 1827,
and provided that it was subject to change by Legislature
if the bank did not commence operation by January, 1828.
Thus, the charter ceased t o be effective when the bank
failed in its first bond negotiations. The Act of February
19, 1628, h owever, revived the charter with the repeated
stipulation that the bank open for business by January, 1829.
( 5 la. A m , 44. Consolidated Bank vs. The State of Louisiana.)

eltSSSSL. p . 6 1.
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State officials, and others Influential In getting the in
stitution organized,83
The funds for the sale or consignment of bonds were not
too plentiful and quick in becoming a w liable for credit and
discount purposes* The contracts with Baring Brothers did not
enable the Consolidated Association to build an adequate
credit account with this London firm.

The terras of the con

tracts did not provide for large enough consl^ments at any
one time to permit the Consolidated Association to draw large
amounts of drafts cm Baring Brothers, For example, besides
the £300,000 of bonds sold, December 31, 1828, and besides
the aale of 450 bonds more, February 15, 1329, there was the
consignment of approximately 250 bonds, effective March 1,
1329» That meant that the New Orleans firm had but $1,000,000
available for loans and discounts until Baring Brothers fur
ther consented to accept additional consignments from the Asso
ciation* Really, the amount available was less than 41,000,000
because the bonds were taken at a large discount. That

was a

paltry sum when there were stockholders in the amount of
§2,000,000 calling for credit, not to mention the innumerable
amount of commercial paper that was offered for discount, nor
the numerous other property ovmers desiring mortgage loans.
BS'phe first loan was to J* B. Moussior who read th©
first project of a loan and who was influential in the rela
tions with Baring Brothers. Th© second loan was to 0. P©»ohapelles, a director of the bank and a member of the Legis
lature, et caters. (Of. GAML, February 19, 20, etc. 1829).
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Sons idea of the early operations of the bank Is
available from the first financial report compiled by the
officials, a so-called "Statement of Affairs .

was drawn

as of June 16, 1829, five months after commencing operations,
and it £ 1*08 , or claims to give, the sources of funds and
their application, viz.:

Statement of affairs of the Association as of June 16, 1829
Basel*e
Loans an Mortgages
Bills discounted:
to tbs State of In.
to H. L a n d m a n
to the stockholders an
credit:
to Mr* Le Bret an $1,500
to Mr. Herrang
6,900
to Ur* Vi H e re
6,000
to Mr* Reman
10,200
Bill disc ora tod to Mr.
Allard, e o m i m i o n e r of
the Association now
absent.
Bills discounted to
various small deraanders

4754,000.00
$55,000*00
15,000.00

24,600.00

2,200.00
90,554.22

187,154.22

Discount on the 4750,000 of Bonds

37,500.00

Balance in the hands of Baring Brothers
and Company to meet the payment of the
expenses of discount on the remittance
of 234 bonds, and on the Interest due
on the remittances

53,866.72

General Expenses

25,393.41

11,037,694.36
(continued an next page)
® * ( m , June 16, 1629.
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AeUw
Capital: 984 bonds of $1,000

$984 000.00

Discounts

64,683.98

J w s i w t t oft letters of exchange on B.B

13,634.75

Surplus In the Bank

7.25
11,062, 268.96

to deduct the passive account

1.037.896.33
24,371.61

add Notes discounted to be
collected*
Total at the disposal of the
Asa Delation

90.334.22
$114,705.03

*Thic la the amount of Bills discounted to the various small
dsraanden Included In the pass Ire account.
Statement of Income and 'Expense (for period ending June 16,
1829)
General Sxpanse
Interest on 964 bonds

$25,393.41
22,166.72

Gross loss

$47,560.13

Deduct Premium an letters of ex change

13.634.75

Add Discrepancy*

33,925.40
24,371.61

Total loss

$ 58,297.01

*ffce discrepancy Is the difference between the passive and
the active In the Stateioent of Affairs.
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Loans on stocks and mortgages, according to the re
port, amounted to $754,000; discounts granted totaled
$167,154*22--an extension of loans and discounts to the
s*ss of $941,154.22.

This extension of credit was rendered

possible through the bank’s acquisition of capital funds;
end the report states that IL& Institution obtained the
funds by the sale of 964 bonds of $1,000 eaoh, the dis
counting of notes with other institutions to the amount of
$64 ,623.98, and the sale of bills of exchange on Baring
Brothers at a premium amounting to $13,634.73.

The loss

sustained during the period u r s calculated to be $58,297.01.
A simple glance at the report, however, suffices to
convince one that the procedure of calculation employed m s
erroneous and somewhat fictitious. An analysis based on the
report at its fee© figures would be in error and of little
practical use. About the only things obtained from the finan
cial statement are: some vague idea

of what transactions

took place during the Interim mentioned; and a strong im
pression that the officials of the firm desired to con
ceal true facts.
It would be best to ignore the financial statement
entirely If a more reliable source of information could be
found, but the other records of the company do not afford
more reliable information, especially during the early
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aenttis or the bank's existence*

It will be necessary,

therefore, to accept, in part, the Information presented in
the so-called "Statement of / ffairs*"

From this statement

It may be possiible to ascertain more factual data upon
which to base a more accurate analysis*
The first thing to consider is the title: "A Statement
of the Affairs of the Association as of Juno 16, 1829*1 is
misleading*

The report resembles more

statement of funds

derived and applied"; and we shall review it as such*
The purpose of the statement of funds— sources and ap
plications— is to analyze the changes which took place in
the business during the accounting period* It is to study the
changes that took place in the assets and liabilities during
the interim in order to trace the sources and application
of funds*
The value of the statement lies in the analysis* The
increases and decreases of specific items, when considered as
a whole, give o picture of the state of affairs* It is quit®
vo 1u r ble in indicating the amount and nature ol* the working
capital and the cash on hand or In the banks, as differentiated
from the profit or loss realized during the period.
The basis of a statement of funds is the comparative
ftK
The accounting employed by the company v;aa very
crude and incoraplete* For example, the entries for early
loans were made on the letters of application, not on any
particular set of books*
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balance afewt.

The information necessary to make the anal

ysis of Tends received and applied is obtained by first pre
paring a comparative balance sheet. Otherwise, it is very
likely that there will be no statement of funds.
The company officials did not derive th©ir data from
a comparative balance sheet, howovor;

instead, they pre

sented their ”fabricated statement” with the appearance of
a balance sheet.
The 984 bonds that were sold or consigned to Baring
Brothers did not yield $984,000, but considerably loss. Be
sides the deduction for the discount of five per cent, there
should have been the deduction of the loss suffered by the
c cm tract rate of exchange.

Under the contract terms with

Baring Brothers it was agreed to aocept the dollar as being
worth 4 shillings 3 pence, instead of the current rate of
4 shillings 6 pence;
cents on every dollar.

that neant a loss of approximately six
The total loss on account of exchange

cm the 904 bonds was about 4 59,000.
When the Association discounted #54,523.98 of Its
notes with other institutions, it had to sustain a loss of
three or four thousand dollars

since the current discount

rate was approximately six per cent. That should have been
included in the statement.
*
Q^Cf.. J. B. Taylor and H. 0. Miller, Intermediate
Accounting (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1933), VolT T f , p F* 75-85.
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Incomes derived from operation should have been added
to the funds derived section of the statement.

Earned interest

and earned discount are funds received, and if they had been
so included the picture of the bank’s situation would have been
improved*

Even then the funds at the bank’s disposal would not

have been $114,705.83 as claimed*
Some very dubltable accounting Is found in the "State
ment of Income and Expense."

Under the assumption that the

so-called "Statement of Affairs" was a balance sheet, the
officers figured that the excess of credits over debits meant
a deficit and, therefore, they added it to the net loss; that,
however, was not the serious deficiency of the income and ex
pense statement.

The real trouble was that only a fev; of the

expense Items were included*

If all items were included, the

expense account would total approximately $17 5,000 to $176,000,
if not a o r e . ^

The income items, on the other hand, would be

rare than the inclusion of the profit made from selling bills

Q?The records are not complete enough to permit a con
struction of a statement of Income and expense, but a few
additional facts serve to show that the loss was greater
than given by the officials:
For example, some of the expenses were:
General Expense
$25,393.41
Interest
22,166.72
Discount on 750 bonds
37,500.00
Discount on 234 bonds
11,700.00
Loss on par of exchange
59,040.00 (approximately)
Commissions on interest
110.83
"
Commissions on bonds
19.680*00
"
Total expenses
3175,590.96
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ef w t o i g n a t a premium, W m b
to M

m

k o o a a would not be large

the expense amount to site the reported

Imam of $&8»£97.01.

It is safe to say that the income

afeauld hare teen approximately |8$t0C0,

An accurate profit

aad loss statement, therefore, should indicate a lose at s o w
figure a bore one hundred thousand dollars, not $58, £97 *01.
as reported.
Why should the of fleers of the Consolidated Associa
tion m a t to present such misleading information'?

It may be

that the officials were ettempting to create credit under the
guise of transferring credit•

It may be, also, that they were

attempting to conceal the heavy losses sustained by the com
pany, especially in the sale of bonds.
During the year 1850, the funds from England were slow
in being made available to the bank, and the demands for cred
it by the people were great, therefore, the Consolidated Asso
ciation sought a loan from s o w domestic money center.

The

direct ore resolved at their meeting of December 1, 1850, to
negotiate a loan of £800 ,000, reimbursable in one to two
years*

This sum,they claimed, would partially satisfy the
36
demands made cm the Association up to June, 1650.
A New fork bank supplied the Association with the loan
desired, but tbs extra 4E00,00C received for purposes of grantla, credit m s

soon depleted.

Tha directors, therefore, seeing

®®afcIIK, December 1, 1330 (Fr.).
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ft shortage in funds and reeling that the tank was approachlag rapidly the #2,000,000 limit specified in the charter
re let Its to mortgage loans, appointed a comnittae to inves@9
tigate the advisability of stopping loans on mortgages.
HT« Lavergne, the spokesman of the committee, reported that:
(1) The institution had a balance of *14,800 left
from the #200,000 loan procured on drafts accord
ing to the December 1, 1830* resolution.
(2) The loans on mortgages and credit to other borrow
ers amounted to #2,118,395, or 4118,395 above the
limit specified la the charter.
(3) On the #213,626.11 owed the Association by Baring
Brothers there was coming due interest of 1176,700,
leaving a net of 1 36,926.17 owed the institution by
Baring Brothers.90
The directors, therefore, decided to order a suspension on new
91
mortgage loans until a new order be issued.
As an additional restriction, they passed a resolution
requiring all borrowers on mortgage to pay interest from the
first day their credit was opened instead of at the end of
the period, that is, interest payable in advance. The direc
tors claimed that this would be a means of preventing the loss
of interest that resulted in the lapse of time which generally
flowed between the day credit was granted on the mortgage and
the time at which the horrowert’ paid interest. To the borrow
ers, however, the policy meant that they had to pay Interest
s®Ibidt, February 7, 1831 (Fr.).
*u'lbld.~. Februery B, 1831 (Fr.).
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before they had had the use of the credit.

AO

Interest payments an bonds had been met regularly up
to 1831. During the latter part or 1631, however, the Associa
tion had difficulty in meeting the interest. The company
could not obtain drafts because of their scarcity and It
claimed that it could not ship

on account of a t o m s .

The President, therefore, asked Baring Brothers to grant the
Consolidated Association an "open-credit" account of twelve
to fifteen thousand pounds sterling. This credit, he stated,
mas to be used in the case of absolute necessity for the pay93
ment of interest.
Baring Brothers refused the request and
reprimanded the officers for not being able to prepare ade
quately to meet foreseen obligations. They agreed, however,
to be of service in the event of unexpected disaster.94
make matters worse for the bank,

To

the sugar planters wore

unable to pay the interest on their loans on account of a
crop failure*

In spite of these adversities, however, the

Association was able to meet its payment

on time.

In 1832 conditions were even more acute. Postpone
ment on stock and mortgage loans increased considerably over
those of the latter rart of 1831. M a n y of the discounted
92

Ibid.. February 19, 1831 (Fr.).

93
GAHL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
Hew Orleans, September 3, 1831 (Fr.).
94
CA24L, Bering Brothers to Consolidated Association,
London, October 22, 1Q31 (Fr.).
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Botes had to be extended*
than ever.

Letters of ©xchane were scarcer

The June Interest payment to Baring Brothers had

to be made in specie, and at quite an expense to the company.®*5
The matter of reimbursement of the five year bonds
was a vexing problem which the directors had to face in 1852*
The maturity date of these bonds was June 50, 1833.

With the

bills of credit scarce, the shipment of specie expensive, and
the planters unable for the most part to meet the interest
and installments on their loans, something had to be done to
avoid default*

The President of the Association, therefore,

asked Baring Brothers for edvice and offered a moans of re
imbursement, which was to make payment through drafts drawn
by the Union Bank against the Baring Brothers.®6
The London bankers at first accepted the proposal, but
a short time later rejected it*

Nevertheless, the Association

proceeded to acquire drafts on Baring Brothers from the Union
Bank and they delivered them to the London house as means of
effecting the reimbursement of the maturing five-year bonds.
Baring Brothers,notwithstanding their rejection,accepted the
drafts for the purpose of retiring the company’s obligations.

9&CA3L, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
New Orleans, April 6 and 15, 1832 (Fr*).
96lbid., April 15. The Union Bank vms another prop
erty bank then in the process of organization, e n d it was sell
ing bonds to Baring Brothers.
(Infra* Chapter IV, 192-222).
97 c a ~L, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association,
London, June 8, 1032, February 3, and April 13 through June
29, 1833.
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daring Brothers, however, were not sufficient

to effect the complete retirement of bonds. It was necessary
to Ship $40,000 in specie to make up the deficiency.

90

By 1834 the financial situation of the bank was ftpproaching & critical stage • The sugar crop of 1333 was almost
e complete failure,

furthermore , there was a shortage of

specie, or rather a flight of specie as soon as It was acquir
ed, and a scarcity of commercial paper except at high premi
ums. A.U the basics of Hew Orleans felt the pressure. The Con
solidated Association along with other banks decided, there
fore, to relieve the pressure through cooperative action.
It was resolved and voted by the Association of Bank
Presidents in Hew Orleans that notes discounted could be ex
tended with the sense security at a reduction of ten per cent
every sixty days until December, 1834; they jointly requested
the Bank of the United states to have the New Orleans branch
extend Its discounts

on il,000,000 of local banks* commer

cial paper to expire February 1, 1834, or to grant loans not
99
exceeding five per cent of the capital of the banks*
98

GAUL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,

Hew Orleans, itoy IB, 1833 (Fr»).
99

GAHL, J. 3. Hulin (Mechanics ana Traders* Bonk) to
Consolidated Ass oc let I on, N*ev Orleans, February 24 and May 26,
1834; H. Lavergae (then cashier of City Bank) to Consolidated
Association, Hew Orleans, Hay 26, 1034.

102
f N Consolidated Association's l o m s

resulting from

the adverse economic conditions were considerable. Furthermore,
the

reimbursement of bonds, which Alexander Trotter claims

100

eould not be absolved by profit,

did not permit recupera

tion from previous losses.

Also, there was the $100,000 loss
101
from osbezslesient by Mr. Provost, cashier.
The "Statement

Of Affairs of the Association as of September 9, 1834,”

gives

10®

an estimate of the loss, and possibly an underestiraate, vis.:
See next page for Statement.

100
Alexander Trotter, Observations in the Financial
Position and Credit of Such"of the 3tates of the' ¥ortii Amerlean Union as have~Centreeted Public Peb t s T Kew York and
London; Longraan, Orxae, Brown, Groen, nnd Longmans, 1839),
p. 283*

101

GA2L, Hugh Xavergne (new cashier of Consolidated
Association) to Baring Brothers, Hew Orleans, June &4,
1834.

10fi
GAML, September 9, 1834.
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September 9, 1654

Profit

teas

Metes and Bills discounted
#426,360.66
Steak Leans
1,133,038*61
Leans on Mortgage
378,565.75
Bill* Resolvable
60,500.00
Foreign Bills of Exchange
State of Louisiana
Motes and Bills discounted, protested
Protest Account
Baring Brothers, London
CseBdLasioB of Interest, London
P real urn on Letters of isxehaiige
Suspense Account
Expense Account
Reel Estate
D a by Local Banks
Cash:
Specie
67,764.87
Loeel Bank Motes
460.00

$118,260.72

2,COE,530.08
51,202.93
5,036.85
129,768.33
179.50
52,600.57
3,178.65
3,437.13
50,264.77
2,081.33
65,413.00
8,200.50
67,764.87
2.559.979*17

>1**1 (bonds outstanding}
tcount Account
Dividends los. 1 end 2
Circulation
Due to Local Banka
Deposits

” ~2700£7655700
95,119*17
160,000.00
75,550.00
145,000.79
80,309•21

The profit and loss item of #118,260.72 appears to hare

been attained by simply subtracting the total considered as
assets from the liabilities; there was no statement of profit
and loss to substantiate the amount claimed as loss.

The as*

seta must also be looked at with scrutiny; it is permissible
to capitalize certain costs, but not operating expenses. By
removing the "water" there would have been a far greater loss
than reported* Bad the officers arrived at a loss of approx*

104
la»t«ly two oar three hundred thousand dollars, they would
have been more ace urate*

IQS

With these losses being evident, the officers, never
theless , declared two dividends, amounting to #160,000. It is
difficult to see how the bank had ever really earned uny
profits.
Financial conditions improved somewhat in 1835.

From

Mexico, silver dollars had been reoelved through the sale of
drafts on London, end the cotton crops for the year had been
good.

104

Furthermore, the Consolidated Association had been

able to obtain some relief from the shortage of conirerclai
paper by obtaining $50,000 in credit from the Union Bank of
BTew Tort: and $50,000 from Messrs. Prum, Olard, King and Compa
ny of Mew Tort to operate on the domestic exchange. From
Thomas ftiIson and Company of London it was granted a running
credit of SO,000 pounds sterling uncovered for n?'n©ty days,
or approximately $100,000 on which the bank probably received
105
#89 ,000 in bills of exchange at the rate of 4 shillings 3 pence*
at #300,000, the lose would have been an under
estimate* For fnstance, the cashier, Mr. Lavergn©, admitted _
to to ring Brother* that the Ass eolation did not expect to real
iz© anywhere near the full value on the #139,768.553 of protest
©d notes ana bills discounted, nor did it anticipate a full
payment of principal and interest In arrears by the mortgage
owners. G&HL, August 7, 1834, and February 31, 1835 .(Fr.).
10w . ,
Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
Hew Orleans, February 21, 1835. The letter states that sugar
prices were 5 end 1/4 cent a a pound and th t cotton was con
sidered almost as good as coined money. (Fr.)

105Ibid.

105
A * Stat* « a

gtttreoa toward tha Association, too.

Seeing

the difficulty the institution had faced in meeting tha fiveyear beads, the Legislature passed an Act on March Si, 1835,
to extend the maturity dates of the 1838 and 1843 bonds until
106
Fwne, 1848, or to a nearer date if convenient.
The 3tate was still more generous In 1836. On March 7
the Legislature provided for the issuance of another #1,000,000
in bonds to be secured by mortgages or ixrssiovable property sit107
uated in Mew Orleans and suburbs, Lafayette, and Carrol ton.
The ml 11 ion. dollars of the "1048

bonds was issued May

1, 1336, and the Consolidated Association entered into a con
tract with Francois dailzardi and Company of London for the
sale of bonds. Once the contract was signed, however, the Gov
ernor refused to deliver the bonds Issued by the State in the
bank93 favor. He interpreted the Law of 1836 to require an
equivalent retirement of the old bonds of the State for the
new.

In spite of the strong pleas by the directors of the

Association for a change of attitude, the Governor refused
to alter his opinion— old bonds had to be retired before an
equivalent amount of new bonds could be relinquished by the
State.108
106La.

Acta. 1855, p. 123.
107Ibld.. 1836, p. 95.
^■®®CAHL , Consolidated Assoofntlon to /. deLlzardl, Hew
Orleans, June S3, 1836 and Consolidated Association to Gov
ernor White, Hew Orleans, August 18, 1836 (Fr.).
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In May, 1637, the Consolidated Association felt the
oriels* A series of events had occurred previous to that time,
however, to give warning that serious difficulties were close
at hand. The uptrend of the Association’s business activity
In 1635 was short-lived, Y»ith all the relief obtained the hank
was not able to fh re any too well; the institution was not able
109
to profit from the substantial credit extended to it.
By
1836 it suffered

the effects of overex pans Ion, and in that re

spect it was witnessing the same effects as were all the other
banks of New Orleans*
Perhaps the major reason why the New Orleans banks felt
the pressure from overexpsnsion la 1836 was con account of the
situation in Sagland* Toward the end of 1836 the Bank of Eng
land was experiencing a shortage of specie and to remedy the
situation it began rejecting all Amerio&n bills not drawn at
short date or eight and not predicated on effects in the hands
of agents in London* Furthermore, it prohibited any English
Wftnkring house from offering or extending uncovered credits.
That radically curbed the credit facilities of the local banks*
Their "open credit" accounts with Anglo-A uorl can bankers were
closed; Xharaas »I1 boii was forced to close the Consolidated Asso110
elation9s |5u,00G "open credit*"
Bills of exchange which
were so essential in the rapidly expanding trade became extreme
ly scarce and specie liad to be employed.
^^ I b i d * * Consolidated Association to T# Wilson, New
Orleans, February 3, 1636 (fr*), and Consolidated Association
to Bering Brothers, New Orleans, February 4, 1836 (Fr.).
1J-0Ibld.. January 28, 1837 {I'r.) .
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The continuous rise in the price of cotton throughout
1336, however, was a major factor which enabled the New
Orleans banks to remain open during that year and the early
part of 1837.^*^

Another reason why there was not a precip

itous downfall as might have been expected was that the
local banks, Including the Consolidated Association, were
heavily Indebted to the New Orleans branch of the second
Bank of the United States and later to the United States
Bank of Pennsylvania and other Eastern banks, which were
actively engaged in maintaining high prices in cotton*
The debt of the New Orleans banks with the branch of
the Bank of the United States placed them under the power of
the second Bank of the United States at Philadelphia*

Mr*

Biddle, president of the Philadelphia bank, placed Southern
banks under its control in order to control the cotton market.
This second Bank of the United States had invested heavily in
cotton and Mr* Biddle wished to maintain the price of cotton
stable .112
When the charter of the second Bank of the United States
expired toward the end of 1836, Mr. Biddle took over much of
the assets and control of this firm, into his State bank,
the United States Bank of Pennsylvania.

Besides, the Louisiana

bftnk-a had entered into contracts with some of the Eastern
banking institutions which were largely under the power of

UlC otton prices rose from 6 3/4 pence per pound in 1833
to 10 to 12 1/2 in 1836. CAML, Hobson and Son to Consolidated
Association, Liverpool, March 31, 1836; CABL, Consolidated
Association to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, March 30, 1Q37.
112Cf., R. C. McGrane, Th© Panic of 1837 (Chicago: The
Ufolversity of Chicago Press, 1924).

loe
Up* M U l i and which were Interested In oottoa, and thane
leeal tanks permitted large aeetronilatlon of balances with
these "Eastern firms, giving them and Mr* Biddle the addition
al poser which had not existed under the second Bank of the
Bolted States*
Thzliks the second Bonk of the United States, however,
#r. Biddle and other Eastern hankers exerted more pressure
Ob the local

hanks and they were not as cautious as th©

-V'

Bank of the Ohited States had been* Therefore, large drains
on specie reserves resulted, and this was weakening the New
Orleans hanks*

115

fortunately, through the combined efforts of these
local banks more specie was secured and a restricted dis
count policy was put into effect In order to check th©
114
strain on the reserves.
The high price of cotton, the 3astern support, and
the importation of specie, however, did not keop the local
banks in a state of apparent soundness for too long* The
Bank of England was even inore stringent during 1837 than It

113Ibid!.
i**Of.. CAUL, Citizens Bank to Consolidated Association,
Hew Orleans, October 11, 25, 1836, March 25 and May 18, 1837;
Louisiana Senate to Consolidated Association, New Orleans,
Say IS, 1837; City Bank to Consolidated Association, New Or
leans, April 1 and El, 1837; Carrollton Bank to Consolidated
Association, New orleane, May 6 and 19, 1837; Bank of Orleans,
te Consolidated Association, £©w Orleans, Ap^ll 21, 1837.
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Im m

la 1836. lb* 1836 w t t o n crop failure throughout

MUili of th« South had la ft m y

cotton factora with heavy

•ivaaew.

yaekson'i "Specie Circular" of 1336 was rapidly
115
waking Itself felt through a deflation in land values.
Specie continued being drained out of the banks ©a soon as
115
It was acquired.
liny 16, 1837, therefore, fourteen of the
Hew Orleans banks closed. '»Yltv In a few days the regaining
hanks suspended specie payments. The Consolidated Association
117
was in this latter group.
Business During the Depression, 1337-1343
Louisiana laws required & bank to forfeit its charter

after ninety continuous days of suspension, but the laws were
not enforced. The Consolidated Association was permitted to
r e s t m operations after the May crisis , and it was not until
November 12, 1342, that any decree of forfeiture was rendered

at the instance of the State. At that time the bank was re
quested to transmit its assets to a board of i^anagers ap
pointed by the State, which request the institution compiled
115
CAHL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
New Orleans, March 30, 1837 t ?r.).
116
A. Fortier, qpA clt.. p. 226.
117
GfcML, John Barnett to Consolidated Association, Hew
Orleans, May 22, 1837 (rr.) . Right or. Gavarre, Martin For
tier, and Debouchel include the Consolidated Association as
one of the two Hew Orleans banks that did not suspend specie
payments.
Barnett lettex*, h w ^ e r , g i w s the impression
that the beak did suspend.

110
with February 17* 1843.

Thus* from 1837 to 1843 the man

agement of the affaire of the Consolidated Association pro
ceeded as it had previous to May* 1837.

Nevertheless * what

took place with respect to the business activities of the
bank during the depression period is difficult to decipher
and analyse*

The reoords are not complete and the information

is often evasive* conflicting* and confusing.

For that reason,

only the more revealing data are cited in giving a general
picture of the affairs of the concern*
The sale of *1840w bonds* authorized by the Legislature
in 1836* was begun by Francois deLizardl a short time before
the erlsis occurred in May* 1837* but this London house did
not terminate its efforts of sale because of the panic*
Throughout the depression years from 1837 to the middle of
1848 It was selling the Association*a Louisiana bonds on the
SuropeaLh markets* and the amount It had to sell was $2 *000*000*
not $1*000*000 as provided by the 1836 Law.

Of that amount it

sold fl*617*000* there being 383 bonds still unsold when the
bank was ordered into a state of liquidation* November 12*
1848*

Ho semblance of agreement* however* seems to appear rel

ative to the exact terms and results of the transactions
Francois deLizardl* Baring Brothers* and the Consolidated
Association pertaining to the new bonds sold and the old bonds
retired as provided by law.

H^CABM* February 17* 1843 (Fr.)
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Bohl4s oat standing in 1837 amounted to $8,004,000:

the original inane had been for $8,500,000, but tbe first
serins amounting to $496,000 was retired in 1633. Of the

$8,004,000, there were $1,170,666.6ft of the "1833" bonds
#833,333.34 of the "104$*®."
By 1842

11Q

the records indleute that the amount or the

original toads had been reduced to $762,000, and th&t these
were *1845* bonds. The conclusion, therefore, is that
| 1 ,170,666.66 of ”1858” bonds and #70,353.34 of the

1843#s,

or a total of 1,341 bonds, bad been redeemed between 1837
and 1643.
On the other hand the ”184QTf bonds totaled #1,617,000.
If the provision was that these bonds were to redeem a like
amount of old bonds, there appears a glaring Inconsistency
In the analysis thus far; 1,617 bonds to redeem 1,341 bonds

Is not logical. The report made

b y the board of managers,

however, when they took over the affairs of the bank gives
a clue to the solution# The report stated that a total of
3,074 bonds, each of #1,000, had been redeemed by the corpo
ration during its entire active existence.

By deduction,

therefore, it is found that the 1,617 new bonds served to
retire 1,578 old bonds, in so far as 496 bonds were retired

According to the provisions of t h e c h a rt er , th e
bank was to issue the bonds In three equal series. That
should have meant #833,333.33 of each series# Th© bank,
however, chose to issue the bonds In amounts cited above.

112
before 183? .

It follows that 337 State bonds had been re

deemed whIch were not Issued for and In favor of th© Consol
idated Association.

It follows, also, that the oost of re

tiring 1,578 bonds was at least $39,000.**20
In the way of a summary, the debt was ^2,000,000 in 1837.
A sum of $1,617,000 of bonds was sold between 1937 and 1843.
From this sale, $1,241,000 of the company*s State bonds were
retired, along with $537,000 of other State bonds.

The bank*a

bonded debt stood at $2,380,000 in 1643.
Interest payments on the bonds were met by the Consol
idated Association from 1837 through June 30, 1842.
default occurred December 30, lQ42.i2i

The first

Interest payments,

however, were not always made In drafts as was formerly the
general practice.

Until the latter part of 1839 most of the

payments were met by the shipment of cotton.
was in specie.

After 1839 it

The June 30, 1837, interest payment had been

last when the May crisis occurred, and the banh had recuperated
enough from the shock by Fall to meet th© December payment,

120 n o direct citation Is given for the figures present
ed because they ere derived figures for the most part* The
most reliable source is the report presented by the board of
managers (CABtt, April 26, 1843). The other important sources
from which the above facts are derived are: pp. 1 and 104,
CABL, Hovember 5, 1839; CABM, May 29, June 8, June 15, July
27, end August 3, 1839, October 17, 1840, and November 20,
1841; end CATL, April 26, 1843.
121*fbe December 30, 1842, Interest payment was met by
Baring Brothers. Infra., p. 128.
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tart la 1838 no specie was available and the drafts were
too expensive* Cotton was the solution*
Cotton was acceptable in England because there was
still a great demand for the product by th® manufacturers.
Payment In cotton was advantageous to the Consolidated Asso
ciation for several reasons: It had not th© necessary specie
and could not afford to purchase drafts at a high premium;
it dealt In cotton and cotton tracts in Its regular business;
Its stockholders were in part cotton planters; and it had
several notes on hand secured by cotton*

Furthermore, pay

ment in cotton was looked upon as a means of stimulating the
export of cotton, which at the time had reached a very low
123
ebb.
Specie was needed to pay interest after 1839, however,
because of the policy of the Bank of England; that is, by
the rad of 1839, London was Buffering from a money panic*
Considerable stubs of specie had been drained from England,
enough to place her In a very unhealthy situation* According
to the theory adhered to by the Bank of England since 1827 the Palmer Sole - a drain of specie which reduced the re
serve of

gold and silver below the minimum required, or deem

ed as necessary to secure th© bank notes meant that the quan
tity of notes and credit was too large. The refox*©, th© Bank
of England proceeded to contract credit facilities and fol122Cf..

CABL, August 3, 1837; CAi.lt> August 3, 1837;
GABM, October 30, 1839, November 6 and 16, 1839 (Fr*) •
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lowed policies which would replenish the supply of specie*
Jirst, this had the effect of increasing the scarcity of
London drafts and it forced debtor nations like the United
States to deplete their supply of specie in order to effect
payment on

their fixed obligations to England,

Secondly,

the curtailment of credit restricted the possibilities of
lor*

shipping cotton to England.

Circumstances forced the Con

solidated Association to make a choice between devising a
plan to acquire specie for shipment to England and facing de
fault on interest and principal*

The bank chose the former*

How it went about to obtain the necessary specie is most
interesting*
Louisiana banks and other hanks throughout this
country suffered from a shortage of gold and silver.

It was

not an easy matter to obtain a specie loan from domestic banks*
Thus, on Hovemher 6, 1839, the directors of the Association
devised a plan whereby the institution was to obtain specie
for ltseld and other banks in New Orleans*
that, in order to get specie,

It was decided

London drafts ammounting to

a sum of $250,000 were to be sold to the New Orleans house of

123cf a, R. c* *icGrane, op* clt* * pp. 14-15; L* H*
Jenks, op* clt*. p. 86;
Viner, Theory of International
Price* pp. 224—225*
The demand for cotton had also decreased, and It
might have been that Britain was boycotting American cotton
because there were so many defaults by American corporations
on their Interest payments*

XX 5
Francois deLizardl and Company of London (Manuel I • de
Llzardl and Company of New Orleans) .

The sale of the drafts

was to he at par— par meaning #4*44 to the pound sterling
and 5 franos 25 centimes on the dollar in ffcvor of France,
The Association was to he paid for the drafts in Mexican
eolns In terms of American dollars. Following is a detailed
process of the roundabout and complicated sale procedure:
For the drafts on London drawn by the Consolidated
Association, the house of deLizardl in New Orleans was t o
issue Its own drafts or notes, payable in ninety days from
date,

Mr, Bauduoin, cashier of the Consolidated Association,

was t o act as agent for deLizardl of New Orleans and go to
Mmcleo in order to exchange the deLizardl drafts or notes for
Mas lean specie. The coins were to be shipped to New Orleans
la the name and title of the Consolidated Association, The
insurance cost in the shipment of the specie was to be borne
by Francois deLizardl of London (not New Orleans) •

Other

costs end losses were to be divided equally between the bank
and deLizardl of New Orleans, If there were any profits re
sulting from the sale, both were to share equally. Further
more, if it happened that not all the drafts could be sold
for Mexican coins, deLizardl of New Orleans was to furnish the
Association with the kind of drafts that the New Orleans house
was in the custom of purchasing for Itself, Also, the Consoli
dated Association reserved the right to terminate such operatlons after a fifteen days' notice,
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BovttJBber 6, 1839 (Fr.).

lie
The transaction «as executed

according to the terms

and specie was secured by the Consolidated Association. No
profits were realized from the negotiation, however. Instead,
there evolved an expense, not including the loss incurred
from the par of exchange, of somewhere over twenty thousand
dollars. As stated above the house of d©Lizard! was to bear
half of the expense under the terms of the contract. Vhen it
came to the payment of its share, however, deLizardi refused
to pay certain interest charges included by the bank on the
importation of specie. The amount of deLlzardl’s portion of
the loss was figured at $11,504.11.

Of this portion,

$7,991.95 was interest. Final settlement was reached in June
of 1845, whereby it was agreed by the Association that de~
125
Lizardl would be held for the balance only, or $3,512.17.
The above is an illustration of one incident. There
were several others. From 1840 through June 30, 1842, it ap
pears that the payments of Interest by the Association were
sade in specie.126

Default occurred in December, 1842,

after a decree of forfeiture had been rendered at the
instance of the State.
The third interesting phase of the Bank9s operations
during the depression years is that of loans and discounts.
At the very outset the policies followed relative to loans
125~_

CASH, June 23, July 3 and 17, 1841, and June
7, 1843 (Fr.).
136ibld.. April 15, 1840, November 6 , 1840, November
10, 1841, November 13, 1841, and April 16, 1842 (Fr.}«
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and diaeounta was not what might have been expected* The de
pression and the difficult times did not cause the bank to be
prudent* Despite the economic conditions, the bank considered
itself sound, and it was too lavish with its credit, Irre
spective of the soundness of the creditor, because it felt
that more credit was needed to cope with the distressing
circumstances•
At the time the Crisis occurred

the bank held a large

amount of discounted notes, and many were on protest* Payment
on these notes could not be met at maturity date; therefore,
the notes were renewed and there was no set policy at first
cm the renewals*

The bank simply operated under a makeshift

arrangement, trying to cope with individual cases as the Imme
diate circumstances seemed to dictate* For the most part the
commercial paper held was extended in maturity, provided addi
tional security was given and/or the paper was reaocepted at a
lower percentage than previously discounted* Ho new paper was
discounted during 1837 and 1838, however, simply because the
bank did not possess the adequate means to extend new credit.
In June, 1839, the policy adopted on discounts was that
notes discounted subject to renewal could be renewed to six
months from maturity date and at twenty per cent less,
127
provided they were paid in full at the end of the period.
—

CASH, June 1, 1839* 3ee also the credit policies
adopted April 11 and September 5, 1838*
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At that time the bank also ventured in the discounting of
new paper.

The provision was that new notes not exceeding

$300,000 could be discounted if their maturity dates did not
exceed January 10, 1840.

In July, 1840, a motion was presented

before the Board of Directors to end all renewals on dis
counted notes after January 1, 1941, but it failed to be
adopted .^29

Instead, it was decided to continue the past

policy; and it was not until after the passage of the Banking
Act of 1843, that restrictive measures were undertaken.

On

February 23, 1842, it was voted to renew discounted notes at
a reduction of ten per cent until April 5, and after that date
129
there were to be no renewals.
The 1837 Crisis forced the stock and mortgage borrowers
to suspend, or continue to suspend, their interest and
Instalment payments to the bank, and about all the bank could
do was to increase its suspense account.

It could not force

payment because the planters did not have the means to pay.
That left two choices: one was foreclosure, the other the
extension of credit.
Foreclosure was employed sparingly by the bank because
a foreclosure could not reimburse the bank, and it would result
only in a substantial loss.
land values.

The "bottom" had fallen out on

The extravagance of the Legislature In granting

iaalbia.. July 11 and 15, 1840 (Fr.).
129Ibld.,

February 83, 1842 (Fr.).
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charters for hanks had contributed substantially to the ex
isting inflation.

The increase of credit and currency and

the rise in optimism throughout the Nation had caused the
price of land to spiral upward.

During the period after 1825

land around New Orleans, for instance, had risen several
times above the 1825 value .130

It was at those highly in

flated prices upon which the bank had granted loans.

The

deflation in land prices after the crisis made it impossible
ofr the institution to recover even as much as one half of the
amount loaned.

Foreclosure, therefore, was emplyed only

when there was no other alternative and when there was no fu
ture hope of recuperating a fair amount of the loan.

Fore

closures were used as a weapon— a weapon to intimidate those
131
who suggested reform.
The alternative for settlement,
or postponing of settlement, was credit.

What the planter

did was to give the ban a note in payment for the interest
and principal due on his loan and almost always this note
was a mortgage on future crops.
these mortgage notes

130F.

The bank then used

as collateral or security for the

X. Martin, op. cit.. p. 436.

131Cf..

S. A. Caldwell, op. cit.. p. 61.
The records of the bak show that there were sev
eral foreclosures and that there was much litigation during
the period. That, however, does not invalidate the above
statements. The cases on foreclosure seem to indicate pres
sure on the part of the bank to enforce Its will.
132 q a ML, various letters from loaners asking to mort
gage their future crops In payment of the Interest and install
ments due on their loans (Fr.).
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Issuance of post-notes, or what might be called oue- or twojeax mortgage bonds* The post-notes bore interest, and the
tank Issued them in son 11 denominations for circulation purposes* Moreover, these post-notes gars the bank a means of
extending credit further to the same debtors as well as
to others.
By giving the bank mortgages

the stockholders were

meeting their obligations on their loans with the bank* The
mortgages in the bank*s possession entitled it to issue cer
tificates of indebtedness with the mortgages acting as securi
ty* In so Hblt as the stockholders met their obligations and

thereby reduced their loans below fifty per cent of the thee
value of their stocks held as collateral, they were entitled
to an additional credit up to fifty per cent of the value of
the collateral, provided, they would accept the loan in the
fozm of post-notes* These post notes could then be used as
circulation; also, they could be used to cancel debts with
the bank* Almost always, however, these post-110tea were re

acquired by the bank in order to sell them on the European
market, and in Europe they could be employed to purchase the
133
*1846* bonds being sold through Francois deLlzardi*
Credit

script flooded the state during the depres

sion years* Safety and solvency did not enter into the tainds
of the bank directors* They were concerned with relieving
133Cf * * GABM* April 11, September 5 and 19, 1858, and
March 14, 1840 (Fr*).

m
distress* The financial status of the borrower mattered
little. They gees o red it freely to anyone who could furnish
the hank with a piece of paper stating it was a mortgage of
seme sort* The bank operated under the false illusion that
security, irrespective of its source, was all that was neces
sary for soundness• Its officers persisted in believing that
the security could not depreciate because the value was
written on the face• Loans and discounts, on the other hand,
did not relieve the planters* They served, among other causes,
to build the Consolidated Association into an unsound institu
tion*
A fourth phase of activity between 1627 and 1842 which
was of considerable importance was the inter-bank cooperation
in Hew Orleans• Kven prior to 1337 the banks of Hew Orleans
had acted jointly to solve problems of specie-shortages*
After the Crisis

they acted jointly to issue post-notes ac

cording to agreements. Ha eh bank was allocated Its proportion
ate share in the privilege of Issuing notes or granting loans
to depressed "sister" Institutions* Agreements were also
reached for the purpose of acquiring specie end resuming
specie puyments* Joint action was taken, furthermore, to oircumvent legislative bank reforms* It may be said, however,
that this inter-bank cooperation was on the whole fairly
s e n d * Xt kept the Consolidated Association and other banks
adhering to similar practices from creating utter chaos—
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op rather accentuating the obaos.
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liquidation
Cm November 12, 1842, the Fifth District Court of
Louisiana in Kew Orleans handed a judicial decree of forfeit
ure to the Consolidated Association of the Planters of
Louisiana* This decree was rendered at the instance of the
State in conformity with the Law of March 14, 1842, providing
135
for the liquidation of certain hanks of the State of Louisiana.
This Law of March 14, 1843, specified the method of
liquidation to he pursued by those hanks unable to comply with
135
the provisions of Act £3, passed February 5, 1842.
The Intent of Act £2, entitled

"An act to revive the

charters of the several banks in the city of Hew Orleans,
sad for other purposes’1 was to put an end to the financial
embarrassment existing in the State, especially with respect
to beaks. The purpose of the law was to establish sound bank*
lag practices• Horace White has concisely sumsaa rised the
main features of the "Banking Act of 1842" as follows;

15i4Th. bank did not cease to exist after the reform
was introduced. Far from it— the corporation continued to
exist for forty years or more.
More about this bank cooperation in Chapter VI,
after the other property banks have been studied.
^ 35Cf.. 35 La. Ann. 425; and La. Acts. 1642, Mo. 98,
pp. 234*254.
X56Ibld.. and Ho. 28, pp. 34-68.
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.«.the requirements (1) of a specie reserve
equal to one-thirl of all its liabilities to the
publlo; {£) the other two-thirds of Its liabil
ities to be represented by eoimerolal paper having
not more than ninety days to run; (3)all commercial
paper to be paid at maturity, and if not paid, or
if an extension were asked for, the account of the
party to be closed and his name to be sent to the
other banks as a delinquent; (4) all banks to be ex
amined by a board of State officers quarterly or oftener; (5) bank directors to be individually liable
for all loans or investments made in violation of
the law, unless they could show that they had voted
against the same if present; (6) no bank to have
less than fifty share holders, having at least thirty
shares each; (7) any director going out of the State
for more than thirty days, or absenting himself from
five successive meetings of the board, to be deemed
to have resigned, and his vacancy to be filled at
once; (8) no bank to pay out any notes but its own;
(9) all banks t o p a y “their balance to eaoh other in
specie every Saturday, under the penalty of being
immediately put in liquidation; (10) no bank to ptar»
chase its own shares or lend on its own shares more
than thirty per cent of the market value*13”
Any bank not conforming with the above sumsarized meas
ures of the Act of February 5, was subject to a forfeiture
of its charter. The Act of March 14 specified the method of
liquidation for any bank incurring a forfeiture of its charter,
The general provision of the Act was:
... that whenever any bank of this state,
located in the city of New Orleans, by any act,
omission, or violation of law shall have incurred
the forfeiture of Its charter, the Attorney General
or the District Attorney shall present a petition
in the name of the State to a court of competent
jurisdiction, setting forth such acts, omissions,
or violations, and praying that the charter of said
bank be declared null and void, and the corporation
137

Horace £rhlte, "National and State Banks" in Bound
Currency. Vol. H , 1694, pp. 209-210.
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dissolved, Th© Court shall try such case sum^arlly, and without intervention of a jury;
and if, on th© trial thereof it shall appear to
th© Court that th© said bank has incurred a for
feiture of its charter, it shall declare the
same null and void, and the corporation

dissolved .138

Th© law, however, was a^iendod to modify its general
stand with reference to a forfeiture of charter and dissolu

tion* Banks in which the State was a stockholder, or for
which the State had Issued bonds, were not to come under th©
general provision of the law* Such banks were not to be per
mitted to go Into liquidation voluntarily, nor could they

dissolve by reason of a forfeiture of their charters* If the
said beaks did not abide by the provisions of Act No* 22, or
other laws, a judicial decree of forfeiture could be rendered
against them. The decree, however, was not to remove the cor
porate powers and privileges previously enjoyed by said banks,
except that of note issue. Definitely, a decree of forfeiture

was not to permit dissolution.

Business was t o continue as

before with the exception that no notes could be issued. Fur
ther restriction was to be imposed only if in the opinion of
the Board of Currency the fixed assets were deemed insuffi

cient to meet the outstanding obligations. In such an event
It could be required that a sinking fund be established from
other assets in sufficient amount to make up for the defi
ciency of th© fixed assets, and these sinking fund assets

136

L a . Acts*, 184B, No* 98, liectlon 1, p. 234.
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were not to bo employed Tor any other purpose ©accept to pay
for or purchase bonds of the State issued to or for the ae~
139
ooait of said banks individually.
According to the law of March 14

any bank in which the

State had an interest that refused to couqply with the above
provisions— refused to relinquish the note Issue privilege and
to establish a sinking fund if requested-wae t o be liquidated*
This liquidation was to be carried out by a Board of Managers
appointed by the Governor, and this board was to take over
the affairs and conduct business under the corporate name of
the bank* The management was to be under the direction of the
Board of Currency, and such management under their supervision
was to continue until the State was satisfied that all the
obligations on the bonds issued in the name of said bank had
been met; afterwards

the remaining assets were to be returned

to the stockholders.140
Thus it was that when the Consolidated Association fail
ed to comply with the provisions of the laws enacted in 1S42,
the Court was ordered to render a decree of forfeiture against
the corporation* This was done November 12, 1842* Th© Governor
then appointed a Board of Managers to take over the affairs
of the firm as was specified in section 29 of the March 14 law.
130

Ibid.. section 23. The sinking fund was to remain
in th© possession of the respective banka under th© direction
of the Board of Currency.
140

Ibid.,

section 29.

im
A latter from the Governor to the officials of the
Consolidated Association was read December 7, 1842p Informing
the directors that the selected managers 'were: Hughes Lavsrgne,
Charles Derbigny, P. A* Rost, Alexander Gordon, and A- Lesaeps.
In this same letter he requested that the affairs of th© hank
141
he placed In the hands of the above-named administrators•
The officers of the bank, however, refused to remit the
assets of the bank as requested. They refused to comply with
the wishes of the Governor until after a vote by the stock142
holders and after an absolute order from a competent tribunal.
The stockholdersf meeting was held December 10, and at
the meeting they voiced the opinion that the Act of March 14,
184S, impaired their rights and privileges. Tlxerefore, they
protested against the taking possession of the assets of the
beak by the managers appointed under the provisions
143
said Act.

of

141

CABM, December 7, 1342 (Fi.). Hughes Lavergne was
president of the bank, Charles Derbigny, the attorney, A.
Lesseps, a director, and Roth and Gordon, substantial stock
holders. Besides, A. Gordon was the New Orleans agent for
Francois de Lizardi of London, _i._e., ho was with the New Or
leans house of de Lizardi, sometimes known as Manuel de Lizard!
of Wev Orleans, a successor of Alexander Gordon, and Ldmund
J. Forestall and Company of New Orleans, de Lizard! of London
owned a good portion of the bonds of the bank. And M. do
Lizardi owned a good portion of the stocks in the corporation.
So did Gordon own stocks personally.

142

Ibid.. December 10, 1842 (Fr.).

143

Ibjd.. December 17, 1842- -a copy of th© letter from
the secretary of the scockholder®, Mr. A. Gaily, New Orleans,
December 16, 1842 (Fr. ).
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The order from a competent tribunal came from the
Attorney General, In his letter of December 13, he ordered
the directors to transmit the active resources of the bank
144
to the managers appointed by the Governor.
The decision
of the directors of the bank was, therefore, to recognize
the managers of the bank, but they agreed to transmit the re
sources only after an Inventory had been made, terminated,
145
and verified by a notary.
Thus, an inventory was begun De
cember S3, 1842, and it was completed by February 16, 1843.
At a meeting of February 16 the directors announced that
they were ready to relinquish the assets of the bank at 10
A. H. the next morning.**^
By April 23 the new managers rendered a report of the
affairs of the Consolidated Association to the Governor. It
included a statement of Affairs as of April 21, a General Becapitulation of the Assets, and an interpretation of the financl&l status of the bank.

144ibia.. December 17, 1842— a copy of the letter from
the Attorney General, New Orleans, December 13, 1842 (JTr.).
145
Ibid., December 19, 1842 (Fr.).
146
Ibid. » February 16, 1843. The President and a man
ager, Mr. Hughes lavergne, died February 16, 1843 (Fr.).
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A State a® at of Affair# of the Consolidated Association
of the Planters of Louisiana as of April 21, 1845.
Assets:
Notes Discounted
Stock: Loans
Mortgage Loans
teal Estate and Buildings
Notes Protested
Benda of the State
Loan to State
Stocks
Notes Receive ble
Baring Brothers
Union Bank of New York
Specie
Citizens Bank Notes
Protest
General Expense
Total Assets

381t876.75
1,176,961.27
67,363.51
131,244.69
406,289♦60
225,000.00
10,072.6 5
60,202 •04
245, 909 •82
767.55
92*78
3,371.67
737.50
960.56
3.110.75
2,716,033.14

Liabilities:
Bonds, 1843
Bonds, 1848
Notes in Circulation
Interest due Baring Brothers
Interest due on Bonds
Individual Deposits
Notes Payable
Dus other banks
Duo de Lizardi of London
Diso ounts
Profit and Loss
Total Liabilities

763,000.00
1,617,000.00
157,570.00
19,170.37
38,825.00
37,265.58
22,086.CO
4,349.58
2,097.20
42,661 .S B
12.008.59
147
2,716,033.14

147CA3U aiid GAi4L, April 20, 1843 (?r.). This
statement has been consolidated for tie sfcka of brevity.
The sequence of the items as listed hf«e
kept* The gen
eral headings were translated to conform with current
terminology.

im
General Recapitulation of the Ass at s of the Consolidated Assoeletlon on the 2lst April.
Description of Assets
Hates and bills
discounted
Stock Loans
Loans on Mortgage
Beal Estate
Hotes and bills disc.
end protested
Due by State of La.
Bills Receivable
Stocks and Sundry
claims
Dus by Bankers
Specie on hand
Protest Account
Hotes of Citizens Bank

Total Amount

Estliaated
value

Zatiinsted
lose

381,878.75
1,178,981.27
67,363.51
131,244.09

272,779.97
1,030,931.27
25,000.00
67 ,575.00

109,098.70
148,000.00
42,363.51
63 ,669 .69

406,289.60
235,072.65
245,909.82

30,000.00
235,072.65
177,000.00

376,289.60

60,202.04
860.33
3,371.67
960.56
787.50

28,454.61
860.33
3,571.67

31,747.43

2,712,922.39

1,871,303.00

68,909.83

960.56
767.50
841,039.39

Liabilities:
Louisiana State Bonds
Baring Brothers, Interest
Balance of interest due
Interest easing due
Hates in Circulation
Individual Deposits
Bills Payable
Doe local franks
Due Foreign Bankers

2,380,000.00
19,170.37
38,825.00
59,500 *00
157,570.00
57,265.58
22,085.00
4,349.56
____ 2.097.20
2,720,862.73

148

148

Ibid. If th© liabilities ..ere 2,720,862.73 and th©
estimated value of the assets 1,371,383.00, the deficit was
848,979.73. In the liabilities seotion the date for the inter
est cooing due was June 30, 1843, and the practice had been In
the past to ship specie or bills of exchange as early as in
April to effect the payrjent of Interest in lune.
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On. the basis of these two reports the iranagers
©lairaed that the $846,97®,73 deficit included a loss from
the devaluation of the assets to the amount of $841,039 *39 .
They figured the net loss to be 35 5/6 per cent when calcu
lated on the basis of the $6,360,000 of bonds outstanding,
and 38 1/3 per cent on the basis of the total bonds nego
tiated*
They further stated that the majority of the borrowing
stockholders were in arrears by at least $3£3,S21*23. These
arrears they attributed to the low prices of agricultural
products during several of the preceding years and to the
great depreciation in property values resulting from the
149
general distress existing since 1637*
The State Legislature, anticipating that the situation
of the Consolidated Association would not be favorable to
meet the payments and interest on its bonds pledged by the
State, and knowing that the borrowing stockholders of the
property bank were in a distressed situation, acted

to re

lieve the bank. It passed an Act on April 5, 1843, to facil150
ltate the liquidation of property banks chartered by the State*
The principal provisions of the act were that:
(1 )

... whenever any stockholder in ^ny of the prop erty banks in liquidation shall tender to the persons
superintend lag such liquidation any of the outstand
ing bonds of the State, issued In favor of auoh Bank,

149GABii, April 26, 1043 (Yr.i .
150La. Aota. 1843. No. 92, pp. 06-59.
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he shall ha entitled to have the property mort
gage by hint to secure the stock, released from
each mortgage, for the amount of the capital of
the bonds so tendered, and of the interest which
may hare accrued thereon at the time of the tender;
and in lieu of said bonds, certificates bearing the
same rate of interest as the bonds shall be Issued
for the same amount, in favor of such stockholder,
in each of which certificates it shall be stated
that it is issued to a stockholder in lieu of a
bend, and is not secured by mortgages, nor by the
faith of the State•
(2 )

whenever any person shall be Indebted to

any liquidating Bank for any stock loan or other
wise, and shall tender to such Bank, In offset or
pert offset of such loan or debt, any of the bonds
of the State, issued in favor of such Bank, the persob charged with the liquidation of such Bank shall
receive such loans in offset, as aforesaid, and
•hall release in such event, only the mortgage
granted to secure the stock, up to the amount of the
capital of the bonds thus received in offset, and of
the interest already accrued thereon, at the date of
the tender; Provided, however, such tender shall al
ways be either an equal number of bonds of each se
ries, or of bonds belonging to some series already
due, or to the series next due, and that it shall be
the duty of each of the Beaks of the State, at all
times, to receive in offset or part offset of debts
due it, its own debts, when liquidated and part due,
whether for circulation, deposits, or arising frcea
any other source whatever, and whether such Bank be
or be not in liquidation, and without reference to the
date at which the debtor offering such tender m y have
acquired the claim by him offered in offset: Provided,
that no defaulter to the Bank shall have this right of
offset for the amount of his defalcation: And provided
further, that in all the payments thus made as afore
said by the stockholders, upon stock debts ten per
cent be paid in specie#1*2
(3)

« •• the Property Banks of this State whether in
liquidation or not, through their authorized agents,
ahali be authorized to contract with their stock
holders for a privilege and mortgage on th© future
151
152

Ibid., section

1.

Ibid,. section 2.
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crops, revenues and rents of the property mortgaged
to secure their a took: or stock loan, to an amount
sufficient to pay and extinguish the annual instal
ments v as they fall due, by the stockholder on his
stock loan, as well as the annual interest, in ad~
wince, due on the balance of said stock loan, and
that the privilege shall be paid out of such future
crops, revenues, or rents, in preference to all
other claims, except existing privileges accorded
by law, and the privilege which may be granted to
the furnisher of all necessary and indispensable
supplies for the carrying on and maintenance of
said property;
The Act further provided that the Consolidated Associa
tion could, with the consent of the bondholders, extend and
prolong the time of payment of any of th® bonds for a period
of fifteen years, provided the extension did not exceed ten
years after 1846, date of expiration of the bankfs charter as
previously extended by law from the original termination date
Of 1843.154
This Law of 1643, therefore, did more than merely fa
cilitate or provide the machinery for liquidation* Xt was
permitting the debtors to pay off their debts, and it was de
signed to relieve the State from contingent liability. More
over, it was aimed at overcoming the handicaps existing in
the export of American cotton.
Because the English resented the American defaults
and repudiations after 1837, a boycott had been declared on
135
American cotton exports.
Furthermore, the policies of
section 4.
154Ibld.. section 10.
156L.

H« 1enks,
O P .cit.. p. 37.

p • 107, and o * A . 0a 1dwell,
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Bank of Borland had continued to make foreign bills of
exchange scarce, thus curtailing the ease of export of American
goods, especially cotton.
The provisions of the Act of 1843 helped to break the
boycott. For instance, Louisiana cotton exporters could ship
their cotton to Sngl&nd and sell or exchange it for bonds of
the State of Louisiana; and the transactions did not necessa
rily require specie or hills of exchange. Since the bonds were
quoted on the London money market at somewhere about bG or 60,
the owners were willing, even anxious, to sell or exchange
the brads for cotton, especially if somswh&t more than the
market price

was offered for the bonds. Furthermore, the ex~

change had the effect of raising the market price of the
Louisiana bonds. The cotton owners, for their part, were anx
ious to exchange or sell cotton for bonds because they could
use the bonds obtained at a price below par to extinguish
their debts on the basis of the face value of the bonds, The
result was to raise the price of both the bonds and cotton,
redeem some of the bonds for which the State was contingently
liable, and increase the volume of cotton exports.

"A steady

stream ox" bonds started from Lngl&nd in payment for cotton
and were automatically retired when American planters used
156
them to pay off their debts."
Impression must not be had, however, that the bond
holders as a whole welcomed, the Act of April 5, 1843, A

ISgL.

H. Jenks, loc. cit»
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storm of protests arose.

Baring Brothers, for instance,

Issued a Circular to the holders of the Consolidated Associa
tion bonds stating that neither the State nor the bank had
provided funds for the purpose of extinguishing bonds or for
the payment of interest.

They decried the liquidation of the

Consolidated Association because they thought it to be a
sound institution*

The Circular stated:

The recent conduct of the legislature has had
the effect of embarrassing the banks, of depreciat
ing the value of their assets, of lowering the credit
of the state, and by the non-payment of the interest
or capital of the bonds of greatly depreciating the
prices of these securities; and as at the same time
the banks had been compelled to receive in payment
of debts the bonds issued by the state in their
favor at par or the nominal value indicated in the
bond, the result had been that the domestic debtors
are benefited at the expense of
the honor ofthe
state and of the just claims of
its foreign
creditors.
Baring Brothers, therefore, emphatically recommended that the
Snglish bondholders keep possession

of the bonds in order to

better control and direct the price

at which they were in

flavor of selling these bonds*

Moreover, they maintained that

the action of the Legislature had made the State directly
liable for all payments of bonds issued for and in favor of
the banks of the State.
Many others criticized the Act*

Most of them, However,

did it at the direct or indirect instigation of Baring

^ 5?Circular of Baring Brothers and Company, July 8,
1843, as cited by R. C. McCrone, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
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Brothers* The Demoo ratio Rories stated that the law had
1Rg
brought discredit upon the State*
Th© New Orleans Bee
and other Hew Orleans papers contained several paid articles
and editorials expressing th© dissatisfaction of foreign
159
bondholders relative to the Act*
An article appeared in
the llorth Agaric an Review in Janua ry, 1344, written by B. R.
mo
Curtis*
Th© article claimed that the law of 1343 Impaired
the obligations of contract between the State and banks,
banks and foreign creditors, and the State and foxeign
creditors, viz.*:
..* No* there is not the smallest doubts
that this law amounted to a contract made by the
state and the banks with every bondholder that
these mortgages should be held by the banks In
trust to secure the payments of the money loaned
on the bonds* There is not a court in the country
which would hesitate so to declare upon these
facts* And when the state placed these banks in
liquidation and thus took control of their af
fairs it was bound to guard this trust strictly
end faithfully* It had no right to receive depre
ciated bonds at par In payment for ^vell secured
debts which It held in trust for third persons*
v’hat would the law of 'Louisiana, or the courts of
Louisiana ©ay to a tutor or guardian who should re
ceive depreciated paper in payment of a debt due to
his ward secured by mortgage? Undoubtedly, they
would soy It v;as unfaithful administration; and
would order him to make good th© difference. And
may the legislature itself justly do what its own
laws condemn as unfaithful and unjust? ••• This
law impairs the obligation of a plain contract be
tween th© state and th© banks on the one part and

158
Democratic Review,

vol. 14 (new series), p* 14.

C f .. K. C* McGrane, op* cit*, p. 104.
R. Curtis was later a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
(C f .. 3. A.* Caldwell, o|>» cit*a
P* ©7*
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the bondholders cm the other; a nd it is there
fore a conflict not only with the Constitution
of the United states hut with the fundamental law
of Louisiana which prohibits the legislature from
enacting any law impairing the obligations of a
coatraet.*®*
London newspapers were more rzhazmnt In expressing
their views and the

views of th© bondholders pertaining to

action of the Louisiana General Assembly. The London Morn
ing Chronicle held that the Act of 1343 was
breach of Ihith than repudiation*”

"a more heinous

The London Times approved

the advice given in the circular of Baring Brothers.'^*'
There were many, however, who defended the lew, espe
cially those associated with soma branch of the State, or
directly connected with Louisiana* The Boa rd of Currency, as
an Illustration, states that the English bondholders were "de
les
sigaadly mis i n f o r m e d T h e hew Orleans Boe on its own
accord took issue with the London newspapers:
'The writer in the London Morning Chronicle
••• either did not understand the circumstances
under which the law was passed or had grossly m i s 
represented them. It would be just as well for the
European Journalists to be chary on their abuse in
noticing matters of this sort, for t h e people in
this section of the Union are Just the very Inst
men In the world who could be bullied or black-

* ^ jforth American R e v i e w , vol. 58 (1844), p p . 137-140.
1

London Morning Chrlnlele. November 3, 1643, and
London Tlgss* July 19, 1843; cited by K. 0* MoGranc, op. cit„ ,

pp* ise-Tef.

i ^ L o u l slana Legislative Documents, 1844, "Report of
the Board of Curxenoy ror 1643
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guarded into measures...* Now we would ask t^e
Morning Chronic* le or the Boston Advertiser.
if by any convulsion in businese or revolution
in monetary afihirs, or imprudence if they like,
either Great Britain or Massachusetts was suddenly
without previous suspicion of oriels, called upon
to provide for a debt, the interest of which alone
required twice as much revenue as the ordinary re
ceipts of the treasury, would or could either of
them at once meet itV And if the amount of the
obligation for which they would have ultimately to
provide depended upon the value or the assets of in
solvent corporations which they had indorsed, would
they not make a schedule of the effects and arrive
at a reasonable appreciation of the defioit they
would have to make good before adopting a system of
taxation for that purposev .
vre know of no surer
way to blunt the sensibilities of a people to the
obligations of contracts than for the preps and
more especially for foreign journalists to assail
their honesty, when they have done the bast thing,
at the time . in their power to do, for th© public
creditors »*LOD
Whatever were the merits or demerits of the Act of
1845, the procedure for meeting payments of debts in bonds at
per, or nominal face value, was pursued. Unfortunately, how
ever, the banks did not always benefit from the method of
liquidation. In the instance of the Consolidated Association
much of the payment of debt was effected by giving bonds and
coupons not yet due, instead of the past-due obligations.
This meant that much of the receipts went toward extinguishing
non-due securities, leaving the bank with insufficient means

Reprints of the articles In the London Morning.
Chronicle end other London papers were mode at the expense
of Werds, agents of Baring Brothers, in the Boston Adver
tiser and other American papers.
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ftew Orleana Bee, December 25, 1B43.
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to tatee m m

of th© past

ana current obligations.
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An illustration of how th© 1843 Act functioned may be
given by citing a specific ease: For instance, Mr. J.

Host,

a manager appointed by the Governor for the administration
Of the liquidation of the Consolidated Association, informed
the benk that in order to pay the company whet he owed as a
Stockholder, he was sanding 225 bales of cotton to Liverpool
with orders to invest the product in bonds of the State,
167
which he expected to receive shortly.
Ur. Isaac Thomas of
Bspldes informed the bank that his daughter was now owner of
the properties mortgaged to the institution for stocks and
that she was offering to mortgage 200 hales of cotton of her
future crop. The first pert of the cotton was to be deliver
ed November 1, 1843, and the second portion on January 1,
1844. This cotton wee to serve in purchasing Louisiana bonds
issued for and in favor of the Association and was t o offw
„ V 4 168
set her debt.
Th© shipment of cotton to England by the debtors inde
pendently In order to acquire bonds, however, was not th©
only method employed to pure ha se Louisiana bonds. The man
agers decided in order to facilitate th© debtors of th©
Consolidated Association to receive frofri th© said debtors

1**2**.-

House J our. , 1846, pp. 120-124.

167Gk3H, April 29, 1343 (Fr.).
TAfl

Ibid.. Jay 13, 1343 (?r.).
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cotton t o to transferred in tendon Into bonds of tbs Stats;
and these bonds would then aerve to cancel the debt® of tbs
debtors In proportion to the cotton transmitted; that is,
the institution would take the cotton, ship it to Liverpool,
esquire the bonds in London then quoted at 50 or 60, a ad
then cancel debts owed it on the basis of the nominal fee©
sales of the bonds.
The cotton trade in the United States benefited con
siderably fro® the Law. From January 1 to April £8, 1845,
the export of American cotton was 704, 205 boles. For the
saws period in 1843, the export was 558,3.53 bale a. It wars an
increase of 546,073 bales, or almost double the amount.

In

spite of the opposition voiced by the British investors,
they wars taking th© cotton In Fug land and Aioerionn exports
170
benefited.
The prioe paid in T^ondon, or Liverpool, for
Asarlean cotton was 4 to 6 pence a pound, somewhat low In
comparison with former prices, but better than 1841 end
171
Utt.
The policy of th© Consolidated Association to facil
itate liquidation and payment of debt did not limit itself
to the provisions of the 1843 Law. Bven before the Act of
169

CABU, Uay 3, 1043 (Fr.). For London quotations on
the Louisiana oonds see Circular of Oaring brothers of April
7 and June 17, 1843, or citation in the New Orleans DaJJly
Pioayune. July IS, 1843.
i7&gfre x^ally Picayune. July Q, 1843.
171
Ibid.. October 14, 1843.
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1843 bad bad time to Isa oarrlad Into effect, the eorpora
tion provided that debts to the bank could be paid with In
terest eoupoas on the bonds of the Stats* The manager® moved,
April 5, 1843, that Interest coupons would thereafter be ac~
*
172
oepted as circulation,
Earlier than that, however, it
bed been moved and voted that spec re would be accepted on the

basis of the bank's depreciated notes. The firm was In need
of $ 20,000 in specie and it arranged to obtain the silver or
gold by permitting the stockholders and other debtors to pay
their debts by giving the bank specie equivalent to the cur
rent depreciated value on the circulation notes end by get
ting the debt canceled on the basis of the face value of the

notes. At the time, the notes ware circulating at about 40
per cent discount which meant that the debtors were paying
their loans at 60 cents on the dollar* This x-olicy was ex
tended in May, 1843, to obtain specie to be converted into
bonds of the State in London* To illustrate, when a debtor
173
gave the bank 50 cents in specie,
it would purchase bonds
la London and cancel the debt on the bests of the nominal
174
face value of the bonds.
The discount policy of the Consolidated Association
during this period was far too generous. Instead of renewing
notes discounted at a further reduced rut© as had been the
172

CABM, April b, 1843 (Jr.).
173
The amount of specie required depended on the
market price of the bonds.
i 7^CABM, inarch 15, 1843 and JAiy 3, 1843 Cffr. )* Tor cir
eolation discount, see Daily Picayune, July 1, 1843.
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practice In the several years past, the managers decided
In April, 1845, that all notes discounted considered payable
17 5
In rail at maturity could be renewed in full.
During 1843

the Consolidated Association continued

to default on its interest payments. It did not even repay
Baring Brothers for the part of the interest thay paid on the
bonds, figuring that they would be reimbursed shortly by the

Association. letters from Baring Brothers requesting repay
ment went unheeded. The only set is faction Ur. M. Purton,
agent of Baring Brothers, received on his request that
Baring Brothers be repaid was a notice that the bank had no
funds with which to reimburse Baring Brothers for the interest
they bad paid for the corporation*

176

?Then asked to suggest

a plan for payment, the answer given by the managers was that
they could do nothing tintII the Legislature enacted a law to
177
provide for the settlement .
Knowing that the Stats had
pledged its faith on the payment of principal and interest
an the bands, the managers figured that the State would make
provision for the Interest fjayrents, and the State did pay
lOQ
Baring Brothers for their 1042 interest advance.
The aaount of bonds outstanding was reduced in 1843,

178CABM,

176
177
178

March 25 and P.pril 5, 1843 (Fr.).

Ibid.. March 4, 1843 (Fr.).

Ibid.. March 18, 1843 (fr.).
House Jour-» 1844, pp* 57-59.
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tat It is impossible to aseertais by how much. The records
©f the bask say that f151,167.55 in bonds and Interest had

been received during the year as result of the provisions of
the Law of 1343*

179

In August, 1844, plans were begun to extend the matu
rity dates of the bonds outstanding *r*d to enpitallze the
interest due on these bonds* Arrangements were m d e to have
SIT. Idsraad J. Foretell negotiate with the bondholders to have
the maturity of the bonds delayed 5, 10, 15, and

20

years

froffi January 1, 1B45, and to have the interest rate reduced
from 5 per cent to 2 1/2 per cent.
Tfhat the bank: officers desired was to have new bonds
issued to replace the existing bonds. Their plan was to have

$2,000,000

of bonk bonds issued in equal scries, one-fourth

watering every five years until 1865,
£500,000
500.000
500.000
500.000

payable
payable
payable
payable

JL±

January
January
January
January

a .:

1,
1,
1,
1*

1050
1855
1B60
1865

The reimbursementv?as to take place In Oon&on with Baring
Brothers at the exchange rate of 4 shillings

Z

pence on the

dollar in favor of Bnglend. The interest was to be
eentpeyable in I,ondon at the rate of 4

2 1/2

per

shillings 6 pence,

the current rate of exchange. The State was to be relieved

Vi n Tirm
rt, there
were

^fiaroh 13, 1844 (Fr.). According to this ret O
1 R A
r V f l A ViA-n
a £ mia 4 t
nn/'i
\ 2 ,1
50,600
bonds<a outstanding
and
j2.280.82’

was that the obligations outstanding wero

,457,995.39.
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from all and any liabilty on these new bonds , and against
these bonds

the institution was to deposit collateral secu

rities with other banks in the State in its own name, along
with the name of the agent representing the bondholders. The
Association was to be permitted to withdraw these securities

ISO
in ascents according to the amounts of the naw bonds retired.
This plan suggested by the Association, however, did
not appeal to the European bondholder, but they were In

vor

at extending the maturity dates of the existing bonds. Baring
Brothers and Company In 1045 expressed their desire to form
ulate a plan for refunding the bonds, end they entered into
negotiations with air. Morphy, aetlng representative of the
Consolidated in the place of Mr. Foretell, in order to reach
101

an agreement.

Tentative plans having been drawn, Baring

Brothers then attempted to get the bondholdersf consent to
formulate terms for the liquidation of their claims* Tentative
terms were reached with the bondholders, but the plans fell
through * It was not until 1848 that Baring Brothers, Francois
deLizardl, and the Consolidated Association did reach an
185

agreement.

In 1847 another drastic change was Instituted in the
management of the affairs of the Consolidated Association.

180CA3M,

August 51, 1044 (Fr.).
181
GAKL, Baring Brothers to Morphy, London, 2uly 17,

1845.
*

>* 34

jLa. Acts. 1848 (Extra Session), Nos. 11 and 59,
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It was dee ms 4 advisable by the Genera 1 Assembly to free the
esgsalzatlon from the exclusive jstmag© aent of the State , and
permit some control on the part of the stockholder. On April
4, 1847, an Act was passed H ..*to protect the State against
lose on account of ita liabilities f b o n d s Issued for the
183
os® of property banks.rt
Under Its provisions, the stock*
holders were to elect three .mnagera, the State continuing to
a n o i n t the others.

Together, they were to manage the affairs

of the institution and proceed with the liquidation as fur184
ther provided by the Act.
The provision to further facilitate the liquidation
was a permission to extend the maturity dvfces of th© bonds 6 ,
9, 12, 15, and 18 years. And in order that the liquidation be
quicker, the law specified, also, that the bank was author
ized to raise funds by contributions from, the stockholders.
These contributions were to be divided Into Instalments
n a m i n g frorc one to seventeen years.
The managers* thereupon by resolutions deter
mined that under th© above act a contribution of
six dollars per share shell be paid by each stock
holder of this Association on June 1st, 1049 and
on the same day of each succeeding sixteen years;
and that the sum due on the stock loan by the
stockholders shall be divided into eighteen annual
Instalments to be paid on June 1, 184 8, onO. being
paid for ©very succeeding June for seventeen years.
X^ *Loulalana A c t s , 1847, i*o. 100, pp. 76-78.
XQ4Ibld.
£ 5 ? ttt
per share of stock was needed to retire th# oonas, or *o
years
far 17 ;

ttm sstttsr of oxtoidisg the bonds, however, m s not
to be such a simple xaatter* First of ell the extension re
quired the a p p r o m l of the creditors; a negotiation had to
ha wd e r t a t e a for the purpose of refunding. While the Legisla
ture had provided for the extension, it had not specified the
t o m s of *refunding that Tftould he acceptable.

The question was

introduced several times, hut the 1847 Session ended without
the problem being settled.

Evidently, the idea of the major

ity of the members of the General Assembly was that the ex
tension he provided for with the Consolidated Association
assuming all th© liability. At least, not to increase the
liability of the State with reference to the bank.
The Idea of the managers of the Consolidated Associa
tion was to devise a plan which would be agreeable to Baring
Brothers and Francois deLlserdi* The first proposal of fbred
was that the extension of bonds be effected by issuing an
nexes to correspond with the original bonds, and the State
was to remain a party to the pledge for security as it was
previously* The Consolidated iissociation offered its own
bunds, however, for the funding of the accrued Interest on
the State bonds that had been issued in its favor*
Bering Brothers and Francois daLisardl agreed to the
proposal, but they asked that the plan of refunding be re
vised in such a manner as to have the state pledge its faith
for the reimbursem«at of the bonds to be issued for the pur
pose of capita 11 xing the accrued interest* Consent was had
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f m

the Consolidated Association, asd the teak

attempted to pera\»de the legislature to great the pledge.
Xa the meantime, the Loud cm houses Issued circulars to the
bondholders of the Consolidated Association and drew terms of
assent for them to sign. The terms of assent, however, Included
the provision that the State of Louralana give its pledge on
the new bonds to be Issued for the purpose of capitalizing
the accrued Interest cm the existing bonds* The terms of as
sent majr be Illustrated by the Form of Assent drawn by
Fransoia deLizardl. It read as follows:
The undersigned Holder of Bonds of the Stats
of Louisiana, tee ring date Slat December 13D0,
signed by the Governor and Treasurer of that
State, and due 30th June, 1343, tearing the fol
lowing numbers, hereby consents, provided the ex
isting liability of the State of Louisiana for
principal and interest remains unimpaired, that
the said Bonds be endorsed by same legallyauthorized Agent, in London and that such on
endorsement engage to repay the principal of ©a oh
Bond as follows:
200Dollars on 30th June 1654
In Hew Orleans
200
n
*t
n
tt 2357
at the Office of
200
n
"
H
H
1860
the Treasurer of
200
'■
„
t
2863
the State of
200
n
w w r t
1866
Louisiana
and that new Coupons shall be attached to the bond
payable in the Office of th© Treasurer of the State
of Louisiana, in Hew Orleans, half-yearly, on the
50th June and 31st December each year, at the rate
of five dollars per Annum for every One hundred
Thousand Dollars due. The first half-yearly divi
dend to be paid cm the 51st December, 1843.
AIre consents, that tee unpaid arrears of in
terest, since 31st December, 184L , to 50th June,
1848, amounting to 275 Dollars, upon Bond of 1000
Dollars, be funded ana a new Bond, with coupons,
be given by the State of Louisiana, In lieu of such
arrears for 275 Dollars. Such bonds ate 11 be legal
Obligations of the said State, and on the Consolidated

*49
Association of the Planters of Louisiana, to
repay on seek bond in the proportion of:
Dollars 45.85 on 30 June 1849
In >Tcw Orleans
*
45.83 « e
w
iaso at the Office of
"
45.35 * n
M
1851 th© Treasurer of
"
45.S3 n »
*
1852 the State of
"
45.83 '• "
•*
1853 Louisiana.
"
45.03 * *
1854
and with reimbursement, Interest, at the rate of flue
per centum per annum, in IlaIf-yearly Dividends payable
30th June and 31st December each year, at the afore
said office, the first dividend to be paid on the
31st December, 1843. *84
Another tentative agreement was reached between the
bank and Bering Brothers, Deo amber £1, 1847, and Baring
Brothers pronounced that the holders of $208,000 of bonds
189
were willing and ready to liquidate.
Francois deLizardi
reported 9 December 31, 1847:
Be received in due course your os teemed
ffevor of the 10th of November and agreeable to
your wish therein expressed; have since coimmnleated with Bessys. Baring Brothers on the sub
ject of the bonds of your institution♦ &e have
caused to be printed th© letter of assent on the
part of the bondholders to your proposal relating
te their bonds and funding the arrears of interest
thereon, to which UP to the present time, we must
have the pleasure in stating that no dissent ion
has been shown, but on the contrary, holders
readily eirn, and we hope by next packet to b©
enable to. send you letters for the greater part
of the loan Issued through this house.
Since the Louisiana Legislature terminated Its session
in 1847 without granting tin- pledge included in the assent
London ^BeS^afedr^tS21 f8478S*a^:
deLir^irdi and Company,
7CAML. Baring Brothers to Morphy, London, December
8X, 1847.
'^xbid. . F. de Lizard! to Consolidated .Association,
London, DeeSsber 31, 1847.
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a revision was necessary in the terms accepted. New circu
lars were Issued a ^ i a in order to get the bondholders to
agree la accepting the hank bonds. For instance, Baring
Brothers published the following circular:
In the circular of assent to tie Flan
Issued by me, and agreed upon by you, for th©
sett lament of unpaid arrears of 'Dividends on the
Bonds of the Consolidated Association of the
Floaters of Louisiana, the following words were
inserted by u s :— "Also consents that the unpaid
arrears of Interest, since 31 December, 1842 to
30th June, 1348 amounting to £75 Dollars upon each
bead of 1000 dollars, be funded, end a new Bond with
coupons, be given by the state of Louisiana, in lieu
of such arrears for 275 Dollars; such bonds shall be
legal obligations on th© said State, and on the Con
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana.”
The sanction by Act of the Legislature of la,
was required for the issue of Now Bonds by the
State; and although no objection was made to the
proposal by the legislature, yet the limited term
of session having expired, that body separated with
out the adoption, of that condition. As by the Con
stitution, th© Legislature will not again be called
together for a space of two years, the President,
Managers, and Directors of the Planter’s Association,
in order to affect an immediate settlement of the
arrears, and recommence the regular payment of Inter
est on their Bonds, propose that the condition of a
nrsna be given by the State for the arrears of Inter
est should be omitted, In lieu of which, Bonds of the
Consolidated Association Bank are to be Issued, and
they specially pledge the following securities, say—
1. All th© bills receivable, amounting
at date of theabove resolution to f298,562.G9
Z. Loans see tired by Mortgage
20,142.98
3. Bills receivable, renewable under
Discount
£4,267.23
4. 5550 shares in the Capital Stock
of the Bank of
Louisiana
53,000.00
5. Barataria and Lafourche Canal
Company Stock
10,000.00
6. 75 Shares of lave© Stoem Cotton
Press Company
7,500.00
7. 34 Shares of Commercial Banking
Stock
3,400.00
8 . Banking House
5,000*00
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Making a Total, Aocording to the Bank, of #431,872.90
for the reimbur sement of these bonds, the aggregate
amount of which would he 384,350 rollers.
The other caudition of the proposed arrangements
remain unimpaired for the aequital of the original
hand as a Special Agent Is now in Europe, in order to
earry into effect the whole settlement, and the ac
ceptance of th© proposed arrangement seeiiis to us,
under all the circumstanoes, favourable to your inter
est, we beg, if you agree with us, that you will,
without delay, sign and return to us th© accompany
ing assent, and send your bonds for the requisite
endorsement, as the stay of the Agents will be of
short duration
The terms of Ass ant as revised by both Loudon houses
were accepted by the Consolidated Association and they were
presented to the Legislature for approval. When an extra ses
sion was oiled, the General Assembly passed a bill to accept
190
the terns end demands of the bondholders.
By the end of 1848, Baring Brothers had secured the
assent of all the bondholders except one on bonds sold
191
through their house*
Francois deLizardi reported the as
sent of holders owning 795 bonds*
109

Ibid., Circular; Baring Brothers to Holders of
Louisiana Bonds of the Consolidated ' ssociat ion, 1848.
**°LouAslana Laws, 1848 (extra Session), ho. 59, p. 34*
191
CAML, Baring Brothers to A. B. Roman, London, Octo
ber 5, 1848; Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association,
Oetober SO, 1846. *./en after the assents had been signed by
several of the bondholders Baring Brothers refused to tsk®
definite action until after bondholders in on aggregate of
$1,000,000, principal ana interest, agree to the Assent.
Baring Brothers, themselves, had on hand 499 bonds due in
1643 and 79 5 due in 1348, which, with book Interest,
amounted to $1,538,525.

ISO
The actual conversion can the refunding started in
January of 1349• To replace the existing bonds the 8t&t«
192
Treasurer issued and delivered #1,376,000 of now bands.
To capitalize the interest due on the old bonds the bank
authorized the I s m s of #352,875 in bank bonds, of which
« a « m t #321,400 was actually issued. By April 20, the re193
funding was complete.
The terms of refunding ax*© enumera
ted In the Consolidated Association Bond Book, 1850-1867,
as follows:
1, Bends issued in renewal of the Louisiana Jtate
Bonds due on the 30th June 1843, Series C,
Five hundred and thirteen (513) Bonds, of
Series C, of One thousand Dollars each, signed at
Amsterdam, on the 15 August 1848, by A * B, Jiotmn,
Agent* To each of these Bonds are attached Five
Coupons of Capital of Two Hundred Dollars each,
payable on the 30th June of the years 1854, 1857,
1830, 1363, and 1366, nmrked C.No. 13, C. Ho* 20,
C. No. 27, C. No. 34, G. Ho. 41, the last Coupon
being only payable on th© surrender of the Bond to
which It is attached and also of the Louisiana State
Bond bearing the same number. .•« Thirty-six Coupons
representing th© interest at Five per Centum per
annum due half yearly, are also attached to each
Bond and are as follows, all bearing the letter C.
No. 1 £25 due 31st December 1843, Mo. 2 etc. ...
No. 40 $5 30th June 1866....
2. Bonds Issued in renewal of th® Louisiana State Bonds
due 30th June 1848, Series D.
Kight Hundred and Sixty-three (863) Bonds of
series D, of One thousand dollars each, signed at
Amsterdam, on the 15th August 1848, by a . B. Homan,
Agent.... To each of these Bonds are attached Five
Coupons of Capital of Two Hundred Dollars each,
192
A. Fortier, op* clt>. p* 62.
193
CAUL, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association.,
London, February 23, and April 20, 1849.

payable on the 30th June of the year* 1854, 1857,
1880, 1883, and 1888, marked D. 13, D. No. 37, D.
So* 34, B. No. 41, the last coupon being only pay*
able on the surrender of the Bond to which it is at
tached and also of the Louisiana state Bond bearing
the same number. • •. Thirty-six Coupons representing
the Interest at Five per Centum per annum due half
yearly, are also attached to each Bond and are sim
ilar to those attached to the Bonds of Series C,
with the exception of the letter.... The payment
of the Capital and Interest to b© effected in New
Orleans, at the office of the Bank. The Bonds bear
the same numbers as the Louisiana State Bonds to
which they are annexed....
Beside issued in Settlement of Interest and Coupons
of Interest due on the 30th June 1848, cm th©
Louisiana stats Bonds of 1843, Series a .
Five Hundred and Thirteen Bonds (513) of series
A, of Two hundred end seventy-five Pollers ($£75)
each, Signed at New Orleans on the 15th May, 1848,
by A. Morphy, President, and G. Miltenberger, Cash
ier, making together t 141,075., representing the
Interest and Coupons of Interest due on the Louisiana
State Bends of 1843, the Holders of which have consent
ed to the Settlement offered by this Bank.... To each
of these Bonds are attached Six Coux>o»s of Capital,
the first of C45.85© payable on the 30th June 1849,
and the others of 45.83 payable on the 30th June
of the years 1850, 1351, 1852, 1853, and 1854, the
last Coupon being only i^eyable on the surrender of
the Bond to which it Is attached.— Twelve Coupons,
representing the Interest at Five per Centum per
«AaiSB} due half yearly, are also attached to
each bond....
Bends Issued in Settlement of the Coupons of Interest
due on the 30th June 184Q, on the Louisiana stats
Bonds of 1848, Series 3.
Seven Hundred and Six Bonds (706) of Series B,
of Three hundred Dollars ({'300) each, signed et New
Orleans on the 15th May 1840, by A. Morphy, Presi
dent, and G. Miltenberger, Cashier, making together
{211,800, representing th© Coupons of Interest due
on th© Louisiana Stats Londs of 1848, the Holders
of which have consented to the Settlement offered by
th© Bank. To each of these Bonds are attached Six
Coupcms of Capital of Fifty Dollars each, payable on
the 30th June 1849, 1850, 1851, 1352, 1853, and 1854,
the Inst Coupon b©ing only layable on th© surrender
of the Bond to which it is attached* Twelve Coupons

xm
representing the interest at Five per Centum per
annum, due halt yearly, are also attached to
each bond*..*-194
After the refunding was completed and after the bank
began receiving the six dollars per share contri but lone from
the stockholders, the bank's deficit was reduced annually
until the time of the Civil tar. The

deficit was reported

at over $300,000 in 1848 and by 1860 it had been reduced to a
point where there was a surplus. The War disrupted this sit
uation, however, and by 1867

when the bonds should have been

redeemed, there existed a considerable deficit.

Below are

some illustrations of the bank's deficit or surplus during
the period under cons iderat ion., viz,;
April &9, 1348:
Assets
Liabilities
Deficit
H ovembo r 29, 1848:
Assets
liabilitle S
Deficit
December 15, 1849:
Assets
Linbilltie s
Defio it
January 26, 1850:
Assets
Liabilities
Deficit
December 28,1850:
Assets
Lis bilit ies
Deficit
194
pp, 1-13,

S1,§65,473,76
1,910,526,51
345,047,75
;i,546,486,16
1,881,295.71
334,827.65
$1,368,265,44
1,706,143,39
337,878,45iy °
1,336,616,22
1,709,140,49
372,524,27
1,290,163*63
1,637,990,9 3
347,822,30

Consolidated Association Bond Book, 1850-1867,

Doc., 1849, "Report of the Board of Currency,
January 23, 1350. (derived)
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desember Sf, 18£L:
Assets
#1,325,771*70
Liabilities 1,564,368.45.
Deficit
338,596.35195
lifivsy 39, 1859:
Assets
729,819*96
Liabilities
933,541*15
Deficit
102,721.16
July 30, 1859;
Assets
772,009.41
Liabilities
832,526.15
Deficit
60,516.74
December 31, 1869:
Assets
77 7,536.23
Liabilities
826 ,566 •15-m«
Deficit
49,029.92
June 30, 1860:
Assets
809,447.04
Liabilities
784,616.15
Surplus
24,330.89
December 29, 1860:
Assets
598,506.79
Liabilities
554,666.151Qo
Surplus
41,340 .
There are no data pertaining to the affairs of the
CGmsolidated Association during the period of the War.
7b* <mly fragment of information is that by 1864, the deficit
was 137,850.199
During the years that followed 1848 most of the stock
holders pa Id their s ix-dollar-per-share, annual contrlbu200
tiona, bat these payments were often made under protest.

19gIbld..

1851.

197
Ibid..
1659 •
196
Ibid.. 1-861.
199
Ibid., 1864-1865, Report of the Auditor of Public
Accounts, pp. 125 and 130.
CAML. There are many letters of complaint on file:
m e records from 1848 to 1866.
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W f t i w d to pay and, thus, th® matter of the legality

Of the assessment and of the Aet of 184? were taken to court*
the Supreme Court, however, uphold tho validity of th® Act
and it authorized the hank to enforce the payment of the
SOI
ecatrlbutl o e b b

.

By 1853 the Legislature was considering the matter of
relieving itself of debt from the bonds Issued to the Clt~
lzeas Bank by permitting the Citizens Bank then in the process
of liquidation to reinoorpona.to an a stock bank, which would
assume the debts of the property bank. Thot would have meant
that the Consolidated Association alone would have to beer
the expense of the board of managers in charge of the liquids*
t i n of the property banks.

202

It was suggested, therefore,

that the Consolidated Association be relieved from the man
agement by a Board of Managers under the supervision of th©
Board of Currency.
This suggestion presented by the Board of Managers
m g

accepted, and April 11, 1855, the General Assembly passed

an Aet to "Provide for the Future Manage!armt of the Affaire
203
of the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana.”
the provisions of the Act

were that ©very year the Governor,

with advice end consent of the Senate, appoint three citizens
^ ^ L e g . Doc., 1852, rReport of th© Board of Managers
Of the Citizensf Bank and Coanolid&ted Association , u p* S»
pp. 3-4.
203----L a . Acts, 1853, Ho. 113, pp. 70-77*
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mot stookholders or the bank to serve as directors of the
Institution, and three directors were to be elected by the
stockholders. These directors were to serve a® a new Board
of Basic Managers for the Consolidated Association, their ex
pense to be borne by the firm. As soon as this nee board was
organized, the existing Board of Managers was to cease to

Tbs affairs of the bank under the new management was
no improvement over the previous arrangement. If anything.
It wss more extravagant. Furthermore» the State Legislature
passed smother law, March IS, 1855, which permitted the Asso
ciation to sink its current funds Into dead weight Invest
ments* Section 1 of Act H o .193, nAn act to provide for the
liquidation of the Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana” authorized the bank ”bo invest their assets
at a discount of eight per cent per annum on all loans having
&05
aero than ninety days to run.”
Than came the War which paralyzed the business of the
nofi
Sotttli*
This war disrupted the liquidation process of the
company, which technically was to terminate in 1856. As it
,, the Association was unable to continue payments on the
bonds when they fell due. The stockholders had to cease
207
paying their assessments.

^^Ibld.. sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
A c t a , 1356, So. 193, P. 249.
Fortier, op.olt.. vol. 1, p. 62,
207S. A. Caldwell, o p . clt.. p. 69.
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Had it not been fop the War, it might have bean that
the Consolidated Association oould have been able to fully
2Q3
liquidate its obligations*
The War, however, was making
paupers out of the planters. Property owners were being sup
pressed by the necessity of making Federal oontribut 1ons
and by the payments of excessive taxes.
Bare Is what Kdmuad Foretell had to say relative to the
condition of the bank and the situation of the time • First is
a report en the Consolidated Association:
Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana
Statement as of 30th June 1063
Liabilities:
Annexes to Bonds
Coupons due
Special Deposits
Total

#548,000.00
29,541.15
33,433*66
610,974.81

Assets:
Stock Loans
Bills Receivable
Beal Estate
700 Shares, Bank of Louisiana Stock
34 Shares, Commercial Bank
Contribution yet due
Consolidated City Bonds
Cash on Hand
Carrolton Bank and small debtors
Total

214,651.40
196,320.13
16,533.10
70,000.00
3,400.00
44,646.00
23,612.30
34,931.57
542*33
604,567.03

Deficit

610,974.81

206

Of„ t CABL, Forstall to Baring Brothers, New Orleans,
July 4, 1363; and "Statement of Affairs as of June 30, 1863*
(English) .
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Th© second part of th© report reflected somewhat th© situation
at

the time:
la this state of things th© Board of Liquida
tion passed a resolution ** * on th© 30th of jus©
(1633) concerning protest on the annexes due on
that day, so that interest thereupon may con
tinue to run taatil paid*
Tor the government of the parties concerned,
I endorse a list of stockholders of th© Association,
showing the annual average crops of Sugar of the
country stockholders; X have no means of ascertain
ing with satisfactory accuracy the income from the
properties of the city stockholders before th© war,
hut it is well known here that It was very large*
You will perceive that to secure the payment
of the annexes yet in circulation amounting to $548,000
the holders thereof hold mortgages and pro
ductive property in this eity principally and
11,351,000
and on productive country property and th©
slaves thereon to an amount of
1.384.000
is total
3.636.000
At & low estimate th© property thus
mortgaged produoed per annum, before the war,
fully 1,000,000
Its condition this day is as follows:
Military necessities have destroyed the crops of
last year and devastated all the sugar estates within
the federal Lines, completely disorganizing labor;
and the work of destruction Is going on— from affluaaee, the Planters named on the list of stockholders
have been reduced, for th© time being, with their
large plantations to absolute poverty and their fine
mansions and sugar works may at any moment be reduced,
into ashes as suggested by our only official paper*w w
Despite the fact that 1866 was to mark th© end of the

liquidstlcm of the bank's obligations, the Consolidated Assoelotion was still faced with a bond and interest debt of
209
Ibid*., July 4, 1363.

im
$647,702*40. What la more, the firm was insolvent to the ex
tent of several thousand dollars; its liabilities exceeded
the m i n e of the available assets— $647,702.40 of liablli210
ties, $ 609,109.48 of assets— a deficit of |38,59£.V2.
Another extension, therefore, was necessary* Another as
sessment ea the stockholders was dee mad essential. The State
legislature found it necessary to grant an extension not to
exceed ten years and to provide fear further oontrl but ions
froe the stockholders• The Aot permitting another funding
stated, M u r i n g the late war this Institution arid its stock
holders ... suffered such heavy losses that a further delay
east he granted fear its final liquidation.n

The bonds out

standing, therefore, were allowed to be postponed on their
aaturlty, provided the extension was on the same terns that
already existed on the bonds. To assure the security on the
tends, the managers and directors had "to require all stock
holders and debtors to furnish mortgages on property of
sufficient value, and other undoubted security, in order to
be able to redeem at the proper time the State bonds and
coupons remaining due, and all Interest arising from
211
the extension of time.”
If the opinion of the Louisiana
Superior Court Is to be accepted, the cause of the prolong
ed liquidation period was not the War,

despite the claims

z * % b i d ., Foretell to Consolidated Association,
May 7, 1866.
211
la. Acts, 1866, No. 38, p. 66.
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•f th* Legislature. Tim m u m

was mainly the diversion of

fund* from their purpose to squandering and riotous U r i n e *
The funds that should hare gone toward liquidation were di
re rted to the payment of unwarranted salaries to a hoard of
officers— president, vice-president , cashier®, director®,
SI 2
and the H i m * The faet remained, however 9 that the hank
had to fulfill its obligations.
Assent free the bondholders was again required In
order to extend the maturity date of th© annexes, and the
bank bends and to capitalize the interest due end the Inter
est coupons. The Board of liquidation which was In charge of
the Consolidated Association offered a plan to refund the
bend annexes due in 1865 and 1866, to refund the bank bonds
net' yet paid, and to capitalize the Interest by Issuing new
bank bonds as had been done In 1348.
On the basis of the proposal for refunding by the Con
solidated Association, Baring Brothers issued a circular to
tbs bondholders, viz.:
Our Agent in Hew Orleans has had placed in
his hands by the Board of liquidation of the Con
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana
a statement of their Liabilities and Assets, and
it shows a present deficit of i?38,592.92. In
view of the present prostrate condition of the
£12

55 Is. Ann. 425. Consolidated Association va„
George Lord. For a verification, see the Books of minutes.
The re were several arguments concerning salaries and expenses.
The matter was taken to the Board of Liquidation and th© Leg
islature* The salary affair way finally incorporated into
law.
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sugar Interests in the State which cannot be
revived before a satis fact cry reorganisation of
later is attained (which say take several years)
it is proposed to extend the period of redemption
of the $400 still unpaid on ths original tend of

#1000.

The annexes due 50th June, 1863, amount to #£65,600
w
•*
"
*
»
1866, amount to 275,200

It 1s proposed to exchange these for
ing annexes to be divided into four equal
ments *
1st Payable, 50th June 1870 .........
tod Payable,
"
"
1878
3rd Payable,
"
*
1874
4th Payable,
"
* 1876

the follow
instal

155,£00
155,200
135,200
155,200
(540,800)
To meet the interest on the Annexes due 50th
tone 1863, say $265,600 a 5>- for 3 years $39,840
TWO years Interest cm $59,840 3 5>
5.984
43,824,
toe Board would issue annexes payable 30th June 1868,
with Interest Coupons at 5 per cent payable Annually
or semi-annually.
Should these proposals be favorably entertained
an agent will be sent to London to carry the same
Into executlop with authority to sign the Annexes
to be issued .-413
The terms were accepted, and Adolph Schreber, a member
of the company of Xdmund J. Forstall and Sons of Hew Orleans,
214
was sent to London as agent for the Consolidated Association.
He left in July and coraaenced in August to negotiate on the
215
exchange of annexes.
Hefunding, however, progressed slowly
216
sad with difficulty.
By the end of 1866, Mr. Schreber re—

^ ( h M L , Circular: Baring Brothers, London, June 8 ,
1866
814
CASK, May 11, 1666.
215
CABL, Consolidated Association to A. Schreber,
July 12, 1866.
C&&L, Schreber to Consolidated Association, London,
August 25, 1866.

.
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tl»t 775, or about hair, of th© bonds had been ax217
changed.
Finally, la February of 1867, the exchange was
completed and the agent returned to Hew Orleans .218
Whatever might haws been th© expectation of the bond
holders from the exchange made In 1366, their hopes were not
fulfilled, because the years that followed were years of
corruption and economic disorder* Taxes increased tremen
dously In Louisiana and the bonded Indebtedness rose beyond
the m aano of the State* The affairs of th© Consolidated Asso
ciation were terribly 'mismanaged *
Xn 1874 the Legislature passed a funding act to consol
idate the bonds outstanding and the floating debt of the
218
State*
This law and its amendments baffled the courts,
the people,the State, and the holders of bank bonds for sateral years* Did the State of Louisiana, through its funding
law, repudiate the Louisiana bonds issued in favor of the
Consolidated Association and in favor of the Citizens* Bank?
•From 1365 to 1877 Louisiana was governed by the
220

carpetbaggers, whose rule was one of great extravagance♦'*
•Of all the rec oast rooted governments in the south, that of

Louisiana was probably the worst.”
217X£2^l,

221

Vulgarity,

br i b e r y ,

November 14, 1866.
February 33, 1867.
219Ia. Acts, 1874, No. 5, pp. 39—42.
380
3. A . Caldwell, op. olt.. p. 103.
221
K. C. HcGrane, o p . olt.. p. 313; and K. Lonn,
Bee oust ruction in Louisiana. pp, 8 , 28 , 68 , 77, and 88.

lea
esrroption, and extravagance ware the vogue of th© period,
and always the State debt was mounting. To ©heok those unwin© a d

unbearable debts 9 therefore, the citizens organised

and passed a e a s tl tut Iona 1 amendment in 1369 to limit the
M a t e debt to $£5,000,000* Nevertheless, th© debt con tinwed to s e a t *
By 1S70 there were so many different kinds of bonds
and other certificates of debt outstanding that the Legisla
ture attempted to consolidate the debt somewhat. March 16,
1070, It patted

"An act to provide for the paysmat or fund

ing of the floating debt of the State, by the issue and sale
or exchange of State beads."

To carry out the provisions of

the funding, a Board of Liquidation (composed of the Govern or s
H e Auditor of Public Accounts, and the President of the Gitineas* Bank) was created; and it was to settle and redeem all
floating debts of the State created by authority of law by
selling or exchanging new bonds of $ 1,000 each, payable forty
years from May, 1870, at the rate of six per cent per year,
payable semiannually. The bonds could be sold at not less
than $ 7B.OO in current money for each $ 100, and they were to
be offered in New Tork, London, Baris, Hamburg, and Frank
fort.

That funding aet, and its amendment of 1871, however,
ggg
failed to curb and consolidate the bonded indebtedness*

Iji. Acts, 1870, Wo. 69,
Ho. 43, p. 134.

pp. 103-154

and 1871,

108
instead, it "created” a new debt*
finally, the opposition to the growing debts was heard
through an organised group or taxpayers* They formed a tax
payers association and presented a circular which stated
that the limit specified by the Constitution had been exceeded
and which warned all concerned that they, the taxpayers, would
met pay taxes to discharge obligations in excess of the
$25,000,000 eonstitutlona 1 limit*g^®

The weight of th© cir

cular persuaded the members of the Legislature to take cog
nizance of the debt situation and It evoked strong denials
from certain officials*
- Governor H* C* Warmoth In his annual message of Jan
uary 1, 1878, branded the findings of the committee "wrong
in principle and false in fact*”

He also voiced his oppo

sition to the reports of the Auditor of Public Accounts which
substantiated the findings of the taxpayers* "The State Audit
or,"

he said,

"persists in publishing to the world that our

debt Is #41,194,473*91, which he makes up by adding the act
ual debt of the State, which Is #22,295,790*58, an amount
which he calls a "contingent debt" of 118,898,683*33,"
Whether or not the constitutional limit was exceeded
is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the reports of th©
Auditor of Public Accounts partly substantiate the conten-

A* Caldwell, op* clt*, p* 104*
S 2*Lex. Doc*. 137E: and New Orleans Republican,
January XTf^BT2Z —
-------------
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tlons of the taxpayers. The debts reported, January, 1870f
war#:
Liabilities for property banks
y Debts proper, in trust funds
Debts proper in bonds
Certificates of Indebtedness

$ 4,858,933
868,195
16,840,685
53,815
$22,589 m m * *

The debts reported in January,1872, were:
#20,188,800
Debts proper in bonds
Bends loaned to T&rloua banks
6,579,683
Idses 11aneons debts
3,476,269
Authorized for debts prior t o 1871

(not issued)

■4l*"f5Sf^SS®86

The debts reported in January, 1873, were:
Funded debt
$21,801,800.00
Unfunded debt
2,291.607.90
Debt proper
Contingent debt

$24,093,407* 90

Tbs re la no coma on basis upon which to compare the ro«
ports for the three years cited because each is different in
grouping and the groups do not bar© the same inclusion of
debts. The contingent debt reported in 1875 referred to the
liabilities for banka; It did not Include all contingent
debts* The other contingent liabilities on the Statefa
statue books as of January 1, 1873, were:

if th© Auditor of Public

Account

286Ibld.. 1872.
227

Leg. Doc.» 1873.
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Balance of subscription of State in 1653
to railroads
$2,108,000
Bonds of Max loan Gulf Canal Co. (Act
No. 116, 1869)*
120,000
K. O. Mobile and Chattanooga R.R. (Act
Ho* 26, 1869 )
2,073,000
H. 0. Baton Rou*g* and ¥Ioksburg R. R.
(Act Ho. 143, 1869)
6,230,000
Charity Hospital of Shreveport (Act
HO* 149, 1869)
100,000
Miss. Vhlley navigation Co. (Aot Ho. 84,
1870).
100,000
Arkansas Delta R. R. Co. (Aot Ho. 106,
1870)
375,000
Southeastern R. R. Co.(Aot Ho. 28, 1871)
375,000
Mias• River N a v i ^ t i o a Co* (Act Ho. 29,
1871)
250,000
To build a State house (Aet Ho. 31,1871) 1,300,000
Alexandria and Fulton H. R. Co. (Act Ho.
40, 1871)
1,875,000
Louisiana Warehouse Co. (Act Ho. 41,
1871)
1,500,000
H. 0. and Northeastern R* R. Go.. (Act
MO. 106, 1871)
1,212,500
Levee Company (Act No. 43, 1373)
1.000.000^^
Total contingent liabilities
Nevertheless, the Auditor m s

#21,090,500

justified in not including these

contingent liabilities because none of the bonds authorized
by the above acts were issued and no liabilities had been
Incurred by the State under any of these acts.
In 1873 a new administration came into office and it
was under pressure to take action on the debt question.
William P. Kellogg, the new governor, was in favor of adjustIB, the debt situation and he appointed a Citizens1, Comnittee

Dally Picayune, "Annual Message of Gove, nor Wil11am p. Kellogg,* January 6 , 1874; Leg. r>oe,, 1874 and
1876, "Annua 1 Message of Governor Vi. P. Kellogg."
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of w w a

p e M o n e to investi^ate the State debt.

239

This

250

Board of Examiners rendered ita report, December 25, 1875,

and the Governor included it in hia message of January 1874*
Xn substance the conclusions were:
(1) Tfeat the contingent debt of the State amounted to
$21,090,500 and that in some oases the laws which
had authorized the contingent debt were void* Thus
it was recommended that a law should be passed to
remove all these laws from the statutes.
(2) That the debts Incurred in favor of the Citizens'
Bant and the Consolidated Association amounted to
$4*828,880*55. He vert he less , it was believed that
the State should not be called upon for this debt*
(5) That the bonds outstanding amounted to $24,283,886*00,
but that their market price was not more than fifty
cents on the dollar, or about $ 12,000,000.
(4) That, as soon as the entire debt was reduced to below
$25,000,000 by an act to remove the void and lapsed
contingent debt, the outstanding debt should be con
solidated on the basis«ef the market price of the
bonds, or $ 12,000,000.
The members of the Legislature which met in January,
1874, had been impressed by their constituents with the neces
sity of reducing the debts and the heavy tax burdens, but they
hesitated to accept the recommendations of the Governor's
Citizens* Committee. Instead they accepted the suggested pro
posals of the Secretary of State made in his report of 1873*

228Ibl*..

1374. and Financial Chronicle, January 17,1874
23o‘.. .
A. Fortier, op* oit*, Vol. I, p* 400.
231
——
The contingent debt was divided into two sections,
the first of 415,003,000, the second of $8,087,500.
^^Tfae Dally Pioayune, January 6, 1874: Leg:* Doc.,1874,
The "Annual Message of Governor William P» Kellogg. *
_
, The above conclusions differ from those given by W*A.
Scott. (O f * . The Repudiation of State Debts fBoston: Thomas Y.
Crowell,“T9$5T7’p. 111).
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He ted proposed th© funding of the whole bonded and float1^5 debt Into forty-year

consolidated bond© at th© rate of
&55
eixty ee»t8 on the dollar*
These debts, however, he fig-

m o d , should first be scaled down to $£ 8,000,000 as provided
by oenstltut iona 1 amendment and then reduced to $15,000,000,
above which they were not to be increased*
The funding aot passed, January 3d, 1374, was entitled
"An act to provide for the funding obligations of the State
by exchange of bonds; to provide for principal and interest
of said bonds; to establish a board of liquidation; to au
thorize certain judicial proceedings against it; to define
and punish violations of this act; to prohibit certain offi
cers free diverting funds except as provided by law, and to
punish violations therefor;

to levy a continuing tax and pro

vide a continuing appropriation for said bonds; to xoahe a
contract between the state and holders of said bonds; to pro
hibit injunctions in certain cases; to limit the indebtedness
of the State and to limit State taxes; to annul certain
grants of the State aid; to prohibiVth© modification, nova
tion or extension of any contract heretofore made for the
State aid; to provide for the receipt of certain warrants for
sertain taxes; and to repeal all conflicting laws,"

This Act

£©« 2 authorized the State to issue forty-year, seven per
east, "consolidated bonds,* not exceeding $15,000,000, to be
233

p» 2*

Leg* Poo* * 1©73,

"Report of the Secretary of State,"
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exchanged by the Board of Liquidation at the rate of sixty
cents is "consolidated bondsn for one dollar of valid obligetiona* Because of the chaotic state of affairs, and because
of the a m o r o u s irregular and fraudulent bonds outstanding,
this Beard of Liquidation, charged with funding the bonds,
m s prohibited from issuing any bonds in exchange for any
outstanding bonds or other obligations whose legality and
■validity might be questioned until their validity and legal
ist
ity ess ascertained by a decree of th© courts of Louisiana*
The next year a supplementary act was passed which contained
s list of bonds that were considered "Questioned and doubtful"
and it reversed the duty of the Board on these: "Mono In that
list could be funded until the holders of them had obtained
a final decree of • * * ( the Supreme Court ) attesting them
235
as in that act directed.w
The funding act of 1874 avoided to state which part of
the debt was considered illegal and it refrained from stating
whether or not the debt exceeded the constitutional limit*
Instead, it stated that the outstanding valid and legal bonds
were to be converted into "cansolsn

at sixty cents In the

dollar with the limit of consols to be $15,000,000, an indi
rect and obscure way of saying that a debt in excess of
$25,000,000 should not be considered in the funding. There-

_Ia. Acts, 1874, No* 5, pp. 39-42.
g 1"■■ — — —
29 La* Ann. 690, The State ox rel o. J « X^orstall
to* The Board~~oT H a u l da ti on * Qf ** 1a . fSE&T, 1TT75, iio. 11,

pp. 110-112.
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fore, inasmuch as th© debt proper was $24,093,407, cons 1sti&i of:
Total bonded debt
Floating debt:
Certificates of indebtedness
Auditors Warrants
Due fiscal agent
there arose in the minds of many the idea

|21,801,805,00
154,108*84
1,987,499*06
150,000.00
that the State was

repudiating its debt incurred in aid ofthe Consolidated

Asso

ciation and the Citizens* Bank:, and it took several years to
settle that issue .236
Objections from bondholders against th© funding act of
1874 were numerous.

The New York bondholders protested and

cited proof of the Statefs ability to pay its debts in full*
The London bondholders r e f w e d to accept the terms of the act
and considered this

ct to be a means to confiscate forty per
S>ot7
cent of their bonds, principal and interest.
Immediately after the supplement to the funding act

was passed, May 17, 1875, ilr. 0. I* Forstall, representing
holders of certain enumerated Consolidated Association
Louisiana bonds, applied to the court for a mandamus to com
pel the funding of the bonds of the Board of Liquidation*

He

alleged that the Board had refused to fund the bonds as pro
vided for by the Act of 1874, and he averred that the Act of
1875 was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court declared the act

236There were many, also, who claimed that the State was
repudiating part of its proper debt because it was redeeming
its bonds on the basis of the market price of the bonds.
Financial Chronicle* August 15, 1874. It included a
quotation of the Resolutions- adopted in London, July 29, 1874.
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constitutional and defended the action of the Board of
refusing to fund the bond© until declared valid* Then it
f e x a a U y declared those particular bonds valid and legal,
end it restricted its abatement by saying,

desire to be

dietlnetly understood that we are expressing no opinion on
the validity of any bonds except those before us and in the
o«g
hands of the re la tor. ^
When Lesassier and Binder presented Consolidated Asso
ciation Louisiana bonds for refunding, the Board of Liquida
tion refused; it said:
We wish it distinctly understood that we do
net deny the eventual liability of the State, in
ease the assets of the bank, end of the stock
holders prove insufficient, after legal discussion
according and in conformity to the full measure of
the obligation contracted, and we fully recognize
that the faith of the State is pledged to redeem
ell promises xaede and all liabilities incurred,
but beyond this we hold that the State has no 1cgitlEKits a u t h o r i t y to extend her liabilities, and
therefore we believe In this instance that the bond
holders must look to the assets pledged to their re
imbursement, see that they are properly and legally
administered and applied, and should those prove in
adequate, they, in the meantime, having peraued all
their legal remedies, then apply to th© State for
the fulfillment and redemption of her promises.
Therefore, they took their case to court, and In 1873 the Su
preme Coart of Louisiana rendered a decision requiring, not
only these bonds to be funded, but all Consolidated a esooia-

La* Ana. t>90,
The Boa id of Liquidation«

The State ex rel <j. J_. ffor stall vs*

30 La. Ann* 615,
of Liquidation*

Legassier and Binder vs. The Board
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tioa Louisiana bonds, it said that the bonds were legal
obligatioas of the State issued for a valid consideration
and within the legal limit.
Dissatisfaction

with the Court’s decision was great*

Ifeny thought that this debt ordered funded was illegal, un240
eoastitutlonal, and unwarranted.
The diesatisfaction
was vnmiaolngly voiced by the press. The New Orleans Times
s^pressed its views as follows:
The latest and queerest faot in regard to
the involved, complicated end eternal Consolidated
Planters’ Association bonds is that the bondholders
are proceeding to fund their bonds into State Con
sols, This is queer, but it is lawful. It Is law
ful because the Supreme Court so declared the other
day. It decided that the State having gone the secu
rity of a private bank for certain bonds, and that
the bank, having failed to pay them when due (al
though It was and Is abundantly able to do), the
State, as security, is responsible and must pay
them. These bondholders were not authorized by the
Sovereign State to sue it, but they accomplished the
same object by a mandamus to compel the Funding
Board to fund their bonds into btate consols....
This is lawful; not because it Is comprehensible,
but because It is the Supreme Gourt that holds a man
damus ....to compel the funding board to issue bonds
for other people’s debts, for which the state is not
equivalent to sueing the state in law, although It is
equivalent in faot.
3 o much for the law. How for the queerness. It
ia queer that these bondholders should avail them
selves of this right to fund their bonds simply be
cause they can do so much better, unless there Is an
enormous lie out of somewhere and an undeveloped
swindle lurking behind it, A §.1,000 Consolidated
Planters’ Association Bond funded into a State con
sol at sixty cents on the dollar and that sold on

A # Scott,

c i t .. p p • 114, H B .

ITS
the * treat at T5 coats will yield precisely $4BQ*
But if good mortgages oa good plantations which
secure the bond were foreclosed and sold out,
the bondholders would get its face value of
$ 1 9GQ0 and costs of a suit besides. Why do short gA1
financiers prefer $450 to $1,00GV This is queer,
The press and the people thought it ’’queer” that the
bondholders should want to exchange their thousand dollar
denselidated Association Louisiana bonds for six hundred dol
lars of consolidated bonds, but it was not queer or strange.
The amount of interest collected on the one thousand dollar
bento wes fifty dollars* The amount of interest on the six
hradred dollars of consolidated bonds was forty-two dollars*
Soto a difference in interest return was not great* Furthersere, the Association bands were quoted on the market at as
low as forty or fifty; their security wes the assets of an insolTent bank in the process of a prolonged liquidation and
motor race 1 worship, with a State pledge which was questioned;
end they had been issued many years previous and had been
extraded several times* The consolidated bonds, on the other
hand, had not yet depreciated; they ware outright and un
questioned obligations of the State; and they were new bonds
with period of forty years before maturity. Naturally, the
preference was for "consols.*
Some of the bondholders, however, wanted the state to
Pay or assume the Association bond debt on the basis of th©

Orleans Times. April 20, 187Q.

face value, one thousand dollars*

In 1883, the Court
S48
reaffirmed the decision of 1878, and th© law of 1877, re
affirming the funding law of 1871, and it settled the Issue
243
on the conversion as provided in th© funding act of 1874*
Hot emir was the funding act of 1874 responsible for
the com fusion of the legality and validity of the Consoli
dated Association .Louisiana bonds, but because of the uncer
tainty of the cut the mono,gement of the concern b©c*uae un
certain, chaotic, and confused* The extension law of 1866
specified that the bonds could be extended for ten years and no
more* When 1876 came it was the end of the extension and the
beads mere due. H o law was passed to furthur extend the bonds
be Oftuse of the funding act of 1874, and the legality of fh*
obligations
for ifqmffim m

was still unsettled* The way was open, therefore,
to take advantage of the situation*

<Tune 17, 1876,

* 0 m Charles Ha than, a bondholder (acting, as is charged, at
tea instigation of B. Flanders (Pres.))

hunted up the record

of the old suit for forfeiture of the bank, which had been
144
Instituted in 1842, **."
lie had it transferred to th© Superior
District Court and he filed a petition of intervention in the
afflairs of the bank* Be alleged that the terra
242

of liquidation

34 I n . Ann. 770, '?orstaIl ana Sons va. The Consolldat-

£*SLa. Ac t a . 1877, No. 58, pp. 77-84.
2 4 4 ^ ^ pee. , 1877, "Report of the President of the
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was expiring and that there was no new provision of law
ffr Its future management end liquidation . He, therefore,
asked that a receiver he appointed.
This proceeding was purely ex parte; nobody
was notified or asked to be notified* It v/as taken
in an extinct suit, in which judgment had been ren
dered thirty-four years previously, which judgment
had received full execution, and the power of the
court over it was entirely exhausted *
Mr* B. F. Flanders was appointed receiver and was au
thorised to take immediate possession of all the hooks, assets,
esd affairs of the corporation* Mr. Flanders as President of
the Board of Directors of the Consolidated Association ac
cepted the order of the court, dissolved his board, abandoned
M s of flee as president, and turned the affairs over to him
self as receiver?47
Subsequently, Mr. Max Orehncr, a foreign bondholder,
considered Mr. Flanders * receivership position Illegal and
te started proceedings in the United States Circuit Court to
«wst Mr. Flanders as receiver. He asked for the appointment
of a new receiver.

Th© strange thing, however, was that Mr.

Grebner made Mr. Flanders, receiver, a party with himself
end Mr. Flanders as president of the Consolidated Aaaoeia£48
t i m the other party.
7040 United States District Court,
toreoner vs, b. F. Flanders.
Doc*. 1877. op. cit
247Z T T

-----

-------
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fl»8« two men obtained a subpcna dlreoted to the Con
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana * through
Its president* Mr* Flanders* That was the only notification
the corporation and its stockholders received of a court ac
tion* Moreover* Mr* Foretell had resigned his presidency
when he had accepted tee position of receiver*
Shea tee ease appeared in court
between Flanders
ceivership

the contest centered

who was attempting to retain his own re

and Grebner

who was demanding the appointment of

a new receiver* Because of the improper management of the
M a t * the Circuit Court ordered the control of the liquidation
to be placed under the District Court* Then* to solve the con
test between tee two mem* it appointed Mr* Flanders and Mr.
A3 la in Rustle, who was Mr* Grebner fs choice* Joint receivers.
The State* which had an interest in the bank* was
nevwr consulted or made a party in the court proceedings* Mr.
H* R* Steele, Assistant Attorney General* filed a petition
of intervention in the name of the state in which he waived
tee rights of the State and asked for the appointment of @
receiver* The court accepted his request by appointing Mr*
Blitz the third receiver* The two other receivers accepted
the appointment and stated in their minutes

”... by the ap

pointment of Lieut. Governor fciltz as one of the Receivers
of the Association* we recognize the intention of the Court
249Ibld.
260Ibld.. aad 7940

United State. District Court.
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to t o w toft State flairly represented In toe adminietration
of toe affairs of the Association.*®5^
Meanwhile the stockholders ofl the Consolidated Associa
tion were sailed together for the purpose of electing their
torftft representatives on a new Board of Directors*

The dire©-

tears of the corporation then started judicial proceedings and
teeftBted that the receivers he -moated and that the affairs of
toft eonpany to returned to th© proper liquidators.
the State, on its part, also moved for a vacation of
receivership.

Messrs. Baring Brothers of London, however,

Opposed toe State’s action and, through their representative,
F o n t s 11 and Sims, sent a protest to the honorable P>. P.
Billings of the District Court, asking that the r©celver254
Ship to fflalntalned.
The receivers, Messrs. Flanders, Fustis, and Wiltz,
constituted themselves as a Board in December, 1077.
Bond t o

They

voted to meet one ft a month to take care of the fi-

B&aaial effairs of the benk, end they ordered the ordinary
t o telly business to proceed in the sane manner as hereto
fore.

Their ms joT change was to select the State Nation® 1

Basic as a depository for the funds of the Association, in-

2aiCABK,

D«c«abar 86, .1877.
2 S2 X.eg. Doc,. 1077, op. clt.. and CA13U,

-to

roll 3, 18S0.

8014 United Stetor, Ulntrict Court, The rvtsto of
r». B. g. flfcndera.
2g4
Protest of Edmund Forsts 11 and Sons to th© Hon. B. P.
, Ttoltea States biatrict Court, November 09, i e W T
2
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stead of the Louisiana National Bank, which had been aeleo£55
ted by the previous administrators in May, 1877*
According to their report of April 8, 1878, the receiv
ers stated the Association^ debt on bonds and accrued interest
was $559,341. Against this liability they claimed that the
fixra had $16,516*14 of good bills receivable, $25,134.67 of
worthless receivables, and some improved and unimproved prop
erty.

Furthermore, they claimed that there was $ 30,384.30

which should be forthcoming from the stockholders to help
liquidate the obligations, $13,188

in contributions not

yet paid, and $17,148.30 in aocrued interest on these pastdue contributions.
What assets the bank had and what contributions were
still due, however, were deemed insufficient to meet the
olalms against the corporation.

The receivers, therefore,

suggested that another assessment be levied on the stocks to
complete the full and final liquidation of the affairs of the
Association.

A further suggestion was that all of the proper

ties held by the bank be sold at once; improved property for
case-half in cash and one-half in notes to mature in 1 , 8 , and
3 years, and with interest at 8 per cent; unimproved real es
tate at one-fourth in cash and the remainder in notes; doubt
ful notes held by the bank at the best price possible; and the
857
good bills deemed desirable to discount at the regular rate.
855

0A.BM, December ^>6, 1877.
25&I*>ia.. April 8 , 1878.
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Before notion could be taken on the suggestion* how•fer. It bad to be presented to the Court which had control
ever the receivership* Mr*

«T* W. Gurley, Jfaater in Chancery,

appointed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Louisiana for the
Halted States District Court, reported to the Court on April
17, 187Q, that he had considered the suggestions made by the
receivers and he was of the opinion that it was advisable to
sell the Improved and unimproved properties, except that the
interest be 5 per cent on the notes accepted instead of 8
per cent as suggested*
The Master in Chancery was of a different opinion on
the sale of bills receivable* In his way of thinking, the
doubtful bills had long since been placed in the hands of
attorneys for collect ion, and, therefore, were not In the
bankvs possession; nor was the bank aware of what steps, if
any, had been taken to secure their collection* Owing to the
uncertainty as to the whereabouts and status of the bills, he
reeoBi&ended that action regarding the doubtful or worthless
notes be postponed until they were returned to the bank, or
more exact information on them had been secured* The good
bills receivable, he thought, were secured by mortgage and
mere bearing interest*

He saw no reason for converting
258
them by discount into non-interest-bearing funds.
It is evident from the suggestions rondcred by th©

358Iblfl. .

April 17, 1370.
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l » e a l w r a t that they were attempting to liquidate the asset a
of the bank in such a maimer as to reimburse themselves on
their claims as quickly as possible* Little consideration
was given to the claims of others* Tor that reason, there
fore, others who had claims filed intervention, claims against
the receivers * These complaints asked for judgment by prefer
ence against the acid receivers on bonds of the State issued
for and In favor of the Association and on bonds proper of the
bank when It assumed the interest coupons due on the State
ass
hands above mantiomed*^*^ What ensued was a struggle by the
various interested parties to gain control of the assets of
the bank. Among the groups were: the State, the agents of
£60
Baring Brothers, and the stockholders.
The State, not being successful in forcing the Court
to order a vacation of receivership and to restore the affairs
of the bank to proper liquidators by judicial proceedings, de
cided to enact a law to accomplish its aims*

Act Ho* £0 of

Kerch 90, 1378, ordered:
That the honorable judges of the Circuit
Court of the United States for this district and
circuit be and they are hereby respectfully re
quested to cancel and rescind the orders appoint
ing receivers for this corporation, and to restore
its assets and affairs to the coutrol and possession
of the president and directors, as at present organ
ised under the Act Ho. 113 of 1353, which is declared
to continue in force, ...

1879.

Ibid*. June 6, 1878.
£6001
Ibid.. July 5, 1878, torch 12, and April 16,

..
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ltoU»r it ordered:
That said president and directors be and are
hereby directed to take such legal proceedings a a
■ay be necessary to procure the rescinding of all
orders of court* appointing receivers for this
corporation, and to recover possession and control
of Its assets and a ffairs*261
After the law was passed,
tain a state of receivership for

the Court continued to main
the Consolidated Associa

tion, rad Mr* Huntington and others, holders of Association
heads, Intervened and appealed the Max Grebner oisso to the
SB p x w s Court of the ttalted States* Apparently, however, all
fartlea concerned were uncertain of their grounds; after
April 18, 1879, the Books of Minutes contain no further rec
ords of the three appointed receivers; the Circuit Court ap
pelated Mr* J ohn Calhoun, who was acceptable to the Directors
of the Association, receiver pro tem.; and the Directors and
President of the Consolidated Association pleaded v/ith Hunt£62
Ington and others to discontinue the aupre.ae Court appeal,
While the Act of 1878 ordered

the j resident and Direc

tors of the Consolidated Association, who had been duly
elected and appointed in July, 1877, to take proper measures
to obtain control of the affairs of the corporation, they did
set take action until March, 1880* It was not until July that
they secured possession of the books, asseta, and the affairs
26lj^# Acts, 1378, No* 20, pp. 254-257.
262
CAEM, June 5, 1800, ^ueport of the President of th©
Board of Directors

131
•f the teak*

£63

Act Ho* £0 of 1873 did not limit lt^ulf to an order
that the Consolidated Association

b© returned to the proper

liquidators• It provided, also, for the redemption of bonds
sad for assessments to redeem the bonds* These provisions
were to be applied Irrespective of the Court's decision on
the eoavert&bility of the Association bonds into consol
idated beads*
In ease It was decided by the Supreme Court that the
State bonds issued in favor of this corporation were legal
and valid obligations and fundable, it was to be the duty of
the Beard of Liquidation to preserve these canceled certlfieates and to t u n them to the Auditor of Public Accounts *
Then, the Auditor was to open an account upon his books with
the Consolidated Association, which would b© charged v/ith the
Ka.onnt of consolidated bonds exchanged for the Association
bonds and interest thereon*
The President and the Directors of the Consolidated
Association were to convert their assets as speedily as possi
ble and Invest the funds in consolidated bonds* If there wore
sufficient funds realised to purchase consolidated bonds in
am amount sufficient to cancel their credit with the Auditor*
they were to assess the stockholders with y e a r l y contribu
tions to moke for th© difference.
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Ibid*, March 3, 1600, July 2, 1380.

If the stockholders failed to pay the assessment
jnaietuilly, they were to forfeit the privilege of delay on
their Mortgage loan* and would be forced to pay the entire
lean immediately, or else oourt action would be taken to
f e m e payment*
la the ease It was decided by the court that the bonds
were not fundable* the liquidation was to take form in the
earn manner, except that the funds of the Association would
be invested in outstanding bonds of the State * Instead of
consolidated bonds.S6*
Sbr the purpose of attaining the amount of contribu
tions needed from the stockholders, a statement of the condi
tion of the bank was asked. The following is what th® direc
tors presented:
Assets
Heal 'Estate
Gash
Mortgages uaraatured
Mortgages iaatured
Outstanding Claims
Coans on Stock
Unpaid contxlbutions
Estimated value of Aasets
Tblue of Mortgage Property for Stocks:
City of Mew Orleans, 1415 shares
Outside of Hew Orleans, 247 shares
Estimated value
Me shares 3886
Mo of Stockholders 37

30, 000
12,000
5,333
1,900
2,000

30,000
9,000
$90,233
$235,000
600,000

835VOOO
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liabilities
Bends
I s U r e a t due
Total liabilities

$460,550
Si.156
511#Vo62e5

estimate of tasMUfimit drawn by the directors m s

as fellows:
Beads outstanding June 17, 1876
Unpaid Interest thereon
Conversion Into consols at 60$

f 460,550
51'156
511,706 or f 512,000
307,200

XA SO ter as the instalments were to he for the years 1873,
1370, end I860, three-tenths of $307,200 of consols
In U M

if bought

and turned o e r to the state at par will require cash,

purchasing bonds at 50$
Interest paid and to be paid cm

46,060
?307,200

124.496
170,496
This sun divided by 3886 shares equal $43* 87/23 per

Thus they calculated that on the basis of $45 per
Share,

only $5 per share would be required for 1381, $4.90

for 1888, and so on until 1387

when $4*16 would cancel all

debts ea ecmsols. (The Mew Orleans weekly Observer stated
that $40 was the amount of the assessment .)867
Apparently, however, the assessment figured was not
large enough. The Legislature, In 1882, jmsaed another act to
further assess the stockholders• This time, the law stated
w r a --tJAHK, July 8 # 1680.
£C 6CABK, Ibid.
267HS£ 2£2£fi£fi»
fc-t-y O b g e r w r . January 20, 1883
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tliftt the stockholders could fully settle their obligations

mm stockholders.S6a
A®ftln the Board of Liquidation devised an estimate of
m m a u t «

The calculated contribution was to be |150, In-

eluding, of course, the $40-45 levied In 1880* The oantrlbu
ttes* however, was not to be In cash Inclusively* The Board
declared that it was prepared "bo settle the debt of the
ctockhol dare on payment of said asses ament of $150 on each
fl&are of which ninety-one dollars seventy eight and a half
easts per share may be paid in bonds of the state leaned under
the funding not of 1874 and fifty-eight dollars twenty-one
and a half cents per share is payable in cash at the Institu
t i o n s office, 66 Toulouse Street.
The stockholders protested against the assessment*
They refused to vote cm any measure or to take any part la the
election of directors* They organised to taka the assessment
270
setter to the Courts*
The Supreme Court of Louisiana tried the oases pertainSac to the legality of th® new assessment request* In November,
1382, it decided against the Consolidated Association In the
George Lord ease— a reversal of the decisions rendered in
the lower court.
26SLouXalane Acts, 1882, Ho. 78.
269
‘
Weekly Observer, January 20, 13BE, and GAML, "Publlo
notice,* December
la&d*
*70

Of., GA.BU, November 16, 1081.

IBB
Th* Consolidated Association had sued George Joaiet
for payment of ooutrlbuttons, both for the one levied
la W f

and the 1000-1882 assessment. Judgment wna rendered

In favor of the bank an both assessments by the Civil DIsilift Gottrt* The Supreme Court, however, decided that Lord was
271
liable for the 1847 assessment, but not for any following levy,.
In brief, the opinion of the letter court vas that by paying
the instalments levied under the Act of 1847, the stockholders
vers ccaplately discharged; but in succeeding acts, the stockholders were not a party In the contractual agreement and
eotzld not be held liable for the assessments placed.
That decision took away a possible source of funds to
the amount of 4502,900•

It left the bank with a meagre

source of a few thousands of dollars in property and about
,000 in uncollected contributions.

For once, the directors

and off leers of the Consolidated Association were without
revenue

with which they could spend lavishly in high sala

ries end other dubious expenses*

V ith the decision rendered,

the offleers lost Interest in the bank, and the institution
eeased to exist*
The fracas ended: since the state could not force addi
tional assessments, and aluce the bonds were convertible, the
State had to accept and make good the deficiency* The Consol idated Association ended as It ha cl started— a generous 8tat a
^ ^ C A B K , December 30, 1882, and Consolidated Associa
tion vs. Lord* 35 La. Ann. 425.
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warn U r n * to aet aa a support, an air of conclusion m s
there to sap away whatever possible, and a sense of false
hood was there to distort all Informtlon possible.
Xt took forty years to liquidate a bank which was in
set lee existence by cha rter during fourteen years.

Little

wonder, then, why the Consolidated Association is looked
upon with disdain.

CHAPTER IV
THE UNION BAUK OF LOUISIANA

Flans for a second property bank, the Union Bank of
Louisiana, were introduced when the Louisiana State Legisla
ture convened In January, 1831*

The Legislators, however,

postponed action incorporating the institution until
January, 1832
The Union Bank was established along the same general
principles as the Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana which preceded it, except that the new firm
had broader powers. While the Consolidated Association was
permitted to acoept mortgages only

on

agricultural proper

ties, the Union Bank was granted the option of accepting
mortgages on any sort of tangible property*

2

To quote

Henry Right or:
The Planters* Bank ( sic ) would take none
but Plantation property; th© Union Bank Included
city as well as country real estate, houses and
lots, as well as plantations— in fine, any kind
of real property, not even excluding negro slaves,
at that time one of the most valuable assets in
Louisiana.
y

House Jour., 1831, P. 120,

*R. C. McGrane, op. clt.. p. 170.
Rightor, pp. cit., p. 592. By Plantors * Bank was
meant the Consolidatea Association of the Planters of
Louisiana.
187
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- The purpose of the nee canoern was to foster agri
cultural development; it was designed to help buy real es
tate end to mate improvements needed thereon* Lite the Con

selidated Association, the theory behind the organization
was that:
. . • Agricultural productivity would be
increased by making it possible for borrowers
to obtain credit on easy terms* As their lands
were rendered more productive it would in turn
become easier for them to meet the interest
payments*4
Unlike the Consolidated Association, however, the
tS&lcm Bank proved to be $uite prosperous and successful,
especially during the first four or five years of its exist
ence* The institution was known throughout much of the natic®, the new West in particular*

*or that reason, perhaps,

often goes to it the honor of being the first property baak;^
though it was not actually the first, there is no doubt that
it did serve as a model for similar institutions organized in
Mississippi, Arkansas, the Jlorida Territory, and in other
southern States *7
*W. 0* Scroggs, A Century of Banklnn Progress (Carden
City, Hew York; Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924) p* 105.
Rightor, op* olt ** p. 593*
•ss*. , S. A. Caldwell, op* olt* * p. 46; W. 0. Seroggs,
QP* olt*. p. 103; K. W. Hidy, rrTh© Onion bank of Louisiana
Loan: A C a s e Study in Marketing,n in The Iourrtal of Polit
ical HeoBoaar. Yol* XLYII, No* 2, Apriiy“T939, pp. £32-253;
and the Baton Rouge Gazette * July 7, 1832 *
7
X* Q. Hawk, OP* cit* , pp* 361-365*
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Organization of the Union Bank
The Union Bank was Incorporated April 2, 1852, for a
period of twenty-fire years and was authorized with a bond
capital of $7,000,000* The bond capital was secured by
$8,000,000 of mortgages obtained from the subscribers in pay
ment for the bankfs $ 8,000,000 of stocks, which were divided
into shares of $100 each*

The stockholders were to be cit

izens of Louisiana and owners of revenue-producing properties,
and they could subscribe

to the extent of the appraised

value of the property less double the amount of any encum
brance on it.
The problem of the sale of stocks for this concern was
recognized as not being a simple matter. Subscription books
were to be opened and kept open for five months, after which
time they were to be closed for a year if the total amount of
stocks was not subscribed to, though they were to be closed
permanently if the subscription maximum was to be reached*
Immediately after the five-months * period the directors were
charged with evaluating the subscriptions; if there were
properties dec!?»d Insufficient for mortgage, those subscrib
ers were to be rejected; and if the tot&l of subscriptions
exceeded $ 8,000,000, the officers were to reduce the amount
of each subscription in such a manner as not to alter th®

eL a . Acte. 1832, pp. 42-72.
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stfitua of th© subscriber in relation to the total.

9

To make certain that stocks not be held by anyone
outside of Louisiana, the law, besides specifying that the
subscribers be none but Louisianians, further provided that
the stocks could not be transferred until after four years,
when they were to become transferable to any owner of real
estate la the State.10
The legislators, having witnessed the difficulty en
countered with the initial attempt of the Consolidated Asso
ciation to sell its own bonds, were not willing to see the
Onion Bank make a similar futile attempt; Immediately they
pledged the faith of the State for the reimbursement of the
bonds and for the payment of the interest thereon. Another
condition whieh they remedied— a definite weakness with the
Consolidated Association State bonds--was that of the matu
rity dates an the bonds.

The Union Bank State bonds extended

from twelve to twenty years: 1,750 bonds were payable in
twelve years; 1,750, in fifteen years; 1,750,in eighteen
ye an ; 1,750, in twenty years. The bonds, otherwise, were very
similar to those of the Consolidated Association. They were
of 11,000 denomination with the interest et five per cent,
payable semiannually; and, according to the Act, the bonds
w e n to be in the following words:
9

Subscription books were opened in Thlbodeauxvllle,
Plaguemine, Covington, Natchitoches, Marks villa, Ve m i l l i o n villa, St. Martinville, and Clinton.
1QL a . Acts, 185E, sec. 4.
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"One Thousand Dollars'*
Know all men by these presents * that the
state of Louisiana acknowledges to be Indebted
to the Union Bank of Louisiana, In the sum of
one thousand dollars; which sum the said state of
Louisiana promises to pay in current money of the
United States to the order of the said President,
Directors and Company, can the
in the year
with interest at the rate of
fire per cent. per annum, payable half yearly, at
the place named in the endorsement hereto, viz,:
on the
_ _ _
every year, until the pay
ment of "said principal awn.
In testimony whereof, the governor of the
state of Louisiana has signed and the treasurer of
the state has countersigned these presents, and
caused the seal of the state to be affixed thereto,
at Sew Orleans, this ________ in the year of our
Lord
(signed)
(countersigned)

Governor
Troa surer.11

For the privileges granted and for the pledge given cm
brads

the State demanded one sixth of the profits*

The only

other request was that the State be entitled to a credit of
five hundred thousand dollars, and for this credit notes or
obligations for such sums as might be required were to be
furnished, and, further, the State was to pay the usual
annual Interest in advance.

12

Profits, if and when realized, were not to be declared
as dividends at the will of the directors. Meither were they
to be held by the bank until the expiration of the bonded
debts* All profits realized were to be retained os part of
^ I b l d ., sec. 5.
17 and 31
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capital uatll the first series of bonds we z r®doomed,
M l ''at that t i n one fourth of the aet profits was to bo api s

~ " ’* ^

j| M h # S M & h© the stockholders in proportion to their holding* *
‘nre tf-ir>
fie reaaei&lag three fourths plus subsequent profits -were to
-

-

he ivlftlflsd again as working capital until the second series
was redeemed, when another one fourth of the net profit could
Be i^ertloBtl.

This procedure was to he followed until all

heads m i

redeemed, after which time dividends could be
13
declared annually*
Bxenehes of the Union Bank were to be established In
eight strategic centers in order to serve the entire State:
the Thibodeauxvi11e , Clinton, and Plaquemine branches were
to have a capital of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars
each; 0owing ton and i^arkaTille, two hundred and twenty-five
thousand dollsrs each; and Vennillionvllle, St* Martinville,
and Satohitochea, two hundred thousand dollars each— a total
14
capital of #1,600,000 for the eight branches*
Begotiations with Baring Brothers and Prime,
Hard, King and Company
Baring Brothers and Company of London heard about the
proposed organizetIon of the Union Bank during the latter
months of 1831, prior to the relntroduetion in the Legisla
ture of the hill to incorporate the bank*
MB

Alexander Cordon

Borate 11 end Company of Hew Orleans wrote to the

Mtttlcm 17.
^Ibld .. seotlon 34.
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London firm for advio© concerning the form of bonds to be
13
issued.
The suggestion offered by Baring Brothers was that
i

provision giving holders of bonds the option of receiving in*
terest payment either in New York or in London should be sub
stituted instead of in Mew Orleans, as was proposed* Such a
provision, they thought, would Improve the marketability of
the b o n d s . ^
When first approached for the purchase of the bonds,
the London banking house Indies ted an attitude of indifference
toward the loan* Baring Brothers stated that if the proposed
Qhion Bask expected a favorable price on their bonds, they
sight be disappointed: the bank would b© unknown in England,
there was already a large amount of Louisiana bonds on the
London market, such a large, new issue of securities would cer
talnly depress the market, and, furthermore, it would require
at least three years to sell the entire amount. They could
not afford to tie up so ranch capital for that length of time.

^ftich of the information and ideas herein included was
taken from Mr* K. W. HIdyfs paper, "The Union Bank of Louisiana
Loan, 1832: A Case Study in Marketing," printed in the Journal
Of Political gooaoBty. Vol• XL VII , No. 2, April, 1939, pp'&3£~"
35S. The material for Mr. Hidy’s study was derived principally
from the business correspondence of Baring Brothers and Company
now deposited in the Public Archives of Canade, Ottawa.
W. Hidy, OP* clt. p. 234; of., V7* G. Sumner, A Historr of Banking in Al^ *ne Leading Nations. Vol. I , The UnTted
M i atee
(new York: TouraaT of Commerce, 1896), p. 244; aXaSTc £ta ~
tion: Baring Brothers and Co. Papers: Books of Official CorreaP ^ * i S :i f l 5 r-' i 5 r t .~gInF~tnd gS."'
te T C i 5 » n ~ ( l g 5 I g S t ~ a ---union Bank) , Jurrnary 2S, 1833.
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furthermore, they expected the political situation In
Europe to became settled soon* which would mean a resumption
of activity in 'European stocks and would "offer more encouragesent to speculators than those of the United states."17
Irrespective of the attitude of Baring Brothers toward
the prospective large issue of new bonds, the officials of the
Union Bank proceeded with their grandiose plans*

On toy 31, 1832,

MT* Edmund J. Fore tall proposed at a meeting of directors "that
a committee of three members be named to take into considera
tion the negotiation of the bonds to be Issued by the State in
16
favor of this Bank*"
The committee was appointed and it ren
dered its report, a most Interesting document * Mr* Forstall,
spokesman for the committee, submitted a bond market analysis
which was a complete denial of the contentions of Baring
Brothers* His report stated:
That a more favorable moment than the present,
for the disposal of American stocks in England, has
perhaps never offered itself; that large portions
of the public debt of the United states are in the
course of being paid off; that the first series of
the Association bonds become redeemable early next
year, and of the Louisiana bonds the following year;
that th© holders have only the alternative of letting
their money be idle, or of buying into the British
funds, which are barely yielding 3 1/2 pr. ©t • per
annum, or in the funds of some of the continent#-? 1

Tbid. * p. 236; c f » citation: Baring Papers; Letter
Book, Baring Brothers to Mollvaine (cashier of Bank of the
United States at Philadelphia), April 21, 1832*
Extract, of Minutes, toy 31, 1832, p* 2„
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powers, all of which are considered more or less pre
carious, whilst just the contrary is the case with the
public funds of America, whether created by particular
States or by the General Government; that the United
States are considered as entirely removed from the
vortex of European politics, and their political
situation is looked upon as fhr more safe than that of
any nation in Europe, while the notorious prosperity
of the country joined to the uadaviating exactitude
with which the public obligations have been fulfilled,
has justly given the utmost confidence to the holders
of the different American Stocks*--That many of the
mealed men in England look with considerable alarm on
the present state of matters in that country, as re
gards its large public debt, and appear desirous to
remove a portion of their means from the British
funds, yielding S 1/2 pr. ct. to those of the United
States yielding 5 pr. ct. per annum.— That as regards
the State of Louisiana, its wealth and great resources
begin to be known and appreciated in Ungland, and there
can be no doubt that if the 7,000,000 of bonds to be
Issued in fevor of the Union Bank, b© now offered in
the London market, they will be readily taken,,partic
ularly if the nature of the institution be explained,
and the public be made to comprehend that the State will
hold the most perfect security for the reimbursement
of the whole amount* The advantages which will arise to
the State of Louisiana from the addition of 7 to 8
millions of effective capital, at a moderate rate of
interest, are too obvious to require much illustration,
especially the enormous difference which results be
twixt selling Bazik stock to foreigners and paying
to them dividends of 8 1/2 to 9 pr. ct. premium and
borrowing money from them at a fixed interest of 5
pr. seat. *
It was recommended by the committee that cananiss loners
proceed to ikiladelphia and New York in order to negotiate
with American houses dealing In stocks. If they failed to make
a sale in the United Ststea, one or more of the commissioners
were to go to Londcaa to ascertain the best price that could be
bag in London, laris, and Amsterdam. It was suggested that if a
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M l * could b© made of the entire $7,000,000 of bonds, it
w e l d be permissible, seen advantageous, to sell at a sacri
fice of one half of on© per cent. If the sale proceeded more
slcwly, it wee thought that it would be better to retain ©
pertlam ©f the bands— -three or four million©— to be sold on
e consignment basis, that is, on account of the bank or in ad**
van©©* Warning, however, was given to the commissioners about
the argis&ents they might receive ©gainst such a large issue of
bonds; the eosraittee remarked: * * * . they must expect, in the
first instance to be met with a declaration that the State of
Louisiana is emitting too many Bonds, and that as soon as
these ere placed, there may be an emission of as many more*”
To this the committee suggested:
The reply to this Is to be able to ©hew the
wealth and resources of the state, end the super
abundant security the state has for every dollar
for which it 1© bound; It may also be brought into
consideration, that the sums for which the State of
Louisiana Issues Bonds are not 3unk in. Canale or
other public works which, although they may yield
the Interest, can never repay the principal, but
fear operatic©© In money, payable, to a xaortal cer
tainty, by a particular day and that so far from the
State running any risk, It derives large sums annu
ally, from the facilities which It has given to the
monied institutions of the State- -and that so long
as the State requires such complete s e c u r i t y for
every Bond issued, m extra issue of such paper
can be apprehended
*^Ibld* * p * 3.

It was also the belief of the legisla

tors at the time • They felt that the State could not issue too
many bonds ea long as they were doubly secured by property*
Furthermore, there would bo always sufficient revenue to meet
the obligation© on the bond©, if the bonds were used to serve
as a source of money and credit* In England, on the other hand,
a bank which had to borrow was considered unsound and insolvent*
Tbs capitalists were not prompt to understand the American sys
tem and often they were reluctant to Invest in bank bonds*

19?

In pays»&t for their services the e m i e e i o s e r s were
to receive one hair or one per cent cm all sales in Europe,
c m quarter or one per cent on all sales in the United States,
five thousand dollars each in the event of failure to effect
a sale* and one per cent on all sums above the limits ape©-

The instructions regarding the terms that would be ac

ceptable to the bank were broad* The commissi loners were empow
ered to receive offers and to contract for sale of the bonds
cgl

any of the following conditions:
1* Principal redeemable and interest payable
in Hew Orleans; proceeds receivable in Hew
Orleans at the time the bonds were delivered*
2* Principal redeemable in Hew Orleans, interest
. payable in Hew York; proceeds receivable at
either place as bands were delivered*
3* Principal redeemable and interest payable in
Hew York; proceeds receivable at either New Or
leans or Hew York*
4« Principal redeemable in Hew Orleans and interest
payable in London at four shillings and six pence
(4s-64); proceeds receivable in Hew Orleans as
bonds were delivered*
5* Principal redeemable and interest payable in London
at 4s-6d; proceeds receivable in Hew Orleans*
6*

Principal redeemable and interest payable in London
at 4s-6d; proceeds receivable in London at 4s-6d
as the bonds were delivered there.

7. Principal redeemable at 4s-3d and interest p&yoblo
at 4s- 6d in London; proceeds receivable in Haw
Orleans as the bonds were delivered*

^ X b i a . . p* 4* Fxtract of Minutes, June 27, 1832.
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8+ Frinoipal redeemable at 4s-$d and Interest payable
at 4s-6d In London; proceeds receivable in London
at 4s-6d*
If the proceeds were to be received in the United States ,
they were to be paid to the Bank of the United States or Its
branches* end the bonds were to be delivered through the said
beak or its branches* If the proceeds* on the other hand* were
to be received in Europe, such proceeds were to be paid to the
Beak of England or the Bank of Liverpool

and the bonds wore

to be delivered through the said banks*
% e eosB&issloners could negotiate the entire amount or
pert of It according to any of the eight plans, subject to the
following conditions:
1* If the interest were made payable and tho capital
receivable in the United States, the bonds were not
to be sold at a premium below one per cent, 1^ e * *
net less then #70*000 on the whole*
Z» Xf the bonds were made redeemable in New Orleans
and the Interest payable In London at 4s- 6d with the
proceeds to be received in New Orleans, the premium
was to be at or above three hundred sixty-aovon
thousand five hundred dolla rs ($ 367 *500) *

8* If the principal were made redeemable and the Inter
est payable in London at 4s- 6d with the proceeds re
ceivable in New Orleans, the premium was to be at or
above five hundred forty-four thousand dollars
(#544*000)*

4* If the principal were made redeemable and the Inter
est payable In London with the proceeds also receiv
able in London at 4s-6d* the premium was to be at or
above on® hundred twenty-four thousand five hundred
dollars (#124*500)*
5, If the principal were made redeemable in London at
4e-3d and the interest payable In London at 4s-6d,
with the proceeds receivable In New Orleans* the
premium was to be at or above four hundred twenty-two
thousand five hundred dollars (44^»500)«
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1f the principal were made redeemable in London
V 4t 4s-54 and the interest payable in London at
4s-6d, with the proceeds receivable in London,
the bends were to s e n at or above par*

Jfesars S. tFaudon and IS&raund

1*

P or stall were appointed

CQKntsiiofidrs, and with the instructions given them

they pro-

seeded to Philadelphia and Hew York* In Philadelphia they con
tacted, among others, Mr. Biddle, president, and Mr. W. Men w i B S , oashlar or the second Bank of the United States at

Philadelphia, and in New York they saw Mr. Thomas Wren Ward,
resident agent of Baring Brothers and an associate of Prime,
Hard, Xing and Company.

Xt was through Mr* v?ard, however, that

mam% of the negotiations took form. This gentleman first tried

to interest Baring Brothers, *in conjunction with Prime, Ward,
King and Company, in a loan to the extent of $3,500,000, at a
pries not above #22.10 per £100."

. Later

this price offer

was raised to $115, provided the redemption was at 4s~6d on

a®
Ibid.. pp. 4-5.

as

8.

W. Hidy, OP. elt.. p. 235.

zoo
the dollar, or at $1X0

If the redemption m b at 4s-5d*

£4

Baring the early stages of the negotiations , Baring

Brothers stated that their house was ready to purchase
$3,500,000-worth of bonds, provided, however, that the re-

These figures cited by Mr* Hidy were obtained
tTQBk the Miscellaneous Correspondence of Baring Brothers, Cowan
and ihlt (London bond brokers) to Baring Brothers, June 26 and
July 81, 163£, and also from. Baring Brothers Letter Book,
Mae 14 and 15, 1832.
In order that the reader be not confused by the abovementioned rate of exchange, it should be stated that the above cited figures are twisted purposely in order to mislead. Viewed
with a superficial glance, it appears that Baring Brothers pre
ferred bauds cm the basis of the current rate of exchange over
bands at the legal fiction of par, that Is, that they preferred
bonds at 4s-6d to bonds at 4s-3d* Since the Americans were in
favor of an exchange at 4a-6d, it gave the appearance that the
figures quoted by Baring Brothers were to the advantage of the
American house. Such was not the case, however* What Baring
Brothers scant was that they would give more fox* bonds If these
bauds wars redeemed by giving Baring Brothers 4s-6d for each
one dollar of debt, instead of 4s-3d. From the American point
of view, paying a debt at 4s-&d is equivalent to a rate of ex
change at 4s-3d. All this is confusing, but it is necessary
to k**©p it In mind when studying international money*
For those who might have forgotten the previous analysis
Oft the sate of exchange, It Is repeated. On the basis of market
conditions, an American dollar could get 4s~6d of English money.
Oft the basis of the law defining the metallic content of the
dollar (and this was before 1854) , the American dollar was
equivalent to 4s-3d of English money. Thus when the British had
to pay Rnglish money for American dollar values, they preferred
the rate of 4s-3d* When they received 'English money in terms of
American dollars, they preferred to receive 4s-6d. When an
Americas receives 4s- 6d for his dollar, he says that the rate
of exchange is 4s- 6d • When the American pays 4s-6d for a dollar
of obligation, he says that the rate of exchange is 4d«r3d in
favor of Ragland, or in terms of American raonay the dollar is
worth 04 cents in exchange. With the British, when they paid
4s-6d for an American dollar, it meant that they wex*e getting
in terms of legally defined American money only the equivalent,
in metallic content, of 4s-3d in terms of the legal metallic
content of the pound sterling. When they paid 4s-3d, the Brit
ish were getting a dollar which could buy 4s-6d.

SOI
mainder was not placed on the Knglish anrket before 1834,
sad provided further that they should ha to the option at that
tine to purchase the remainder at

the sains

price they paidfor

the 3,500 bonds* Xf the terms did

not meet

the approval ofthe

eeamisalonersf Baring Brothers offered to accept 1,000 bonds
immediately in order that the Union Bank might commence its
operations* The bank would be given an immediate advance of
$500,000 on half of the consignment and another

f 500,000

ad

vance as soon as they gnTO the bank notice that the first lot
of bonds had been sold. This procedure they could continue
until the entire $7,000,000-worth
Realizing that the hope of

of bonds

w as sol A. ^5

receiving an offer outside

of Baring Brothers through Mr* Ward was impossible, the Union
Bank commissioners concluded their negotiations by signing a
contract, August 14, 1832, which was in conformity with the
proposal offered by Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, king and
Coapany. Heedless to say, it was favorable to the parties
purchasing the bonds, viz.:
Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. of London, and
Messrs* Prime, ward. King and Co* of New York, each
far the sum set opposite to their names hereby agree
to purchase of the Union Bank of Louisiana— which
also hereby agrees to sell to them--five and a half
ail lions of dollars of the bonds of the state of
Louisiana, to be issued in favor of said bank in
equal series having (12) twelve, (15) fifteen, (IS)
eighteen, and (20) twenty years to run, payment for
25
Ibid*. PP* 235-236. The information is from Baring
Brothers Letter Book, Baring Brothers to Ward, June 15, 1832.
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the arae to be mad© on delivery, with (10) ten day©
notie© at one hundred and six and on©-fourteenth
dollars (#106*1/14) for ©very one hundred dollars
(#100) of bonds— to say on the first day of November
a n t , one million dollars and the premium thereon—
on the first day of December next, five hundred
thousand dollars and the premium thereon— on the
first day of January next, five hundred thousand
dollars end the premium thereon, and the balance in
e©ual sums per month, until the whole sum and the
p r e m i a thereon be paid; with the privilege to the
purchasers of receiving any amount of the bonds, at
such time as they may call for them, giving thirty
days notice, and on due payment therefor; such calls
mot to be made before the first of January next and
ell instalments to be paid within twelve months from
the first payment* Payment to be made in New York,
Philadelphia, and How Orleans, at the option of the
purchasers, with o n month*a notice to the bank, if at
Haw Orleans* The endorsement on the bonds shall spec
ify that the principal is to be reimbursed at the
counting house of Messrs. Baring Brothers and Go.
London, at the rate of four shillings and three pence
sterling (4*3) per dollar, and the Interest be paid
la Load on at the same place, at the rat© of four
shillings and six pence sterling (4*6) per dollar,
and that in all other respects the bonds shall be made
substantially to conform to those negotiated through
Mbs are. Baring Brothers and Go* for the Consolidated
Association of the Planters of Louisiana; excepting
that the interest shall be payable the first day of
February and the first day of August, in each and
every year* It Is agreed that the commission of
Messrs. Baring Brothers end Co. Is to be he If per
cent* on the sterling amount of the dividends, and
half per cent, on the amount of principal reimbursed*
The remaining one and a half millions of bonds shall be
consigned to Messrs Baring Brothers anu Co. for sale
on account and risk of the Union Bank of Louisiana—
and Messrs * Baring Brothers end Co. shall not be
obliged to offer them lor sale, until the ox pi rat ion
of the year (1853) eighteen hundred thirty-three, at
which time, or any time previously thereto, they
•hall have the option of taking them to thelr own
account, paying for them on the terms herein before
mentioned as paid for, the sum of five and a half
millions of bonds, provided, that If not taken for
their own account within six months from the first
day of November next, Messrs. Baring Brothers and Go.
will advance to the Union Bank of Louisiana five
hundred thousand dollars, on or before the first day
of June next, on the security of the above bond®—

zm
end the further sum of five hundred thousand dollars
at the expiration of the year (1833) eighteen hundred
and thirty-three, and in ease of the ah o’*© advances
toeing a a ^ f Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. shall
met he restricted as to the price for which they u»y
sell the bonds for the purpose of their reimbursement,
after making every effort in their power, to obtain
M e h limits as the t a k may think proper to fir * The
commission of Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. is to
he two par sent* on the sterling amount of the sales.
The Union Bank of Louisiana will endeavor to obtain
Chum the proper authority, a renewal of such bonds as
■ay be lost or destroyed toy accident, upon satisfac
tory proof thereof and a guaranty against the re
appearance of the original bonds. . .
laring> Brothers and Co. — for thirty seven hundred
thousand dollars
Brine, Ward, King, and Co.— for eighteen hundred
thousand dollars
The Uhlon Bank GouEais si oners did not immediately accept
Baring Brothersr offer, however; therefore they continued to
seek other purchasers in the United States, but they found
the prospective buyers refusing to deal with them Independ
ently. Accordingly, they said In their letter in regard to the
centraet, "All the parties from whom we had expectations had
waited with Messrs.Prime, Ward, King and Go. and they with
27
Mr* T h e m * w. Ward."
Wham they went to London they found a similar situation.
All the investment houses there had agreed to unite with Bar
ing Brothers and Baring Brothers with Mr. Thomas W. Ward,
they coaid not even deal with Messrs. Thomas Wilson and Company

84ua?c,

pp. 3-9.
E 7UBJC, k m York, August 16, 1838, p. 8 .
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©f lABdoii from whom thmy had hoped to receive a competi U v e hid.
To illustrate how the competitive bidding for th©
m e n

Baakfs Louisiana State bonds had been eliminated, even

before the contract with Baring Brothers was signed, Gowan
aai Mash of London, bond brokers, "had agreed to subscribe
fear 1,000 bonds at coat— 600 for themselves, 400 for Thomas
Biddle and Company of Philadelphia, 100 for G. Marx and Son
28
of London."
no

contract needs interpretation; some phases of it

were left ambiguous— apparently that m s

intentional, too—

and elarl float ion Is necessary. Of course, the most important
phase is the matter of the par of exchange. That, however,
has been explained in the previous chapter in the analysis of
the Consol Ida ted Association contract. The British investors
held par to mean the value of American money as defined by the
law of 1791— that legal fiction in which tbs American dollar
was equivalent to 4 shillings 3 pence In British sterling—
while the current xrarkst rate was higher.

In other words,

the American dollar was worth but ninety-four cents or so,
and not one hundred cents; that was a loss which should be
taken into consideration in the present analysis.

citation: Baring
______
.
„
_
BrotherBates, June 14, 1832; and Gowan A Marx'to Baring Brothers,
June 26, 1832.

SOS
There were two separate parte to the contract: one
dealt with the outright sale of 8,500 bonds and the other with
the consignment of the remaining 1,500 bonds* First, It v«as
agreed that daring Brothers purchase 5,700 bonds, and Prime,
fcrd, King and O o ^ a n y , 1,800 bonds, the rate to be f 106 1/14
per #100 with the par of exchange at 4s, 5d, or what amounted
gg
to about 100 or 101 to the 100 in American terns*
Of these, 1,000 bonds were to be delivered November 1,
1838, n o on December 1, 900 on January 1, 1853, and the bal
ance in equal sums per month until the whole sum and the
premium thereon be paid*30
Second, the remaining 1,800 bonds were to be consigned
to Baring Brothers for sale at their terms* Baring Brothers,
however, reserved the right to withhold this sale of consigned
beads until January, 1354, if they so desired* At that time, or
previous thereto if deemed desirable, they could further re
serve the option of purchasing the bonds at the same rate as for
the first lot, with one per cent premium more if they did not
decide to purchase the bonds prior to six months after November
1* 1852, that is, at 107 1/14 after April 1, 1853. If they did

" r t m * wwe a better price than that offered for the Con
solidated Association Louisiana bonds; they sold under .contree t
at 95 and 87 of par with par being 4s. 3d*, or the equivalent
of approximately 79 on the 100 in American terms.
*°It is clear that the balance was 3,500 bonds, but it
is not clear what was meant by "equal sums.” Obviously, that
part was left to be interpreted as desired by Baring Brothers.

&06
not a g m

to take the bonds, Baring Brother® specified that

they advance §500,000 to the Union Bank on or before June 1,
M S B # provided an equal amount of consigned bands served as
security toar the lean.

An additional sum on the same terms

was to he granted January 1, 1854.

After that time, the addi

tional advances were to be granted only upon a notice that
Baring Brothers had eisposed of the previous bonds.
Under both phases of the contract Baring Brothers re
served for themselves the privilege of selling the Union Bank
Louisiana bends at whatever price they deemed advisable in order
to pretest and reimburse themselves.

"After making every ef

fort to obtain such limits as the bank may think proper to fix,"
they, of course, diplomatically Inserted.
The Gomel as loners had the following to say to their
principal, the officers of the Union Bank:
The powers which we held from the bank gave
us the liberty of accepting this offer. It is
the exact equivalent for a stock, paying Interest
and redeemable in the United States, at one per
cent premium, agreeably to the calculations which
were originally submitted to the Board of Direc
tors, and which very fully covered all possible
as peases • We could not but feel, therefore, very
sensibly the responsibility which we should assume
by rejecting this offer, and deciding to take the
risk of effecting a negotiation at ® better rate
in Europe. Heavy, however, as this responsibility
was, we had no wish to shrink from it. V'a had
undertaken the negotiation, and we therefore con
scientiously applied our best Judgment, aided by
much reflection and discussion to the decision
of these questions:
1* Is the price offered, under all circum
stance s , a fair price?
E. How much higher can we reasonably expect
to obtain in Kurope?
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3* Are there any general considerations in
favor of a negotiation here which would
counterbalance the chances of obtaining
a better rate in kuropet 31
the report on the contract does not give an adequate
answer to the questions posed by the coxmissianera; they avoid
ed answering any of the questions* Nevertheless, the answers
are Interesting and afford soma statccaents which reveal eco
nomic eondltions of the time:
In forming a conclusion as to what is a fair
price, the items which enter into the calculation
are, the quotations for similar stocks in London,
and the rate of exchange for sterling bills. The
bonds of the Bank of Louisiana and of the Consol
idated Association, were quoted at 4 to 5 per cent.
F S w I s a at the last advices; ££ per cent, interest
would be due on them in a few days which reduces the
fhlr quotations to
per cent* at the highest rate.
Sxohange in London Is now 8 per cent* here, and the
prevailing opinion among those who are most extensive
ly engaged In the exchange business, and who have the
best means of information is, that the rate will rule
low during the coming year. They insist that the sur
plus imports of last year are already paid for; that
the imports of the present year are unusually light,
and will continue to be so; that the prospects of
large exports of produce next season are very flatter
ing; that the Bank of the United States has already
provided very large funds In London to meet the pay
ment In October next of that portion of the United
States 3 per cents which is held by foreigners; and
that the amount of American stocks, Pennsylvania *s,
Alabama *s, Indiana’s, Louisianavs, etc. sent and to be
sent to Surope far sale is extremely large; and that
of course exchange on London must be very plenty and
low. If this be true, can the Union Bank hope to
realize an average price for bills on London to the ex
tent of 7 millions of dollars within 13 months, at or
above 6 per cent, premium? We decidedly think it cannot.
The price then offered for our bonds is at least equal
to the premium on exchange. Is the premium of BJ- per
cent, quoted in London, more than sufficient to cover the
expenses of a negotiation there, such as bankers’ oommission, brokerage, loss of interest, risk of loss of bonds
31UBJC, p. 6
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in transit, ate.? To this also we readily answer in
the negative* The effect which the introduction of
ee large an amount of mew bonds may produce on the
sextet has mot yet been brought into the calculation,
nor have we allowed anything for the profit which
parties entering into so large an operation have a
right to expect* 11 we say that these ere compensated
for by the length of time that our bonds have to run,
we are still brought to the same result:— and the
conclusion is, that under all circumstances the
price offered is a fair one*
What the eozsalssloners noglacted to say was that the
price was a fair one for Baring Brothers. The logic they use
leads up to it, but they refrain from stating the m e t * ?hat
they actually tried to infer was that the negotiation was not
worse than ether negotiations entered into with Baring Broth
ers and ether English brokerage and investment firms by Amer
ican sellers of state bonds, and that under the circumstances
the agreement was about as much as could be expected*
What we learn from their answer is that the huge amounts
of b u d s being sold in London was making bills of exchange more
plentiful agd therefore lower in price* This ffe11 In price was
use thing Baring Brothers were guarding against, and they did
all la their power to avoid such a situation; they succeeded, too,
as far as they were concerned*
Hext,to the second query, How much could they get in Eu
rope?

The answer is of Interest, especially in the light of

what was claimsd when the coomlssiomers were informed of their
duties* They now said:
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¥h& chances or u rise In American stooks In
London, which is almost their only market, it is
very difficult to oalculat
and we know that they now
terest than many of the Continental stocks* If the
peace of Europe should continue uninterrupted, the
current of investment will still he directed to
the latter; for American stocks are chiefly looked to
in consequence of their supposed greater security* But,
has noting occurred to impair the confidence of for
eigners in Amarioan stocks? We fear we cannot answer
no* At a distance, we all know how rumor magnifies
the declamations of politicians into movements that
must shake institutions to their centre. We may not
dread the issue of the excitement which the term "nul
lification* produces — we see and know the ardent at
tachment of the great mass of our fellow citizens to
the "Union. w But it is not so abroad* Already we find
that great anxiety is expressed, and repeated in ©very
letter on this subject by foreigners who are Interested
la American securities; and this will continue and in
crease until "nullification* Is forgotten* Xhe recent
*¥fct©w too, will no doubt be held up as a proof of the
instability of our institutions, and we shall be told,
what if true would be a most serious evil, that with
the prostration of the national bank will come the de
rangement of our currency, and a recurrence of the
state of things that preceded the chartering of that
hank* What foreigner, believing these things, would
he willing to purchase a State stock? We hear here,
and it would be urged upon us in Europe, that the
legislature of our state has run wild in banking; that
It is multiplying banks ad libitum» and that no sooner
will this loan be disposed of, than we shall see proj
ects for others sev on foot* Altho* these and similar
arguments might be entirely met and refuted in conversa
tion with a few, yet it would be difficult to obliterate
their Impression from the public mind* Jailing in our
negotiation at home, we should be in some measure in the
power of European houses who would not fall to turn this
circumstance to their advantage* Upon the whole then,
we were forced to conclude, that probably quite as much
eould be said against the chances of a rise in American
stocks in Europe as In favor of them; and that if we
eould reserve a moderate portion of the bonds to be
sold In Europe, for account of the bank, It would per
haps be the best mode of settling our difficulties on
this point* This has been done; and altho* we believe
that the payments which have been stipulated for will
give the bank its capital as rapidly as it can advanta
geously dispose of it, yet we provided that no Inconvan-
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tense should be felt In ease of a delay in selling
the hank's portion of the bonds, hut that a large sum
should he advanced if called for.
Barteps no better price could have been received for the
heads an the tentinant, but that is not the most striking re
mark made by the oosnissloners*

Their statement revealed fear

in Europe about the vast amount of American stocks on the
market — or rather, the vast amount they thought m s

soon to be

placed os the European market* In that fear they were justified,
too*

Ho sooner was one project undertaken than another was

"set os foot*1*
The third question, that of whether or not there were
toy general considerations in favor of a negotiation in London
uhiah would counterbalance the chances of a better negotiation
in Europe, was answered In such a manner as to indicate how
pressing it was thought to hare immediate capital* To the
query they answered:
• « . we are forcibly struck with the fhct,
that the contract now nade will enable the bank
to commence its operations on a large scale, two
months hence; whereas, if we all era one j^onth fear
the voyage to Europe, two months for completing the
negotiations there, and a month and a half for advice
to Hew Orleans, the bank could not ascertain the re
sult of our operations before the first of January
next, and must then submit to a further do lay for
the purpose of negotiating its bills* The difference
in time was, therefore, to be estimated at not less
than four months, and considering the earnest wish of
the bank, long since expressed, to relieve the money
market from a pressure which has been Increasing
rather than otherwise; the importance to many of the
stockholders of receiving their loans from the bank
is time to meet engagements which fall due early in
the season — and the relief which the whole community
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will f w l , o w n before the bank commence® lbs operatioae, from the confidence which will be Inspired by
the knowledge that this large capital la so soon to
c o w into the State, we believed that this differ
ence of tine, to say nothing of the difference of
interest that the bank would give, presented a power
ful argument in fhvor of concluding the negotiations
here ( London )* To many of our stockholders, the
result will no doubt be a benefit far greater than
any advance which the most sanguine calculator could
have hoped for in Isurope* Our planters, many of them,
at least, are, in consequence of lev,’ prices and short
crops fear two or three years past, severely pressed,
and obliged perhaps to submit to great exactions;
end there has probably been no period for ms ny years
past when our merchants have been b o largely in ad
vance of their friends and correspondents In the
country, or when relief could arrive more oppor
tunely to prevent great distress and heavy
sacrifices.321
What the Union Bank actually received in American dol
lars for the #7* 000*000-worth of bonds is not ascertainable.
The terms of the contract, however, appear to be less unfavor
able than those agreed to in the sales of previous Issues of
E ^ r f bonds*

Nevertheless, one thing is certain, and that

Is that tbs contractors. Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, King
sad Company, reaped a considerable profit; the lack of informs ties may complicate an attempt to estimate that profit, but
33
tbs indications are convincing*
Of the 5,500 bonds purchased, 1,000 were delivered on
November l, 1632; 500 in December; 500 in January; 1,000 on
February 1, 1633; 300 in each of the following 7 months; and
32
TJBJC, pp. 8-11.
33The writer owes his information and. ideas to the sale
of bonds of the Union Bank to Mr* R* W. Hidy in his article
"The Union Bank of Louisiana Loan, 1832: A Case Study in Mar
keting,” op, olt.
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This sal® of bonds, however, nade it obligatory for the
WBirftetara to raise funds in the United States to pay the
Broke To do this lnroltsd the sale of bills of exchange
os Baring Brothers in this country, which, at this tine, were
selling at eight per cent premium— in itself a rather profit
able endeavor.
The object of the purchasers was to sell the Union Bank
Louisiana bonds in London at as high a price as could be ob
tained above their oontraet price, while at the same time they
transferred the funds for payment of the bonds to the United
States at as high a premium on the sterling exchange as possi
ble— a two-way profit operation at least# For instance, ignor
ing for the moment the fact that the contractors sold the pur
chased bonds above the contract prloe, these other profits were
first, the profit of exchanging sterling for dollars at the
sate of 4 shillings 3 pence (4s. 3d) Instead of 4 shillings
6 pence, a profit of 3 pence per dollar acquired; and second,
the profit of eight per cent on each dollar received In the
exchange process, the premium, on the sterling bills sold In
the Ifeited States.

Baring Brothers* big worry, however, was

whether the American market could absorb the bills thus created
along with the numerous other bills similarly issued for other
undertakings, without causing an "over-supply" of exchange, an

M B. W. Hidy, 0£a. clt, . p. 237.
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"over-supply* which might lower the lucrative premium on
Loadoa drafte.
The sale of the bonds was most confusing and quite com
plicated, and only a partial picture may be described herein*
Tor instance, there was not only the matter of placing the
bonds in two categories--those purchased outright and those
consigned for advances— but instead they were divided into
f(»ff categories*

Baring Brothers carried part of the bonds in

an account known as "Account L,"
c m as

one known as "Account S,"

the W. T* Hard Account, and one as the Union Bank

Account*

^

"Account L" originally included 4,600 bonds of the
5,500 purchased— 800 for Prime, Ward, and King

and 3,700 for

themselves. This account was soon changed, however, when it
was agreed to place £00 bonds in W. T. Ward’s own account*
"Account S ” included the 1,000 shares purchased from Prime,
Hard, and King

by three Hew York firms— J. D. Beers A Co*,

Joini Ward and Co*, and J. L* and S. Joseph A Co*— and con
signed through Prime, ward, and King to Baring Brothers. The
T* W* Ward account included 200 bonds allocated to him at his
zequest* The Union Bank account included the 1,500 bonds con
signed by the bank for advances to be granted by Baring
Brothers*
"Aeeeta&t L." — By the terms of the August 14 contract,
the 5,500 bonds purchased by the contractors carried with them
the provision that they could bo sold at any price the con-
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t » c t o r » deemed advisable in order to reimburse themselves,
end* furthermore, it was not obligatory that these bonds be
sold for ©ash* It was a sale of bonds to the contractors for
a special sum with the funds made payable in the United
States, and the contractors could dispose of the bonds in
a naaner suitable to themselves.
The 5,500 bonds, however, had been reduced to 4,500 by
a sale of 1,000 to three Sew York firms*

when these firms

consigned the bonds to Baring Brothers for sale, the terms of

sale were specified, so that the contractors were not at liberty
to dispose of them in the same fhshlon as the original.

Baring

Brothers had disposed of some of the purchased bonds, even be
fore the contract had been signed, but apparently this sale
m s not like that made by Prime, Ward, ana King. In June, 1632,
Qovaa and Marx, London bond brokers, had agreed with Baring
Brothers to subscribe for 1,000 Union Bunk bonds at cost;
500 were for thernselvcs, 400

for Thomas Biddl© arid Company

of Philadelphia, and 100 for G. Marx &. Son of London. All
the shares were to be sold throu&h Baring Brothers, and thus
35
they were kept in *Acoount L.fT
There was, also, Thomas Goterlll of Birmingham who had
agreed to buy 150,000-worth of the bonds at one per cent above
purchase price stated In Uho contract, and his friend, John.
Ferguson, also, had requested to purchase bo tween i&0,00G35
and $25,000-worth of the securities.
SSIbld.. p. 229.
36Ibid.. pp. 245-246.

215
Xa October, 1832, Baring Brothers announced a public
subs erlption sale of the bonds for future delivery. The terms
of the subscription m r a that the buyers take equal portions
of the four series Issued, paying for them in Instalments of
B
B
B
B
fc

40
40
40
44
50

per
per
per
per
per

bond
bond
bond
bond
bond

of
of
of
of
of

f 1,000
f 1,000
| 1,000
|1,000
$1,000

on
on
on
on
on

Monday, October 15, 10332
Tuesday, January 15, 1833
Friday, March 15, 1333
Monday, April 15, 1833
Monday, June 17, 1 3 3 3 ™

That seeat a price of (fc) 234 pounds sterling per bond, or about
104 per east, a 440-premium on each $1,000 bond.

33

Then, too,

the subscribers, if they wished, might anticipate payments at
a 4 per cent discount, and receive letters of engagement which
proa 1wed the delivery of the bonds as soon as possible. All the
securities thus subscribed to were to have attached to them the

Interest coupons dating from February 1, 1833. Thus, in this
aaaasr Baring Brothers effected an advance sale of "Account L . "
39
stock to the amount of $1,723,000.
Rot all bends In "Account I .,’
7 however, were sold out
right oar by instalment • Many were exchanged for other American
securities. Xarly In 1853, Bering Brothers exchanged 346
Bank bonds for lezmsylvanla, Philadelphia, and Baltimore
bonds .40

Inter they acquired, with the approval of Prime,

57Ibld..

33

p. 246.

234 pound sterling equals 36,160 pence and at the
rats of 4a 6d (54d) the rate is 104.
®*R. W. Hidy, OP. oit., p. 246.
40
-----Ibid.. p. 248.
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King, shares of tba second Bank of the United
State* and of the Uhited States 41** for their Union Bank
heads* In the fell of 1894 they exchanged £0,000 pounds ster
ling of the Louisiana tends at the rate of 102 for United
State* 5 fs at 93, and in January, 1835, they completed the
sale of the 4,500

bonds by exchanging $96,QQG-worth of the

Louisiana bonds for £11,000 in Hew York Life Insurance and
Treat Company certificates with coupons bearing 41 per
41
cent interest*
"Account S." — Of the 1,800 bonds allocated them by the
contract, Prime, Ward, King and Company sold 1,000 to the
three Hew York firms at cost* They paid Prime, Ward, King and
Company approximately £57,142 in cash (a premium of 6 1/14 on
the bonds) and through them had the bonds consigned to Baring
Brothers* Xt was specified that the securities "be held at
H a l t s not above 104 per cent" for three nionths after the
maturity of the bills drawn by Prime, Ward, and King upon the
London firm In transferring funds to the United States • ’ After
that period, the London house was to accept the market price
/ p

for the consigned bonds*

Provision was, however, on this ac43
const that the bonds sell for cash*
Against this account, Baring Brothers specified that
Prime, Hard, and King were permitted to draw but h 3133*10

41Ibld..

pp. 243-249.

^Xtoia.. p. 236.

4 1*1*». P*

in

Bl?

blllc «

them per $1,000 bond, not Is 225.10 which was the

4 shilling 5 pence rate on the legal par basis.**
Nevertheless, Prime, Ward , and King did not abide by

the restrictions at first and that violation became a source
of friction be t e e m the two houses, but not e serious one.
Prior to January 1, 1833, the New York house had drawn on the
Loaislaoa bonds on "Account 3" for more than B 212.10 per
$1,000* The Barings pointed out that violation of their wishes
end the mistake was admitted by Prime, Ward, and King, who
prwlssd to draw less in the future in order to make up
the difference .*5
According to Ur* Hidy, the bonds In "Account S n did not
sell at first. No cash sale was recorded until April of 18331
and then the market for these was entirely slack, so much so
ttet Bering Brothers suggested a change In the arrangements
by Prime, Ward, and King with the three New York houses, but
46
Prise, Hard, and King did not think it necessary.
The sale of the consigned bond a in MAooo\mt S" being so
poor, Nr. W. T. Ward and Prime, Ward, and King pleaded with
Baring Brothers to attempt a sale of part of theaa bonds in
New York. Baring Brothers acquiesced but the plen did not
succeed. It was not until the summer of 1834 that e good
**Ibld.. p. 241.
***Tbld.. pp. 249-250, of. footnote, Bering Brothers
* lne to ******
H. W. Hidy, op. olt..

p. 246.
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portloa of the heads were being sold and then in Holland
through Hope and Company of Amsterdam* The account was finally
elosed in January, 1835, by the sale in London of the 445 re47
seining bonds*
V* T • Ward Aooount. — Mr# Ward’s account for the 200
shares granted him by Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, and
King ues not extremely important. These bonds were to be sold

by Barings for cash and at a premium* Later, when Ward saw the
difficulties encountered with the cash sales of the bonds in
•Account S,* however, he urged that the 200 bonds be sold im
mediately "at not less than par.”

Tet, no me ricet was offered

for them* They were taken at the desired price by Prime, Ward,
and King#*®
Onion Bank Account# — The 1,500 bonds consigned by the
Onion Bank for advances from Baring Brothers also showed ex
t r a s sluggishness * On these bonds, the Union Bank had spec
ified *99 per eent ex i n t e r e s t a s the lowest price aecept49
able, and the sales had to be for cash*
By 1835, only 36 of the 1,500 bonds had been sold* In
January of that year, therefore. Baring Brothers secured an
agreement from the Union Bank not to seek another advance until

47Ibld.. p. £47•
48

Ibid* # pp* 246-247.

49

Xbid., pp. 247-248, of * footnote Baring Brothers
Miscellaneous Correspondence, Perrault (caahior of Union Bank)
to Baring Brothers, November 29, 1832*

HX9
Jfey 1, 1836. As a result | B&riog Brothers rtwir® u&fibls to dis—
#88# #f 488 bonds at rates that produced the limit of the

50

beak, but only at the sacrifice of & part of their comms issIon."
Simety-sewen more were sold between May 1 end July l.

But on

Jbly 90, Baring Brothers announced the sale of 424 at 100J,
ercluding Interest, which meant a loss of one half of one per
sent on their Qo m i s s i o n to make the desired prloe of 99.
Finally, by the end of 1835, the London house still had on
head some 455 bonds consigned to them by the Union Bank
IB 1 8 3 8 . ®
Relations between the Uhion Bank and Baring Brothers
were not always harmonious, but the disagreements were not
serious* Kearly always they were straightened without diffi
culty and by good cooperation on the pert of Baring Brothers.
TBs first friction arose when the Union Bank Directors objected
to the Barings? assumption that all interest payments were to
be effected through the London house even if payments were to be
mads In the United States to other firms. Bering Brothers did
net uphold Prims, Ward, and King on this demand, and they agreed
to Include only Interest payinenta actually paid through them,
if it did reduce their commission somewhat.

W* Eldy, Q P « clt«, p. 248, of, citation, Baring
Brothers Letter Book, Baring Brothers to Morgan (President of
Obion Bank), January 5, 22, 30, 1835.
¥• Hidy ,o p . clt.» p. 548.

Ibid.. p. 250.

BZQ

The saoond source of friction was the Baring Brothersf
to purchase either part, all, or none of the consigned
bemfts ao cording to the terms or the contract. The Union Bank
officials Insisted that "the six months which were to elapse
before Baring Brothers and Company must decide upon the method
of handling the last 1,500 Bonds should he considered as ended
on May 1, 1653, in New Orleans rather than in London."

To

this the London merchant-banks rs agreed instead of adhering
53
to the position held by Mr. ward.
The third misunderstanding was more serious, and it
M a r l y caused severance of relations between Baring Brothers
and the Chian Bank.

It was stated that Baring Brothers were

under eon tract obligation to advance the Union Bank $1,000,000
upoB the consigned bonds should they not purchase them out
right.

Furthermore, because the sale of these bonds had been

slow, an agreement was reached in April, 1834, to reduce the
advance to #500,000— the reduction in the price limit was
refused by the Union Bank. To effect this reduction, the bank
was to remit funds in London.

?then September came, however,

Baring Brothers stated that they would feel at liberty to sell
the heeds at the market rate if the advance was not covered.
TO this the officers wrote that they would cover the advance
am $500,000, end asked that the remaining bonds be held sub
ject to their order. Because of Baring Brothsrst demand they

ZBX
thought that the London house wished to cancel their previous
agreement e, and# therefore, the bank proceeded to H a d pure hasM S for the beads who at the same time would act a a the bankfs
agents, Seedless to say, Baring Brothers protested the hank,s
setlem* They wrote that they had no Intention of altering their
relations with the Louisiana f l m .

In a conciliatory manner

they explained their action, and in January they oarae to terms
s m s mere; they sold a good portion or the bonds to show their
good Intentions* As part or this last negotiation, however, the
Uhlan Bant had asked for a oredit of h 300,000 to be covered
by remittances should Baring Brothers fall to sell all the
heads by the end of 1835* The credit was granted,

Another de

mand was that the commission charges upon acceptances be re
duced,

This was refused. All in all the entire affair turned

Into an amiable solution, and while Buring Brothers were forced
to mate concessions, they saw to it that the operation m s
54
going to be profitable.
Operations of the Bank
During the first four or five years of its existence,
the Uhlan Bank was the most prosperous bank in Nov Orleans, and
it handled a large part of ths business of the Now Orleans Branch
Of the second Bank of the United 3tates,&& and why not?

After

^ I b l d , . pp, 250-251*
high tor, oi>, clt*, p • 592; Aloee Fortier, op* clt « a
Tol* I, p* 64,
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till, kh* second Bank ot the United States at Philadelphia
had played an important role la the sale of the Union Bank
bond*.96
True, the bank, like the Consolidated Association,

found that the stockholders had difficulty in meeting payments
because of crop failures and adverse aarket conditions.

The

thloa Bank was In a better situation because it still had ex

changes to sell and more capital to invest.

Nevertheless, it

ask the name fate the other New Orleans banks faced in May,

183?, and like the other banka of the city, the Union Bank co
operated la order to survive during the depression years. Un

like the two other property banks— the Consolidated. Association
asd the Gitissue* Bank— however, it was in a fairly sound con
dition when la 1043 an Act was passed for the liquidation of
57
the property bank*•
As a matter of Xhot it was one of the
fdv

beaks which had issued bonds that actually did not de-

fault on interest payment*.

58

in 1043, when the notes of the two other property banks

were on feh* market at a discount, the Union Bank notes were
59
being paid in specie•
Its current assets were greater than
56

W «

W. Bldy, os. oit.. p. £42-24 3 .
S. A. Caldwell, op. clt.. p. 48; A. Fortier, op. olt.»
I, p. 64.
58
59

Of., a.

The Dally Picayune. July 1, 1843. Union Bank pays
specie, cTETzen*• Bank notes circulate at 31 to 34 discount,
the Consolidated Association at 36 to 38 discount.
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tt* exmrent Xloblllties; according to Board of Currency,
«lw last &88d^3 were

}9X9 *X91 &&d the l&tsb H&bjLXi.ttics

war* #749,782. 53 .60
When. the first series of the bonds issued became due In
Xeveoter of 1843, the redemption was met— there was no refuudlug*

*1

The Board of Currency stated:
Of the "Property Banks" in vhioh the State
has a more immediate interest, the Union met the
series of her bonds that fell due on the first of
NOTember last, amounting to $1,7&£,000;— the po
sition of the bank renders it w r y certain that a
continuance of past management will secure the same
punctually in her future, as she has observed in so
remarkable & manner in her past engagements•
A H other sources state that the amount redeemed ves

$1,750,000, The discrepancy arises, apparently, from a differ
ence in the Interpretation of par.

There were 1,750 bonds of

the first series, and, therefore, it is logics! to say that
the redemption was $1,750,000.
Because the bank met Its first series, does not mean
that the bank was anxious to meet ensuing maturity bonds. In
1044 the officials of the Union Bank started to press the

^gl l e a Weekly Register, Vol. XIII, p. 340
6*Cf«Y Haw Orleans Bee, August 6 , 1844; Leg. Doc,, 1844,
•Benort of’ the $oard of Currency": lilies Weekly Register, Vol.
XTX, p. 412; 8 A. Caldwll, 0£. oTETT p : W : Ale,. Toriler
op. pit.» Part 1, p. 04; and v*. o, Scroggs, op. oit., p. 105.

.

63R, 0. McGrane, op. olt.. p. 188,

,
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Legislature for a new issue of bonds* They claimed that if
M W bends were issued, the hank could pay on its bonds in the
future*

This was not granted*
The 1847 series was also met— if not In full, at least

almost so--for the Louisiana State Auditor reported, January 1,
1848, that the Union Bank bonds had been funded to ths* amount
68
Of fS,834,000.
Had both series bean completely redeemed,
the total should have stood at #5,500,000.
Governor Joseph Walker, on January £6, 1858, wrote a
message to the Senate and House, stating:
X have the honor to inform you that one mil
lion eight hundred and sixty-four thousand dollars
of the bonds of the State, issued in fevor of the
Union Bank of Louisiana, with five hundred and
forty-two thousand six hundred and fifty dollars of
interest coupons, and amounting in all to th© sum
of two nil) Ion four hundred end six thousand six
hundred and fifty dollars {£2,406,650) were deliv
ered by Christopher Adams, President of said bank
on the 25d instant, to the Secretary of State,
Attorney General and myself, and destroyed by burn
ing, in conformity with resolution No. 7 approved
January 85th, 1844, and a record of the proceedings
made in the State Treasurer’s office in obedience
to the above stated resolution .64
Thus, seeing tint the Union Bank was liquidating its
bonded debt successfully, the Legislators proceeded to make pro
vision for a settlement. On March 6, 1852, the Judiciary Com
mittee introduced "An Act to induce the State freaaurer to
settle with the Union Bank of Louisiana.”

So ardent were

«SL*g. Doe*, 1849, "Auditor’s Report," January 1, 1848,
54SBa>

a 1852, pp. 38—39.
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the Legislators for the hill* that* on motion* the rules
were suspended* and the Act was passed .66
What the State wanted as a settlement was to relieve
Itself of contingent liability and at the same time to give
up its right to one sixth of the profits,

e^, sell its

stocks for a lump sum.
The State Treasurer approached the bank to effect a
settlement and the officials offered hi;a but eighteen dollars
a share for the one-sixth interest.
was right in refusing .66

This he refused and he

In June* 1852, the State received its

first dividend which amounted to $207*170, and on January 1,
1653* another £137*396.
Of course* the State did not receive the entire sum for
its own use •

The entire amount of the first dividend and

$22*866.73 of the second were retained by the bank upon agree
ment.

Part was retained "on account of the liabilities of

the Bank for Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company ;67
*3 *000 was credited on account of a sight draft on the Treas
urer* paid by the Bank; and $6,000 to refund a deposit made

65House Deb., 1852, p. 111.
. . 66LS£. Doc., 1052.
"Reports of the Standing Committees
ef the Senate and House of Representatives on banks e n d Bank
ing." P* 4.
67La. Acts. 1848.
No. 190, p. 124. A resolution was
approved »3arch 16* 1848* whereby the State a c q u i r e d 217 bonds
of the State Issued for the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad
and Banking Company.
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to represent six State Bonds which the Bank ( was ) ready
to delirer.w

The remaining $105,629,67 was deposited to the

eredlt or the state on the books or the bank subject to
tea ft.68
The Committee on Banks and Banking demanded information
fTOBi the Uhion Bank to ascertain the position of the State as
one-sixth owner.
11,

The Statement of Affairs presented February

1854, Indicated that the fixed assets were m l u e d at

$541 ,108,33, while the fixed or long-tern liabilities were
$106,000.

The current assets, on the other hand, amounted to

$636,912,85, against which there were current liabilities
69
to the extent of $556,000.56,
In view of this information, therefore, it is simple to
see -Ay they advised that It was not to the best Interest of
the State to sell to the bonk Its prospective share of the
profits— they recommended that the bank be

permitted to pro

ceed in Its regule r course of liquidation and the State re70
eeive the profits as they were realized.
Bod of the Union Bank us & Fropex*ty Bank
By the end of 1852 not all of the bonds had. been re
deemed, but the liquidation of the debt was proceeding without
difficulty.

The remaining debt was nominal and provisions

^ L a » Acts, 1048, No. 190, p. 124.
go
Leg. Doc., 1853, T>Report of Joint Commit too upon
Busks sad m n k i n g , ” p. 21.
7QIbld.. 1852, p. 4.
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t a & b M a made for the payment.*3^

Therefore, the Dank was per-

iHtiil t o eentimwe Its operation until the expiration of
ahtrfcer*

Its

That was in 1857.

W h e n the Union Bank ©eased as a property bank, however,

it did sot go out of existence. Louisiana had passed a ifree
Banking Lew In 1853 and the Union Bank of Louisiana was reineerporated under Its provisions; it became a free stock
78
bank.
After the Civil V-ar it took the ruuie of Union National
73
Bank* which it kept until Its liquidation in 1896.
M o m will be said about the Union Bank in the conclud
ing chapter, but a few pertinent remarks can be laed© here.
Me doubt the amount of capital was large— maybe more than was
needed---but the bank succeeded in meeting its Interest pay*
Mats*

Chet is more, it did not need to refund its debt at

Cay tins* It nay be that the redemption was not too punctual,
bat it was effected pretty much according to the charter regwiXMMBts, end when it was over, there was a profit to be
Showni The stockholders, instead of being assessed, received
dividends* Certainly the picture was not as described by Mr.
1* T.

In his Soonomic History of the South.
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a M

Of..

It was not

Harold Heck. Developing of Banking iri Louisiana,

B *4 s §f L . . ,

L . 8 . U. E iS ix * ^ M iS T T 5 3 f e ru n p S E M e a

• M M M r l p t ) , p. so.
S. A. Trufant, "Hevlew of Banking in New Gi’leana,
I M P 16*0," Louisiana Hlatorloal Society, rol. 10, p. 38.

2ZB
tew* fete*

wThs bank soon tied up its capital in frozen

assets, issued too ja&ny bank notes, and went into liquidation
74
slang with the Planters Bank*" ( sic )

C f .. pp. 363-364. What Mr* Hawk meant by Planter®
ftmir
the Consolidated Association of the Planters of
I d d s i a n a , not the Planters Sank which was incorporated in
m .

CHAPTER V
TEE CITIZENSf BANK OF LOUISIANA

Perhaps no bank In Louisiana has bad as varied a his
tory *s the Citizens* Bank; and certainly no bank has had a
eloser relationship with the economic, agricultural, conraercial,
and basking development of the State, especially during the
period

frost 1336 to 1642. Its span of life extends from 1833

to I M S — a hundred year 3 of varied, complex, and confusing activ
ities.

From 1833 to 1842 it vms an active property bank. Dur

ing the next ten years it m s

in a state of liquidation. In

1853 It was revived as a stock bank with two separate depart
ments, a banking department and a mortgage stock depnrtoient,
with the f o m e r ©ssumlng the obligations of the property bank.
In 1911 It was reorganized again under the name of The Cit
izens * B+mr and Trust Company.

In 1924 it merged with the

Canal Commercial Bank and became the Citizens* Branch of the
Canal Bank and Trust Company.

The end of its history came with

the Banking Crisis of 1933.
This chapter, however, does not cover the entire history.
It takes Into consideration only that portion relating to prop
erty banking and State bonds issued for the bank and in Its
Caver.

Nevertheless, the analysis covers a period extending
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tram 1635 to 1902, and the story Is a Ions

oociplicated

S M despite the lack of existing data to accord a complete
description of the more important phases* To avoid repetition
sad lengthy discussions, therefore, analyses which pertain to
this hank hut which were previously stated in farmer chapters
will be eliminated where possible*

The reader, however, Is

asked to remain aware of the analysis given with respect to
the ease study on the Consolidated Association

Inasmuch as

there la great similarity between the two in xaany instances*
Organization of the Bank
A bill to Incorporate a third property bank in Louisiana
was introduced in both Houses of the State Legislature, Febru
ary 1, 1835* Mr. Grymea, spokesman for the bill in the House
of kepresentatlves, proposed that this new property bank have
broad privileges.

He advocated that the concern,

• * * in addition to the usual privilege of
issuing cad discounting notes, receiving deposits,
aad negotiating exchange, be permitted, to underwrite
against marine losses and losses by fire; also to
e a n t m o t for the expenses of any work of internal
improvement: such as canals, railroads and even
to the building of & house .1
The charter for such a grandiose scheme was granted
April 1, and by the t e r m of the Act the Citizens* Bank was
authorized to issue 112,000,000 of bonds with interest at

^Batou Houge Gazette, February £, 1833.
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fit* per cent, and their maturity dates were to extend from
14 to 50 yea re. Mortgages on property were to act as security
for the bonds, and they were to be acquired from the subsoribers in payment for $14,400,000 of the b£mkf£> stock.
procedure was the same as prescribed for the Consolidated
Association and the Union Bank; the subscribers of the CItim r s v

Bank stock

w . . • mortgaged their lands ana slaves to

secure the shares taken by them

and the mortgages given by

the stockholders were to remain in the vaults of the bunk to
serve as a perpetual pledge nto the holder or holders of said
beads until the expiration of the charter and the final
4
liquidation of the affairs of the bank.”
la the event of nonpayment of either principal or in
terest on the bonds by the bank, the bondholders were entitled
to enforce payment by materializing on the mortgages through
legal process.
pora t ion

Nevertheless, under this original act of in cor

in 1833, the State did not bind Itself in any manner

for the debts of the bank.

The bonds were to be bank bonds

without the State pledge.
The stockholders on the pledge of their certificates
cn deposit with the bank, were entitled to a credit from the
bank equal to m

half the par value of their shares. "On using

this eredit, the subscriber was required to give his note, r©~
La. A c t s . 1833, pp. 172-192.
A. A. LeX/ms. Reminiscences Culled from Annals of the
Citizens Bunk of Louisiana a® cited by H. Heck, op. clt
p # 31
Loo » clt.

B32

newable at the end of ©very twelve months, on payment of the
interest ($i£) annually In advance, and such proportion of the
eapltel sum in annual Instalments as would extinguish the
debt at a certain fixed period. "5

recourse the hank had

In case of nonpayment by the stockholders was foreclosure by
law or by other court action; failure, neglect, or refusal to
pay Interest or instalment on principal of the loan, gave the
bank the privilege to enforce payment in accordance with the
provisions of its charter and the laws of the State.
Albeit that cotton and sugar planters and other proper
ty owners already had two banks to serve them with a capital
amounting to nine and a half millions of dollars, and albeit
that these property owners were already stockholders to the
amount of eleven millions of dollars, there were still many
property owners left who were anxious to secure credit and
willing to become stockholders in a property bank.

The terms

that were offered the subscribers were very attractive and they
satisfied the property owners.
property was accepted.

Most any fixed,tangible

It was not necessary that it be prop

erty In the state of cultivation and it was not required that
It be revenue-raising property.

Uncleared land and vacant city

lots met the requirements for mortgage with this bank, because,
if development were taken into consideration, these too were
liquid, safe assets.

Slbid

Furthermore, all properties were ac-
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cepted at the current valuation* simply because the belief
was that the value of property and slaves always appreciated
— never depreciated.

The result was that the bank's stocks

were oversubsox\lbed.

Every owner "of a vacant lot, whether dry

or under water, every proprietor of old ten&ntlesa buildings
imagined that the millenluni was really approaching ,116 end each
hastened to subscribe., with the result that subscriptions for
stocks totaled $35,875,600.

The stock subscription was lim

ited by law at $14,400,000, therefore, the applications for
stocks had to be scaled down*

This was accomplished by reject

ing the non-qualifying applicants and by reducing the amount
of each subscription without altering its ratio to the entire
subscription so that the total subscribed did not exceed the
legal limit.
Attempts to Sell Bank Bonds
Immediately after the chai'ter was granted in 1833, the
Consaissioners for the Citizens* Bank proceeded to the Northeast
in an attempt to sell the bonds in this country, but they wore
not successful in finding e market. Only a sum of $133,333,33
was borrowed that year through the sale of the bank bonds .7 In
1334, the Citizens 1 Bank directed its Ooiomis si oners to attempt
negotiations in Burope for a sale of 09,000,000.

No one in

Rightor, op. clt., p. 593, and 3. A. Trufant, op.
clt. . pp. 25-40.
743 Le. Ann. 738. hope & Co. vs . Board of Liquidation;
47 La. Ann."Tg74. D . A. Breard,Jr. vs. Citizens* lank of
Louisiana. et. al.
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Interested in tho bonds• Tbus, the CdSEBissionsro

tried Amsterdam*

Here they entered Into a conditional eon-

t a o t in February, 1855, whereby the firm, of ¥* willinck was
to tote the entire #9,000,000 issue and offer **he bonds for
a l e on the European market* The Amsterdam banking house then
set days for subscript ion to the bonds, but there were no
takers, mainly because the Louisiana firm failed to transmit
the boids to the Holland company*

When the bonds did reach

Amsterdam, however, a new contract was signed— July 5, 1655*
V* H I lino k Issued a printed circular or a prospectus

offering

the bcmde at forty cents to tho guilder, but this second at*
8
tempt was unsuccessful*
While these negotiations were going on with W* Willinck,
other Commissioners were appointed and they too were sent to
Europe to negotiate the loan, provided their predecessors had
not completed the sale * They went t o England in an attempt to
eater negotiations as their predecessors had done*

They

found no interest on the part of Baring Brothers* Mr* ft* T.
tkrd had warned the Baring concern already.
the charter of the Citizens Bank,”

rtI have examined

he wrote on June 28, 1835,

"and have case to the conclusion to have nothing to do with
it on this side* * . * Under this charter X do not see but
that the bank m y do Just what it pleases and to any extent

8R.

0* McGrane, op* clt** P* 174.
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a
within the limits of double the amount of it® capital."
Nevertheless, it we a not necessary to warn Baring Brothers;
their

negotiations with the Uhlan Bank of Louisiana hed led

them to alter their policy of taking large issue a of bonds fear
resale*

10

When It came to the other London bankers and bro

kers, the Commissioners oould not get their interest either,
although they had some encouragement from Thomas ftllson and
Company and a new firm being organized in London by Lizard!
Harms nos of Paris, which went under the name of Francois de
Lizard! sad Company.U

They assisted the Commissioners,

however, in contacting Hope and Company of Amsterdam.
One of the new Comal as loners arrived in Amsterdam in
August, and during September he succeeded

in entering into a

conditional contract with the Holland bankers.

12

Hope and

Company agreed to take 5,750 bonds, which amounted to $3,000,
1$
000 In American money,
provided the Citizens Bank obtained
9

Baring Brothers miscellaneous Letters: w. T. Ward to
Baring Brothers, New York, June 2 2 f 1835,’ aif~cited by R. 0.
MoGrane, o p . olt.» p. 175.
10Cf .. E . W. Hidy, op. olt.. p. 253.
^CH E O , 1830, Ho. 20, p* 15.
M CS1C, 1342, p. 8 .
^ T h e Citizens’ Bank bonds were not of $ 1,000 den onlinetion. Xach bond had on its face three values; &444.44,
b 100 sterling, and 1,200 guilders.
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the pledge of the State of Louisiana over and above that of
14
the bank;
provided, toot that the State repeal the power
gives to the bank to purchase stock of the Borgne navigation
Company of New Orleans.

15

Following are the terms of that

contract, vis.:
Conditional Contract between Hope and Company of
Amsterdam, and Edmund J. Fore tall, acting on behalf
ot the Citizens Bank of Louisiana , under a power of
attorney bearing date 9th May, 1635, to wit:
On the first part, and on the conditions herein
after mentioned, Messrs. Hope and Co. hereby agree to
purchase of the Citizens Bank of Louisiana who also
hereby agree to sell them, three millions of dollars,
M y 6750 bonds, of h 100 sterling each, of the State
of Louisiana, which may be Issued In favor of said
bank, in equal series of 14, £3,
41, and 50
years, and bearing an interest of 5 per cent, payable
sanl-annua lly; payment of the same to be made on deliv
ery, at the rate of 1,£G0 for every bond of h 100 ster
ling; binding themselves to remit, if so directed, the
proceeds of said bonds to London or Paris, on account
of the bank, free of all charges except the customary
brokerage of one-tenth of one per cent* The said Hope
and Co* reserving t o themselves the right, until the
10th of January next, to reduce their said purchase to
one million of dollars, should any extraordinary change
have taken place in the European money market; and also
re serving to themselves the preference of the remain
ing bonds of the bank, or any portion of them, which
may be offered for sals in Europe at their current
value*
On the other part, the Citizens* Bank binds
Itself to use all its exertions to obtain, on or be
fore the 1st of February next, the following amend
ments to its charter, which are hereby made the sine
qua non of this contract, to wit:

14
Loe* olt*
C. HOG pane, op* clt*. pp. 174-175; and of*
85 Cong* Z Sees * 7x. Doe* Ho. 79, p* 638*
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1st
2nd

The repeal of the power given to the
hank to subscribe to the stock of the
Lake Borgne Navigation Company*
The issuing of the bonds of the State
of Louisiana, la lieu of tho bank*

The endorseent of the bonds purchased && -above shall
specify that the principal Is to be reimbursed at the
counting-house of Hope & Co., Amsterdam, at the rate
of & 1200 per & 100 sterling, and each bond shall be
d r a w for i 100 sterling
and the interest
be made payable at the same place, on the 1st Febru
ary and 1st August la each year; and coupons in the
margin of the bonds, for thirty guilders each, shall
be thereto attached.
The interest of the two millions in suspense
shall only be computed (639) from the first day of
the month of the delivery of the sale bonds in Amster
dam.
It is agreed that the commission of Hope & Co.,
is to be two per cent, and on© quarter pox cent,
brokerage, on the amount purchased by them, and half
per cent, on the dividends and half per ooat on the
principal reimbursement.
It is also agreed that the Citizens* Bank binds
itself not to offer for aale in Lurope, without the
consent of Hope & Co., its remaining bonds, the two
millions of dollars, if not taken or accepted be
fore the 1st of January, 1 ® 7 ; it being understood
that the bank may dispose of 43,000,000 in the United
States, provided the interest be made payable and
the capital reimbursed there.
It is also understood that the two million dol
lars of bonds, If taken, shall be forwarded, after
the receipt of Hope & Co* *s notification to that ef
fect, within the shortest delay, not exceeding thirty
days •
Executed in triplicate, In the city of Amster
dam, this first day of September, 1335. ivitness the
hands of the above parties:
Sullen
Witnesses &•• Ro
inhold
^86

Hope & Co*
26
Edmund 3*. Foratall

Cong. 2 3ess* , Ex. Doo. No* 79, p. 633.
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The Act of 1856
Xn order to ooa^ply with the provisions of the condi
tions 3 contract with Hope and Company an act to engage the
faith of the State on the bonds was passed in January* 1836*
This pledge was granted in a peculiar manner, however* By the
t e n * of the Act the State pledged its faith on only £3*000*
000 of bonds* which it authorised the bonk to issue immediate
ly* end obviously this was to effect the sale with Hope and
Ompeny.

On the remaining £9*000*000, it agreed to pledge its

fbith by granting the bank the privilege to issue the same
kind of tends up to § 12*000*000. Ttaoh issue was to be In five
1?
equal series*
One-fifth of the bonds was to uature in each
of the following years: I960, 1859, 1868, 1877, and 1386,
that is* 14* 23, 32, 41, and 50 years from February 1, 1836.
for the privilege and pledge granted
for one-sixth

18

the State asked

of the bank's profits* and any sum thus ac

quired was to be applied to the support of free schools and
19
three colleges. By profits, the state intended to include the
net Insane from operations and the premiums received from
the sale of bonds in the negotiations succeeded in obtaining
a price above that specified by law.
17L b .

Acte. 1836* pp. 16-24.
La. Ann. 286. Citizens Bank vs. Levee Steam Cotton
Compress Company; I n . Acts, iB'gff* pp.“ 16-24.
La. Acts, 1336* pp. 16-24. The profits were to be di
vided to the free schools on the be.sis of the population of
eeeb perish* end £5,000 was to be given to each of thro© col
leges for scholerchips. Tho colleges were: J'efferson College in
St. y a m s Parish* College of Franklin in Opelousas, College of
Fackson in Fast Feliciana.
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Negotiations or the State Fledged Bonds
®ie negotiations of the State bonds issued for and in
Ihvor of the Citizens9 Bank were extremely complice*ted* Anyone
net acquainted with some of the entangling relationships among
the houses and agents involved with the negotiations will be
faced with utter confusion.
First, there was the Netherlands becking house of Hope
and Company.

The Citizens9 Bank was anxious and willing to

have this Amsterdam concern sell Louisiana bonds on the Euro
pean market. The bank, however, had very little relationship
with Hope and Company otherwise; that is, it was not interest
ed in maintaining an account with the Dutch bank in order to
dsmv guilder exchange bills against Hope and Company. On the
other hand, English sterling bills of exchange and French franc
drafts did interest the Citizens9 Bank, Therefore, they wanted
to establish accounts in London and Paris.

By having tho

Dutoh bank sell the bonds and deposit the funds in a French or
English bank against which the Citizens9 Bank could draw bills
of exchange, the problem was simplified*

This was done by

selecting the banking firms of Thomas Wil3an and Company and
Francois dsllzardl

as the London agents, and Lizardl Hermanos

as the Paris agent*
Thomas Wilson noon failed and that left the Llzardis as
21
the exclusive London agent;
but the sole agency was not a
20CB10, 1842, p. 2.
2xor.. h. C. Mocrane,

op

*

clt. *

p* 14.
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simple affair.

It involved tho Citizens1 Bank later in an

extremely unusual manner,
In Itself the Lizardi organization was complicated, to
say the least.

Lizardi Kermanos of Paris had established in

1835 two sister houses.

To London went Txancisco deLizardi to

open the banking firm of Francois deLizardi and Company.

To

New Orleans went ~^iguel and later manuel deLizardi to organ
ize the house of *1. deLizardi and Company.

Actually, the latter

earned firm bought out the concern of A. Gordon and It. J, For
etell and Company, the two gentlemen remaining

with the New

Orleans house of deLizardi.
Messrs. a . Gordon and L. J. Forstall, besides being mem
bers of the New Orleans house, also were the ; merlcen agents
for the London firm of deLizardi.

They were the official rep

resentatives and the business transactions in this country
with the English house went through their hands.
Mr. E. J. Forstall was, moreover, president of the
Citizen*s Bank; in other words, the bank president was the
agent for the bank’s agent.
With the Act passed In January, 1636, the conditional
contract with hope and Company became on actual contract.

Post

haste the directors of the Citizens* Bank co^nmenced to draw
against the *3,000,000 of bonds; that wao in February, 1856.
No more bonds were sold during 1836.

The next news of

another sale was received February 20, 1827, when Francois

22CBIC, 1842, p. 2.

og

£41
dsLisardi advised that Hope and Company had purchased 3,375
a w e heads, or $1,499,985 at face value* The payments were to
he one-third on February 28, one-third on April 30, and one£5
third on Kay 31.
This sale brought about a series of
events which beclouded without end the ensuing transactions
between the Citizens* Bank and the English banking houses*
Then, too, It brought no small amount of friction and dis
harmony among the directors and officers of the Citizens*
Bank.
What the Citizens* Bank expected from the sale to Hope
and Company was to have funds in the hands of its agents upon
which it could draw bills of exchange* Therefore, after Fran
cois deLizardl notified the Citizens* Bank of the sale, the
Hev Orleans institution proceeded to drew many drafts on the
European agents, mostly on Lizardi Henaanoa of Paris. Muoh to
its surprise, however, the bank found many of the drafts pro
tested which had been drawn on Linardi Henna nos.

The Paris

house pleaded that the bills were protested because they had
act been informed by Francois deLizar&i of London that the
hash was to draw on them, and that funds had not been forwarded
to Paris by London to take ears of the drafts. Actually, what
the Paris house had done was to use the Citizens* Bank funds
to take ear© of the difficulties they were encountering in

23
CHIC, 1836, No. 1, P. 13.
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tt* M&reh money market o h a o s . ^
Hope and Company made its on©-third payment on the pur
chase qf bonds and it was effected through Lizard! Hexnanos
even though the sale took place through ifrnncols deLizardi•
lizard! Hermanns took the funds for their own purposes 9 that
is, to honor their own obligations, Instead of placing the
funds on account of the Citizens* Bank*

When an avalanche of

drafts drawn by the Citizens 9 Bank arrived In Paris they were
pretested on the pretense that the negotiations took plaee
through Francois deLlzardi, and, therefore, they were not
authorized to honor the bills because they had not been
as
advised to do so by the London firm.
A l a action by Llz&rdl Hezmanos, not to mention the pro*
tests by other bankers, nearly precipitated an immediate crisis
in Wee Orleans*

Many houses Ihiled, but the crisis was averted

The March episode on the European money market had its
rest in England, or rather Ireland* In November of 1836, the
Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland failed and a run
started in other Ireland banks; fortunately this was stopped by
the b m k of England* During the same month the Northern and Cen
tral Bank of Manchester with Its thirty-nine branches faced
difficulty and os lied upon the Bank of England for he Ip. These
incidents resulted in the Bank of Englaad*s placing restric
tions on Anglo-Amerioan relations* The crisis occurred in
March of 1837 when three Anglo-American houses— T* Wilson A. Co.,
e* Wildes 1 Co., and T. Wiggins & Co. (the three W 9e) — found
thesselves unable to meet their engagement a . This had enormous
repercuss ions— the Paris firm of Llzardl Her 139nos being in
volved* (Of*, B. C. McGrene, op* clt.. p. 14) .
E50BXC, 1838, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,

pp. 13 and 14.
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VtttiX Miy when the panic was nation-wide. Lizard! Hermanos,
according to a letter written by Francois deLlzardi on Itoy 09,
finally accepted ttoe drafts, tout toy then the damage toad been
dene* The result of the affair was that the Isaak changed Its
ageney in Paris to Andre and

Cottier

teter,

quite a stir in the affairsof the

1337, and it created

Citizens9 Bank

Company.

That wasin Oc-

which increased in intensity as time went on*

I d W B i J. foretell, president of the bank and agent for de
llzardl, offered his resigns tion; and while it was not
accepted, it remained a chafing incident*
The Lizardi Kexso&nos episode, ttoe Panic, and the dla*
wlceal

of the Paris agency, however, did not disrupt the nego

tiations*

Bonds continued to toe sold, and for a time Francois

deLlzardi continued to act as agents for the Citizens* Bank*
Xn July, 1837, Hope and Company purchased another 300
27
bonds at ttoe same xate as before the crisis
and within a
28
had sold them at par*
On July 26, 1,175 bonds w e n
sold toy Francois deLlzardi to Marquis Casa Riera; the agents,

however, claimed that they toad to give up all commissions to
effect the sale within the limits set toy the bank*
the 83rd and 30th of October

29

Between

Mr* P* J» Trlcou, in behalf of

the Citizens 9 Bank, entered into a contract with Mr* L* J.

Itold*.
Ibid*

Ho. 28» p. 17
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F o w t a i l , agent for Francois deLiaardi, to sell to the London
f i m 800 tends of each, of the five series, that Is, 1,500
tends.

__

SO

The price offered was £ 705,533*33.

of tee tends was £656,650.

the fhee vain©

In brief, it was an advantage

31
or premium. for the Citizens* Bank to the amount of #36,673.33.
Thns ended 1837 with the Hew Orleans institution having dis
posed tte faee-value s m of #5,300,000 in State pledged
tend©.3*
The year 1833 began with another sale of #360,000 of
tends. In January, Hope and Company agreed to purchase 825
tends for b 77,784. 13.4, or approximately £343,500.
Two
54
months later they acquired #500,000 more*
On the seventh of
ifereh, Hope & Company wrote to i\ deLlzardi of their intention
to purchase 1125 tends more on the same terms as those of Jan35
wary and the bonds were transmitted to them on the ninth.
36
The price paid was t 105,847. 6.0, or about $469,960.
Another 400 tends were taken in May for h 37,955, or nearly

S0C3IC, 1836, So. 31, p. 21.

The reason why ?. deLlzardi could offer such a price
was that they received 8 per cent in premium when they sold
their dxaft. to obtain the funds to effect payment in New
Orleans.
CBI0, 1842, p. 4.
Ibid.; 03IC, 1836, Noa. 41 and 43, pp. 24 and 25.

34

CBXC, 1842, p. 4.

55

CM C, 1836, Ho. 44, p. 25.
36

845

HW|ttO. fto Moalalog 785 bonds ot their series was
JtO

t> l » mi June SO.

This resulted in there being a nego

tiated capital by the Citizens * Bank of $6,666,666,67 at the
38

end of Augrat, 1638•

ftbat the Hew Orleans bank actually

received on the sale of the bonds, however,

cannot be asoer-

taiaed because the bank kept no records; that is, no entries
appeared on its books in relation to this matter*3^
In September, 1838, the friction existing within the
Direction of the Citizensf Bank grew into a cleavage; which be
came a wide-open break

that came near assuming catastrophic

proportions• It nearly destroyed the bank itself, not to
Mfttloa the effects on the market of Louisiana securities.
On the surface the claim was that the majority of the direc
tors was opposed to the multitude of irregularities committed
by Francois deLlzardi for whom Mr. F. y. Foret all, president
of the bank, was the American agent.

Underneath it was a

rebellion against the strict and regular operations of the
bmir when "easy-credit" under any terms was in demand. Xt was
also a Jealous rebellion against the president, cashier, and
a few of the directors. The result of this affair was that Mr.
Fora tall resigned and Francois deLlzardi & Company ceased to
be agents for the bank.

The affair Oi>ened the way for grandiose

scheme a and unsound practices— the beginning of the end of the

■ I b K U . NO. 50, p. 28.
g C U I C , 1842, p. 6 .

CMC , 1838, No. 65, PP. 35-36
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Citizens' Bank* A change of agency was voted September 24;
the reasons for the change were:
1* That la May, 1837, F.deLlzardi & Co*, in conse
quence of their imprudent operations, became unable
to pay the sum of $157,000, accruing from the sale
of Bonds of the Bank,and of which they had received
the amount*
£* n e t in May, 1637, the Bills of the Bank of Baris
were protested for non-acceptance, and that this is
as muoh the fault of S1*- deLlzardi & Co* as that of
Llsardi Hermanns, and perhaps more blame is to be
attached to the former than to the latter. By this
eiroumstanoe the credit of the Bank was necessa
rily very much impaired.
3. That F. deLlzardi & Go* sold 1175 Bonds below the
limits, and in violation of the Instructions pre
scribed by the bank*
4* That F* deLlzardi & Go* borrowed $43,000 on pro
tested Bills, the property of the Bank*
5* That F* deLlzardi & Go* were wanting in sincerity
when they sought to excuse Lizardl H s n m n o s by pre
tending that there had been no transfer of funds
from London to Paris*
6*

That on the 23d of July last ( 1836 ), P* deLlzardi
& Co* did not take measures to pay in full at matu
rity, a note of %234,444.44, accruing from the sale
of 1500 Bonds (including the 1175 Bonds sold in vio
lation of the Instructions of th© Bank), although
the Bank granted them, for reimbursement of this sum,
ell the time that they had themselves asked for*

7* Lastly, the majority of the Committee are of opinion,
that the Bank la selecting as their agent in London,
some other House, older and better known, than that
of 7. deLlzardi &. Go. which Is of recent formation,
would find it easier to negociate the remainder of 4n
the Bonds: a result deaired by all the stockholders. w

Ibid* * Ho* 61, p. 29* This change of agency was final
ly voted on October 22, 1838*
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Reid, Irving and Company was selected to replace
Francois deLlzardi and Company*

They and Andre and Cottier

of Paris acted as agents of the Bank for the remainder of the
bonds that were sold .41
By the end of 1838 Andre & Cottier sold 250 bonds, pay
able In post-notes at fifty per cent discount*

That brought

the total of bonds sold by January 1, 1839, to $6,777t777*78.4S
From then until the middle of 1642 both new agents proceeded to
sell small amounts at various prices and terras*

In July of

1839, the total capital by sale of bonds amounted to $5,822,000*
A bond sale of only $44,222 had been made in six months*

From

July, 1839, to July, 1840, another $44,000 of bonds was sold,
bringing the total to $5,866,000.

From July, 1840, to July,

1841, the amount rose to $6,927,000*00, and by July, 1842, the
bonds sold amounted to $7,188,888.

After that time no more bonds

were sold, for the bank went into liquidation in October.4®
Operations of the Citizens* Bank, 1836-1842
The Citizens* Bank commenced operations in rJarch, 1836.
Inasmuch as the Act of January had made the conditional con
tract with Hope and Company a legal and accepted contract, the
firm was in a position to draw on its new accounts with the
London agents handling the sale of bonds with the Amsterdam

ttCBIC, 1842, p. 6.
42Ibld..

p. 8 .

4gIbld..

p. 22.
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company*

Against these accounts the officers of the bank,

therefore, proceeded to discount commercial paper, and within
two ninths;that is, by May 15, these discounts equaled the
then existing oapital.

Loans were also granted to the stock-

holders as soon as funds became available; each stockholder
was permitted #25*00 per share*44

Business was soaring dur

ing these early monts and the bank was extremely active.
Scarcely six months had passed when difficulties appear
ed on the horizon.

Along with the other banks of the city,

the new Citizens* Bank was feeling the tremendous drain on the
specie reserves.

Unlike most of the other banks, however,

this property bank had the means of acquiring specie.

The

bank’s bonds continued to sell in Europe and these sales built
the firm’s accounts with the European agents; these accounts
permitted the bank to draw

bills of exchange with which nec

essary speoie could be purchased from Havana and Mexico.
Most of the bankers of the city were of the opinion
that by offering a premium for specie it would check the flow
out and even encourage It to return In sufficient amount to
meet the demands.

Mr. Forstall, president of the Citizens’

Bank, however, was opposed to the move.

To him, such a policy

would be tantamount to an acknowledgement of a depreciation of
the paper currency.

He proposed In its stead to have his bank

import such amounts of specie as might be needed.4^
ciation of Bank Presidents took to the Idea*

44Ibld..

p. 2 .

25 Cong. 2 Bess#, Ex. Doc. Wo..79, p. 651.

The Asso
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At first, It m s
seeded,

thought that <£3,000,000 would be

but as discuss ions progressed among the bank pres

idents, it m s

felt that the immediate importation of

#1,500,000 would suffice ,46

The refers, the Citizens' Bank

use authorized to import #1,650,000, which would be taken by
the various banks as a loan, according to the terms of the
47
agreement signed by the bank presidents.
To obtain the importation of gold and silver, Messrs,
H, deLlzardi and Company of Bow Orleans were requested to
Issue their domestic bills for sale la Havana and Mexico to

purchase specie there. This specie, Messrs, dd Lizard! were
to deliver to the bank when received, and to reimburse themselves they were to draw against the bank's account with y,
48
dsLlzardi of London,
46

GAML, Citizens1 Bank to Consolidated Association,
M m Orleans, Octobe r 11, 1856 •
ATmjj- orders for specie by the various banka were as
follows:
Canal and Banking Co. ----------- ^200,000
Bank of Orleans
100,000
Consolidated Association------- 100,000
City Bank
200,000
Mechanic and Traders ----------- 150,000
Improvement & Banking Co,
200,000
Gas-Light and Banking Go, ------ 300,000
Commercial Bank
100,000
Carrollton B a n x ----------— *--- 100,000
Bank of Louisiana
100,000
Atchafal/? ya B a n k --------------- 100,000
Ll,650,000
*a Cf. CBIO, 1838, No. 67, p. 49; and 25 Cong. 2 Seas.,
Ex. Doe., No. 79, p. 652.
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Mr. foretell, who was talcing an active part In the
settings or the Association of Bank Presidents during Septemter and October, orrered several sound suggestions on banking
practices and principles. Hot too much attention, however,
was paid to them at the time, but the Citizensf Bank was fol
lowing them, which probably accounted for the strong finan
cial position of the bank, a financial strength which remained
even through and after the crisis which followed *
la a latter written to the bank presidents, October 11,

1836, Mr* Foretell suggested a principle for sound currency
and basking which was later incorporated in the Bank Act of
1M&*

His idea, of which he did not claim to be the origina

tor, was that good comaercla 1 paper served as & sound basis
for a stable and elastic currency provided there was suffi
cient spools backing the currency in order to prevent sudden
expansions and contractions* By having the circulating notes
backed by two-thirds ooasaerci&l paper these notes could vary
in amounts of circulation according to the demand and market
conditions*

Nevertheless, currency needed an equi libra tor to

prevent sudden and dangerous fluctuations and a one-third
specie reserve, therefore, was essential in order that the
currency might also follow the movements of the meteUios.
His statement was:
Nxperlenoe has proved that with a circula
tion of paper of no less a denomination than $5*00,
each Bank ought to regulate its operations so as
to have in Its vaults an amount of specie equal to
ose-thlrd of its Cash responsibilities* were this
Rule strictly adhered to, and made a fundamental
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part of the Constitution of all monied Institu
tions, tbs Currency of the Country could never he
disturbed— to extend or curtail suddenly is equally
dangerous— a good medium will always he obtained
by following the movement of the no tallies
The members of the Association of Bank Presidents agreed
with Mr* yorate11* s idea and they authorized the Citizens*
Bank to acquire the necessary specie for their respective
banks* After operations had begun on the acquisition of specie,
however, there m s a change of attitude on the iart of the
bank officials, which change reflected the feeling on the
part of the public.

The people did not care for money which

was readily convertible; they were suffering from a lack of
currency, even paper notes, and they wanted plenty of money
and cheap money.

A maintenance of specie redemption of paper

currency could only serve to further contract the amount of
notes In circulation.

Both the banks and the public— with a

false illusion— were now looking at a suspension in specie re
demption as a means of relief. The imported specie, therefore,
was not employed by the banks and Messrs. M. deLlzardi were
50
left with the bulk of it *
**GA.1£L, loc* olt.;
79, p. 656.

and 25 Gong. 2 Bess. Ex* Poc., Ho.
fows^*

i*aportatioas from

247^846

jii’kj

my

Jga?

&

iS'S»
,

August

j*

114 9/9

252
Tfcs Ifey crisis of 188? occurred scarcely a year after
the bank had begun its operations and its activities were tem
porarily dttsrupted in spite of the fact that it was doing
" i W i to ft oil itat e the eomaeroe in the Mississippi Thlley
^
SI
then any of the Banks in Hew Orleans.M
And, too, the crisis
threatened the financial status of an Institution which at
that tine was In an excellent condition, according to a lagls52
1
lative exemining oommittee•
? m the chaos first created
by the Stale, however, the hank was soon able to resume nearfiOtSftl operations though it continued a suspension of specie
payments*

The oont lnuation of the sale of bond® enabled the

institution through the sole of hills of exchange on their
Xsidsa and Bstrls agents, to discount notes, and to grant loans.
By December, 1337, specie payments, to a limited extent,
were resisted.

The shock had been resisted, and the firm had

#872,000 of specie in its vaults a^tinet a specie-paying lia
bility Of #85,000.

It had #1,275,000 in capital funds, and a

portfolio of eoesaerolal paper amounting to #4,000,000.

Against

these It had e #1,730,000 debt, much of which was payable in
* S3
leeal bank notes.
A fatal step was taken in April, 1336, however.

It was

the first move toward the decadence of the Citizens* H&nlc, and,
actually, it was a violation of the provisions of the charters.
The directors, with the consent of the Attorney General, voted
®*S. A. Caldwell, OP. olt., p. 50.
^Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Louisiana* p» 18.
1042, p. 4.
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unanimously to emit post-notes in favor of the stockholders.®4,
The eleventh section of the Act of 1833, stated that
the stockholders had a right to a credit equal to one-half
the value of their stocks.

The Interpretation of the law was,

furthermore, that the loans on stocks be proportionate to the
amount of capital negotiated.

That would have meant that the

stock loans were to be limited to 60 per cent of the capital
received, and that interpretation had been followed by the offi
cers until this time; $3,600,000 had been loaned on stocks with
the negotiated capital to the amount of $6,000,000.

In April,

1338, it was ordered that $3,600,000 of post notes, payable In
3, 4, and 5 years, and bearing 5J per cent interest,®^

could

he issued in order to make available a means of circulation so
badly needed.
The April resolution called for an emission of postnotes.

During a period of nine months a total of il»495,000

in post-notes was issued.

Of this total, $784,300 of post-

notes was bought back by the bank from the stockholders in order
to resell them to P. deLlzardi and Andre and Cottier, and a
total value of only $£16,700 was sold by these European agauts,
and on account of this small rate $567,600 had to be kept by
the bank.®®
Strength remained with the bank, however, after the
move was taken.

The President continued to adhere to sound

principles In spite of the desires of many of the stockholders.

5*1bid.. p. 5.
S5Ibld.,
seibid.

EM
0 m tiroTi which was not foreseen when committed 9 wa0 the ac
ceptance of the Federal Government fs offer to use the bank as a
depository, and that misgiving was caused by the imprudence of
a later administration.

The bank felt strong and there was

serious talk of resuming specie payments in June* 1038. It had
#300 *000 In specie in the vaults* and $300*000 more was being
imported from Havana. The circulation had been reduced to
57
11*860*000.
That was about a one-third reserve on the
circulation.
Good management ceased in September of 1838 when S. J.
For*tall resigned* and after that the gross irregularities com
mitted by the new administration started the bank toward its
downfall.

They simply refused to listen to Mr. Forst&ll’s

sound advice which he gave upon departing.
53
the picture might have been different.

Had they done so*

One year after the firm had Issued post-notes* it had
$888*700 of them on hand; they had been returned because no
market could be found for them. These post-notes which had
been issued to help the hard-pressed stockholders and debtors
had failed to be of substantial assistance.

Therefore* an

other plan was proposed— thnt of granting an additional loan
of $16.00 per share to the stockholders. A strong minority
aroee against the measure but it passed.

^ I b l d . « pp. 6 and 7.
**®CBIC, 1838, pp. 5-7.
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The minority objected to the new grant because it felt
the consequences would be disastrous•

It submitted convinc-

ing date to prove its point* According to the report, the
bank's portfolio (not Including stock loans) was $3,805,990:
that

is, $1*796,500 In

in other promissory

notes frora stockholders find | 2 ,009,590

notes* These were payable as follows:

Renewable at

10 peroe;*t discount

Renewable at

20 percent discount

Payable in full at maturity

I

950,665

2,487,790
567,455

Xn addition to the portfolio, the bank held $733,000 in specie,
$59,TOO in foreign deposits and drafts , and ^ 138,400 in local
bank notes (then at a discount); in other words, current assets
to the total of 44,786,890* Against these were current liabil
ities of $2,277,000, circulation of $536,000, individual de
posits of f 1,236,100, and a government deposit of $404,900*
Taking the specie, notes of other banks, and deposits with
ether banks, as against the current liabilities, the excess of
active debts was $1,296,000*

Furthermore, along with these

figures, must be taken into consideration the fact that the
bmt- already had reached |4,365,736.57 In loans to its stock**
holders— $300,000 above the legal limit* The stockholders in
tinea owed the bank in principal, interest, and otherwise, an
amount of $6,162,036*57, that is, a sum equal to 90 per cent
of the negotiated capital.

The { 15*00 per share grant in

pest notes, therefore, if all the stockholders availed themselves of the privilege, would increase the current liabilities

S5C
e w

tb» t»nkfs resources by 1810,000. Moreover, there was

the matter of interest payments to be met in August, and that
« a « i

$B,5E7,S61*

On the other hand, all the hank had in

Its portfolio that would mature within the period before
dugust was the paltry sum of *745,963.
However convincing was the argument against the grant
of an additional loan of *15*00 per share, the xuajority was
set convinced.

Even the advice to invest only in short-

maturity cornu©rciel paper failed*

Instead, the policy chosen

was to renew discounted paper in full at the time of raaturlty,
provided additional security was given*
It was mentioned above that the Citizens 9 Bank became
a depository for the Federal Government in 1838, and that it
feeeeae a source of great trouble for the bank*

The Holt© af

fair and what followed it were the cause of the difficulty—
Vincent Holts was a Hew Orleans cotton broker who had been
doing business with the Citizens 9 Bank.
After the crisis in 1837 the ootton market fell and it
remained low for soae time.

The bank's policy, therefore,

was to avoid making loans on cotton.

But by 1839 the price of

cotton was regaining its former level, and there were signs
that the increase would continue.
tempted, persuaded

Therefore, the bank was

to be exact, by Mr* Kolt© to grant him

a loan on cotton.
The Directors, nevertheless, took precautions and did
not permit the loan to exceed two*thirds the cost price of
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cotton, and the transactions were considered very sound.
Mr* Nolta’s transactions in cotton became speculative, how
ever, and so fast were his dealings that he claimed he could
not wait for the execution of the neoessary forms demanded by
law and custom before approaching the bank for additional
credit *

He asked the bank, therefore, to grant him advances

or a loan on the simple deposit of certificates from the cot
ton presses and insurance policies until he could furnish the
necessary documents*

The bank granted him his wish, which was

the very source of the trouble that followed and an imprudent
aet on the part of the officers*
^hen they realized the danger involved, the Directors
became frantic*

In their frenzy and haste, they seized every

thing of Noltefs that they could lay their hands on.

Every

legal device Imaginable was thrust at Vincent Nolte„

Wherever

they found cotton which belonged or had belonged to Mr* Nolte
they seized it.

It so happened that others had granted Mr.

Wolte credit on the same cotton and they too were seizing the
cotton; sometimes as many as three or four had claims on the
same cotton*
The vfcole affair was extremely complicated and many were
involved.

Only part of what occurred is included herein; it

is simply an isolated case out of several others.

Other trans

actions were just as fantastic*
Messrs. Yeatman and Company had sold cotton to Mr. Nolte
on credit.

On this cotton Mr.

then secured a loan from
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Messrs. A* and J . Denistoun and from the Gitizens 9 Bank; the
l&ssrs. Denistoun had the warehouse receipts.

Thus , three

concerns had claims on the same cotton.
The cost price of the cotton was $334,000.
izens9 Bank loan on the cotton was $£71,117.

The Cit

The total claims

against Mr. Nolte on this cotton was $375,000.

What did the

Citizens 9 Bank do when it found that Mr. Nolte had obtained
credit from three concerns on the same security?

The behavior

of the directors was astounding; they displayed a la ok of judge
ment, foresight, and financial understanding.
All three creditors were fighting for the possession
of the cotton.

Finally, the Citizens 9 Bank agreed to pay both

claims in order to get the cotton in its possession.

Messrs,

Yeatman and Company9s claim was $143,698, and Messrs. A. and
Denistoun9a claim amounted to $92,000, a total of $£35,698.
The market value of the sequestered cotton was $170,000.

The

Citizens 9 Bank cleared its claim on the cotton at a price of
$65,689 more than cotton could be bought on the market.

Fur

thermore, the value of the cotton did not cover the $271,117
loan that was made on it.
In its frenzy over the unsound loans it had granted
the Citizens 9 Bank seized everything that it thought to be a
security, even that to which it had no rightful claims.

How

ever, it was not certain of itself on the claims, not certain
of its priority rights contested by Mr. Nolte9s creditors.
Therefore, a compromise was offered to put an end to the

zm
dlfflenXtiee and the bank accepted it*

She result was

catastrophic .
B » beak ceded ita claims against those items which
were claimed by Mr* Noltefs other creditors* Then it agreed to
let Mr* Nolte transfer to the tank all his non-appropriated
balances, #467,057 in cotton*

This cotton was to be sold in

Europe and the tank selected Mr* Nolte to sell it, advancing
him #998 *000 upon a personal guarantee from his creditors*
Once in England, the cotton was seized by the Bank of England
because Mr* Nolte had received a loan from it on the same cot*
ten* To get the Bank of England to release the cotton the
C&tlzans 9 Bank sunk more money*

In all it spent #660*000 to

cell cotton which had been accepted at a value of £467,0$?*
As soon as speculators found out about the generosity
of the Citizens 9 Bank and what could be obtained therefrom,
they flocked to its windows insurance companies, cotton press
es, brokers, and boat captains received loans on cotton which
the bank sent to England for sale .
Soon afterwards, cotton prices fell* A new disaster oc
curred. More litigations and more legal fees were Involved*
•wd what is more, instead of making a profit from the Federal
deposits in its vaults, the Oitlzens 9 Bank became involved in
the improper use of those funds; that is, It used the deposits
for Its speculative activities,
59
loss there, too.

50
CHIC, 18*2, pp. 9-12.

and suffered a considerable
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Tli© bank was to keep specie in special reserve for
payment of the Federal Government deposits, but this it did
not do*

When orders cam© in June, 1639, for the bank to remit

#3S0 #000 of the Federal deposit to New York between June 30
and September 30, this caught the Citizens * Bank at a bad time*
Xt had made large advances on cotton and it had little specie
at its disposal *

What current resources it did have were need

ed to pay the August interest on bonds and to meet the promis
sory notes discounted with other banks in the West*

Deductions

made, It had but #146,000 of current resources at its disposal
and the specie it held amounted to #320,000*
The idea of sending the specie was rejected because it
was rare and it would imperil the bank*

After all, some specie

had to be kept in the vaults to maintain a semblance of secu
rity for the circulation and deposits*
Another way out would have been to draw on its agents
in Europe, or secure a loan*

That was not tried, however*

Instead, a scheme was devised to buy cotton for ship
ment and sale— speculation*

Cotton costing #237,000 was

bought and sold with expectation of a handsome profit, but
instead of making a profit, the bank lost #37,000*^
Largely on account of Its speculative activities through
out 1839, 1840, and 1841, this New Orleans institution remained

®°It)ld. , pp. 12-13
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In a atata of legal proceedings, unsound credit expansion,
and unlawful activities*
Before April, 1636, the stockholders had received $25*00
per share on their stocks and by the post-note policy these
ease stockholders had received an additional §15*00 per share,
waking $40*00 in all*

The owners of stock had not benefited

from the $15*00 post-note grant, but in May, 1841, the policy
of post-nores was resumed again.

The officers ordered another

issue of $10*00 per share in post-notes with the obligation on
the part of the bank to repurchase them at 3 per cent dis
count*

Post-notes to the amount of $624,900 were issued:

$150,000 sold in Europe; $124,900 were given to and re
purchased from the stockholders; and §350,000 were not
61
negotiated.
The Association of Bank Presidents In New Orleans, in
December, 1641, presented a resolution to resume specie pay
ments one year later.

The president of the Citizens 9 Bank

refused to concur on this resolution because he felt that a
prolongation of suspension would hinder the bank*s progress
in the negotiation of bonds in Europe*

Therefore, this

Institution left the Association and established Itself on a
specie basis*

Unfortunately, the situation of the bank was

not such as to Justify the move:
The current assets were;
Due from other b a n k s --------- $673,416*70

61Ibld.. pp. 13-28

Local bank n o t e s ---------

$162,051.00

Municipality notes ---------Other bank notes

19,058.00

-------

470.00

Specie ---------------------- 570.196.00
Total

$1,686,091.70

The current liabilities were:
Dus to other b a n k s -------------------- $961,396.17
Post-notes -- ------------------------

£41,700.00

Circulation

---------------------

361,810.00

Government deposit ---- — ------------

13,906.32

Special deposits ---------------------

45,502.00

Individual deposits ------------

795,291.37

Deposits at interest ---------------

1,189,518.30

Deposits on certificates-----------

7,076.00

Deposits an certificates at Interest

10.800.00

Total

$3,431,950.67

Xn other words, the current liabilities exceeded the current as
sets by $1,805,658.68.
The year 1642 was the fatal year for this property bank.
XtS portfolio-*current assets— became exhausted and all that

warn Is ft were the eight and a half millions in loans to the
Stockholders.

Every action of the bank, therefore, gave signs

that it was faltering, and the indecision became apparent even
ts»tte general public.

It was seen that the bank was In a

financial position and a run was started. On May 30, with

£65
Its m © « m 8

exhausted the Citizens* Bank was the first %&

suspend specie payments.

By the end of 1343 a decree of for*

feltnre was rendered at the inst&nee of the stv.te, thus the
property hank was forced into liquidation.
liquidation of the Citizens* Bank
Because the Citizens* Bank was unable and refused to
eoafoxw to the Bank Act of February 5, 1842, and because the
State wanted to prevent waste and ex pens I've litigation, a de
cree of forfeiture was rendered at the instance of the state
on October 18, 1843*

Thus the property bank entered into a

state of liquidation which lasted until 1903*

From 1853 on,

however, this liquidation was carried on by the new State bank
of the same name •

Throughout, however, the State had its

preblsBs with the bonds issued for and in favor of this
original Citizens* Bank.
The history of this liquidation and how the State at
tempted to rid itself of its liability— contingent liability,
it was called— is s o b s what analogous in many respects to that
of the Consolidated Association, but it possesses peculiarities
all its own*

Furthermore, the xsanagement of the insolvent

company was not as improperly carried on as that of the sister
bank which was also being liquidated.
The Governor with advice and consent of t h e Senate ap
pointed a Board of Managers which was to take over the affairs
“ ibia..

pp. 13—28.
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of the bank, and it started its duties October 27, 1842.

It

met jointly with the Board of Directors on November 5, and it
wan decided that the hooks, assets, at cetera, be placed in
the hands csf these managers on the twenty-f Ir?»t of the month
after an inventory had been completed. In so far as this inven
tory was act finished by than, however, the transfer did not
oeear until December 10*

The first business the new administra

tion undertook consisted of the interest payment and the reUbarsanent on the bands.69
Bonds end Interest on Bands during the Period of Liqui
dation. —

Kedemption of bonds was not a problem in 1842 be

cause the first series still had eight more years before
maturity, but interest payment on the securities was a press
ing problem.

? ith the current assets exhausted there was no

effective means of making payment. About $190,000 was needed
for February, 1645, and a like amount for August, not to men
tion the amount that was still due on the partial non-payment
64
in August, 1842.
Therefore, on December 10, the Governor and
Hope and Company were informed that the bank was unable to
meet the February 1 interest.
The next step taken by the Managers was to request Hope
and Company to return 6,525 £tate bonds amounting to
65
$2 ,011,111.11
issued in favor of the bank, the unsold por69CBBM,

1643, p. 1.

p . 141
_________ p. 2; leg. Doc., 1843; CBBM, 1844; and New
Courier. November 27, 1843.
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tlon of the bonds issued by the State*

Alsot it was ordered

that the unsold post-notes be returned*

To accomplish these

two things, Colonel John Winthrop was sent to Europe as agent
for the bank:* and he returned in November, 1843, with
$3,400,000 of bonds and post-notes*

66

Many acts were passed during 1842 to place the Louisiana
banks on. a Sound basis*

Namely they were:

prevent violation of the law by banks, ^
February 5,

( gj

Act No* 1 7 ^ to
Act No* 22 of
(3)

Act No* 47 relative to banks,
Act No. 59 to
(4)
(5)
supplement former Acts,
Act No* 93 to amend Act No. 22,
/c \
Act. No* 95 to prevent suits against the banks,
and Act No.
(7)
98 to provide for liquidation of banks.
All these acts were
considered insufficient to cope with the liquidation of the
insolvent property banks— the Citizens♦ Bank and the Consoli^
dated Association--and another act was passed April 5, 1843.
This Act firmly established the management of the Citizen9s
Bank in the hands of the State
of Managers,

through the existing Board

and the bill defined its powers*

Furthermore,

to facilitate commerce and the paying of debt by the stock
holders, a provision was made whereby the bank was to
accept bonds in cancellation of debt.

Through this lest pro-

®6New Orleans Courier* November 27, 1843.
Niles Weekly Register, Vol. XV, p* 240.
67la. Acta. 1842, (1) PP. 26-28; (2) pp. 34-62; (3) p.
112; (4) pp. 152-153; (5) pp. 214-228; (6 )pp. 231-232; (7) pp.
234-254.
681bld.. 1843, pp. 56-59. Of. Chapter III, pp. 130-133
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vision the bank managed by the and of 1645 to reduce the
amount of bonds outstanding by f 184,442.60, leaving the cap
ital debt at 1 7,004,446.29?* By 1846* through this $eana, the
70
bends had been reduced to |6,466,007 .21
Edmund j # For stall again m s

elected president of the

bank In 1845, and under his management, the institution m o
able to materialize on Its resources and to pay the interest
as it fell due.

Uhfortuna t ely, Mr. For stall rema ine d as

president only for a year. In 1844, he was replaced by Mr*
James B. Hull a; and under his administration the affairs were
net conducted so soundly as under the previous president •
nevertheless, the bank did continue to pay interest
after the first three defaults.
Be ring resources to meet the interest payments was one
matter; having resources sufficient to meet the payment of
the maturing first series of bonds (due in 1850) was another.
While the current assets were sufficient to meet the halfyear dividend ooupons on bonds, they were by no means ade
quate for the reimbursement of the 1850 series of bonds.
Wherefore, in 1847 the State authorized the Citizensf Bank
72
to extend the maturity date from on© to four years.
port of Board of Managers,
^ L e g . Doo.. 1845.
1340
71CBBM, 1843
10
La. Aeta. 1847, Ho. 100, pp. 76-78

p. .
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By this saae Act of 1847 , the State mad© © change la
the method of administering the affairs of the Citisens* Dank.
It considered the hank well enough advanced in the process of
liquidation to permit the stockholders soma say in the manage
ment*

Exclusive management, therefore, was relinquished; and

thia was done by repealing the Aot of April 5, 1843.73
The exclusive management was oeded, however, to "sugar
coat a hitter pill."

The State directed the bank officers to

assess each stockholder for periodic payments for a period
not to exceed seven years, in order to establish Xunds suffi
cient to pay current and post-due liabilities, Interest and
ghe like*

The contribution deolded as necessary was seven

dollars per share, and they were to be made in seven oneyear instalments starting from 1651 and continuing until
M W . 74
After the 1647 Aot was passed, the bank proceeded to
set its records straight.

The Directors paid the current lia

bilities out of their cash collections and from the sale of
55 State 6^ bonds, and in June they entered Into negotiations
with the bondholders.

Terms were reached in .August,1848.

The

1650 bonds, amounting to #1,279,557.14 were extended in equal
yearly instalments from February 1, 1851, to February 1, 1855.
Bond interest

in arrears, amounting to £675,000 (amount not

paid in 1842 and 1843), was

73Ibld..

funded in seven yearly payments

seoti onn 1 and 2.
7412 La. Ann. 286, Cltlssens flank vs. Levee Steam Cotton
Compress Company.
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tram Aug«*t 1, 1848, to August 1, 1855.75
Condition. bsgan to etaaao is 1848.

On til than the

• W i t * of the Citizens * Bank exceeded its liabilities.

After

that tine the liabilities exceeded the assets— much to the
76
n r r j of the State.
Furthermore, not only was the bank showing a deficit
in its assets to meet liabilities, but the default on extend
ed debt of 1561 to 1865 was imminent.

In a ll, the bank was

faced with the need of nee ting a current debt amounting to
w
#1, 873,800. OS.
M o w s were made, therefore, to devise a plan whereby the
State could rid itself of the obvious need to make good its
promise to pay in the event the bank could not.

Hen? best to

extricate itself with as little loss as possible from the dilem
ma in which it found Itself was a serious problem, and one
which brought forth much controversy and disagreement.
Something had to be done to extricate the State,
if possible, from its financially perilous position
in respect to the bonds which, in an evil hour, it

75U k , Doc., 1849. "Report of the Board of Bank Manager
m the A^faira 'of the Citizens Bank and the Consolidated Asso
ciation ,77 and "Report of Board of Currenoy."
7^1bid.
77ieg. Doc.. 1851, "Report of Board of Managers of Cit
izens *
*
IW_
Semi-annua 1 interest — ----------- —
^060,000.00
Interest on 1843 bonds
192,111.15
Instalments on 1650 bonds extended
f m X351 to 1856 ----------------621.683.37

$1,573,800.OS
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had issued in aid of the Bank* Something had to be
done to advance successful liquidation of the Bank,
If these things went on as they had been going
the State would inevitable incur the great loss of
having to pay the bonds with accrued and accruing
interest
That something was Act No* 141, entitled "An Aot for the relief
of Citizens* Bank of Louisiana," which was passed March 10,
1852, after much controversy.^^
The State, through the Act, released the Citizens*
Bank from the decree of forfeiture rendered on October 18,
1842, and permitted it to resume operation with all the prlvileges originally granted by oharter.

The Bank, according to

this Act, had to restore $800,000 of State bonds to the
Governor, such bands to be purchased by means of contributions
from the stockholders not in excess of twelve dollars per share.

80

The sum of $800,000 was specified because that was the
amount that had been estimated as the existing deficit in the
findings of the Joint Committee on Banks.

Heal estates of the

Citizens* Bank, they figured, were worth about $5,600,000,
81
while the liabilities equalled $6,500,000.

7®108, La. Ann. 315, Hope &. Co. vs. Board of Liquidation.
7^Kouse Jour.. 1852, "Joint Committee on Banks,", p. 46.
8<W

Aots,1852, No* 141, pp. 109-111.

®^Such a deficit, however, the Joint Committee on Banks
concluded, was only temporary because the stock mortgages which
secured the State obligations were worth considerably more than
the bonds outstanding. In other words, they estimated the real
value of plantations and city properties mortgaged at $11,160,000;
with other assets included, $12,300,000 stood to pledge $6,500,000.

"The Aot for the Belief of the Citizens 1 Bank,”
however, was vetoed by the Governor after it has passed hoth
Houses of the Legislature, but the Legislators did not give
up the plan*

The bill was reintroduced and it was bitterly

fought into passage over the veto.®^*
Even though the majority of the Legislators were
successful in enacting the bill, the act did not meet the
approval of the stockholders*
Citizens* Bank

In the case of Pollard vs.

It is stated, the "Act of March 10, 1952,

having failed to resuscitate the defunct Citizens* Bank a
more successful effort was made under the Act of April 28,
1853, Ho* 246, which introduced a radical change in the consti
tution of the bank and was accepted by a majority in number
S3
and amount of stockholders,
and so came Into effect
The **radlcal change** created

by Act* No* £46 was that

the defunct property bank was revived as a stock bank; it was
an set to authorize the Citizens* Bank of Louisiana to convert
shares secured by mortgage into cash shares*

How such a

change was to take place, nevertheless, was left extremely
vague and ambiguous:

Q*Sen* Jour** 1852, pp. 39, 47, 48, 58, 99, 111, 113,
and 143*
House Jour*. 1852, pp* 46-47.
House Deb.*1852. p. 63,
Leg. Doc*. 1852, "Minority Report of Judiciary Co ■mittee
on tne citizens Bank
Bill,"and Joint Committee on
Banks and Banking."

Z7X
• • • the Board of Directors ♦ * • shall
h a w p o s r to raise oas million of dollars, by
obtaining the payment in eash of 10,000 out of
the 144,000 shares composing the capital stock of
said Bank, and for that purpose the seid Board of
Directors are hereby authorised to set apart, to be
disposed of as hereinafter stated, a proportion of
the stock held by each stockholder, not exceeding
« M <hS of a w r y fifteen shares; which shares are
set apart, together with such proportion of the
eteek held by the Bank as will stake up for 10,000
shares, axe to be paid In full at the tine and in
the s u m e r to be determined by the Board, in order
to constitute a eash stock; Provided the mortgages
sals ting against the stockholders to secure the por
tion of the stock so set apart, shall not be consid
ered as raised, and the contribution due on the same
shall remain ss heretofore, payable by each of them
reaps etlve Xy*
Shat was actually done was apparently a little different from
what was Intended by law, if the law can be interpreted*
From what appears in writing, it seems as if the Legis
lators wanted the existing stockholders to relinquish one out
of fifteen shares held without altering the debt owed, the
mortgages held as security, or the seven dollars per share
contribution previously assessed* This share c out ri but ion by
tbs stockholders would have given the bank 10,000 shares which
it could sell for eash at $100 per share* That was not the
interpretation given, however.
When reor^nlzed, the Citizens* Bank had two departmasts: a mortgage department which Included the "dead weight,"
asr the fixed assets and liabilities of the old corporation; and

A eta. 1835, Ho* 846, pp • 807-208.
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a banking department which took over the liquid resources
of the old firm upon the agreement to make up any difference
occurring in the mortgage department.

The banking department

became the active part of the bank and the stockholders con
trolled its affairs along with those of the mortgage depart
ment, but they were not the same stockholders as before*

Ac

cording to the interpretation given the law, one-third of the
shares of the old corporation became part of the stock of the
new company, that is, five thousand shares were tinder the con
trol of the mortgage stockholders.

Ten thousand new shares

of stock were issued and sold for cash, and this gave the new
stockholders control of two-thirds of all the stock of the
b ^ k . 85
The plan of 1853 was accepted by 380 mortgage
stockholders owning 88,992 shares, rejected by three owning
458 shares, and not voted upon by 313 owning 54,442 shares—
there were 143,892 shares in t o t a l . T h e r e f o r e ,

the new

bank started business as an active bank in February, 1854, with
a stock capital of $1,500,000.87
If the opinions of the Courts of Louisiana were correct,
the Act of 1853 was of great benefit to t h e 8tate and its peo
ple.

For instance, the case of hope and Company vs. Citizens *

Bank has the following statement;

0®12 La. Ann.. 228, Pollock vs. Citizens* Bank,
86H. Heck, op. olt,., p. 37.
67Cltizens * Bank and Trust Company of Louisiana. p. 52.
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The evidence established that during the period
from 1853 to 1680 the banking department paid the
mortgage stock department alone on the half million
stock held by the latter department in the former,
$1,065,000, which was applied in payment of the
interest on the bonds of the State. This amound
would doubtless have been much longer, but for the
Civil War and its resulting demoralization of busi
ness and destruction of values, both in landed prop
erty and slaves. In addition to the $1,065,000 so
paid as profits, to the mortgage 3tock department,
the banking department advanced its sister depart
ment the further sum of $682,000 which was applied
to the bonded indebtedness and which was under the
termns of the compact of 1853, to be reimbursed.0*3
In 1866, shortly after the Civil War, the State once more
saw the possibility of having to make good its pledge.

Chaos

had disrupted the activities of business to the point where the
Citizens* Bank was facing the problems of meeting interest pay
ments, and reimbursement as well.

The bonds of the third se

ries were maturing in two years, and there were bonds of the
1850 and 1856 series that had not been redeemed as yet.

There

fore, the 1850,1856,1868,1877, and 1886 bonds were extended to
89
mature on February 1,1901,1902,1908,1911.
Throughout this
period, however, the benking department was reducing the bonded
debt of the Mortgage Stock Department,though the reduction was
not great.

Vhere the debt was $6,253,533.25 In 1853,^° it was

eel0S La. Ann.. 315.

Hope and Co. v s . Board of Liqui

dation.
0^43 La. Ann.. 738 and 108 La. Ann.. 315, Hope and
Company v s . Board of LlQuldatIon.

90Lefl. Doc.« 1853, "Proceedings of the Board of Currency.n
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rsdueed to $4,803,683.33 by 1678;®^searoely $1, 500,000 was paid off.

in almost twenty years,

It must be added, however,

that during this interim, the banking department had issued
$800,177.77 of its own bank bonds in exchange for State bonds
end this amount had been reduced to $633, 533. 33.

In 1866

when the extension was granted, the citizens9 Bank State bonds
totaled $3,797,333,33, a reduction of #£,466,199.08 from 1833.93
In 1874 the Funding Act was passed whereby the bonded
indebtedness of the State was combined into a consolidated bond
ed debt, and, as was stated with reference to the bonds of the
Consolidated Association,9* This Act created some question as to
the legality and the State’s obligation toward the bonds It had
issued for and in favor of the property banks.

As In the case

of the Consolidated Association, the bonds of the Citizen9s
Bank were not Included as fundable.

Legal action on the part

of the European investors was undertaken, therefore, through
Eope and Company of Amsterdam.

In 1889 representatives of the

Dutch concern brought cult against the State for a conversion
of the bonds Into consols, and the lower courts declared that
they were not fundable on the ground that they were not includ
ed as part of the bonds fundable in the Act of 1874.

This

9iIbid., 1072 and 1873* "Heport of the Board of Liquida
tion fro the C o n s o l i d a t e d Association and the Citizens Bank,"
and "Beport of the Auditor of Public Accounts," p. 47, p. 178,
P . 36 «
92lbid., 1864-5.
"Keport of the Auditor of Public Ac
counts," p. X£.
93Ibid* . 1867, p. 31.
feonds Payable Feb. 1, I860
#1,265,333.33
•*
"
99
1,
1677
1,264,868.89
q.
"
”
"
1A 1886
1,267,111.11
®4Chapt«r III, pp. 170-183
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decision m e

reversed by a higher court In 1890, but the

s e n t dismissed the case because the Amsterdam Company had not
95
followed the proper procedure for the funding of their bonds«
When it was brought before the court again la 1891, the decis
ion m s

rendered that the Citizens* Ban* Louisiana Bonds were

funfeble into consols as provided by the law of 1874, that is
It held that;
the limit of the bonded indebtedness of the
State is not exceeded by funding the balance due
plaintiff. At the tine that the amount of seeu*
ritles collected was imputable, and at the pres
ent, the State*a interest was, end is now, to
pay its consolidated bonds and coupons.90
Instructions were given, therefore, to the Board of
X&fe&fetlaa to fund the bonds la accordance with the law of
1994, that is, to issue consols on the basis of 40 cents on the
feller of old debt.

It was ordered, also, that the company be

scarfed interest an the consols at the rate of 7 per cent for
six years, 2 per cent for five years, and 4 per coat from
97
1BQ5 to the time of the funding.
From the amount of the
principal and interest, however, the following items were to
be deducted:

® 54 S , La. Aim. 738, Hope and Company vs. Board of
H o w * action; end 45, La . A n n . 555.
96Ibld.
97Ibia.: of.. 3. A. Oaldwoll, OP. Pit.. p. 109.

£76
!• Payments already made
£• Interest on the

-

payments

$£,060,466.33
-

(not given)

3* Amount already paid by bank on .coupons

300,000.00

4* Gash in bankfa sinking fund for the
retirement of b o n d s -------------

85,000.00

5. Amount of Hope & Qo*9s stock in Cit
izens 1 B a n k ----------------------

133,000.00

6. Stockholders* Wortgagea guaranteeing
the b o n d s
-------------------

800,000.00

nevertheless, the court’s decision did h o t meet the ap
proval of Hope and Company and they demanded a re-hearing,
this was refused and the final liquidation was retarded until
1908.

At that time the remaining $230,999 .£2 of bonds were

converted into consols on the basis of 60 cents on the dollar,
99
according to the Act of 1374 and ensuing amendments* *

The

end of the bonded debt earns seventy years after the inception
of tbs third and last property bank incorporated by the Legis
lators of the State of Louisiana.
Operation during the Period of liquidation
The business operations of the Citizens* Bank did not

eease in October, 1342,

when a decree of forfeiture was ren

dered at the instance of the State against the institution for

98S. A. Caldwell, op. cib,. p. 110.
99
Lea. Doe.. 1902, "Report of the Louisiana State
Auditor";
i S s L a ? Ann. 315, Hgge & Company ra. Board of
liquidation; a n T "Report of Louisiana State Auditor. 19^4.
p.78.
’
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net abiding by the provisions of the laws of February 0 and
teroh 1B«. Outwardly, business proceeded somewhat as before*
The chief difference was that the power to Issue bank notes
was revoted.

Policies with reference to loans and discounts

vers not altered by the decree. Management, however, was
pieced In the hands of officials selected by the Governor;
a d Che reason for the change In the administration was that
the financial condition of the property bank was bod.

Be

cause of mleaanagoment and expensive litigations, the State
felt it necessary to take control of the affairs of the Insti
tution in order to protect Itself on the pledge it had made
to the bondholders end, also, to protect the stockholders who
vers at the mercy of the previous bellgerent directors and
officers.

100

is the Law of March IS made provision for the selection
of a Board of Managers for banks which were to go into liqui
dation, the Governor appointed six man to constitute that
board after the Fifth Diet riot Court of Louisiana rendered the
decree.

These men were; Messrs. &. y. Fore tall,

A. Boa, W. Treret,

B. Lepretre,

X. Rousseau, and R. Our re 11; and they to ck

their oath of office October 27, 1642*

Soon after they wears

installed these new members formulated and adopted rules and
regulations for the future operation of the bank now in the
10043. La. A n n . 736, Hope and Co. vs. Board of Liquidstlon; end H. rSclc, op. clt., p* 34.

E70

State of liquidation; and under the leadership of Mr* For
etell, president of the Citizens9 Bank from 1336 to 1858, the
institution was reorganized in order to

operate along sound

policies and practices.**^
tecs use a large number of stockholders had h e w in ar

rears for several years, and because these arrears had deprived
the bank of the means to pay interest on bonds and other obli
gations, the Board of Managers voted upon measures to force

payment.

The bank’s attorney was instructed to notify all

stockholders in arrears that unless the arrears were fully
paid in eash, or in deposits of produce at

a valuation of two-

thirds of their marketable value, or by additional satisfactory
security, it would be necessary to institute foreclosure pro
ceedings*

Furthermore, if produce were deposited, the bank re

served the right to dispose of it at any time within ninety
days by order of the depositor, or by the bank’s own pleasure
after nlsety days, provided It was disposed of at the current
market pries.102
Marly in 1843, Mr* Edmund 1. for stall was elected pres
ident of the Board of Managers for the Citizens’ Bank, while
he continued to represent Hope and Company of Amsterdam,
bondholders and agents for bonholders of the firm’s securities;
and thus he was In a peculiar position.

1843,
102Ibid.. p. 14.

pp. 11-13

Actually, Mr* For stall
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was acting for two separate and opposite groups simultaneous
ly*

Strange as this might hare been, however, he served to

the good interest of both, although not without conflict and
complication— but it was typical of Mr. Forstall.

Under his

supervision, the bank restricted its previously lax discount
praetioes, refrained from placing Its income in ’frozen1
assets, and insisted upon prompt payment on loan Instalments.
Soe]| policies were to the good interest of the State, the
stockholders, the bondholders, and the bank.
it was sound banking.
soon to arise.

That was because

Nevertheless, queer situations were

For instance, after the Board of Managers ob

served the financial situation of the firm It was decided to
notify the Governor, and Hope and Company that the Citizens’
Bank could not meet its February 1, 1843, interest payment on
103
the bonds, and this notice was given by Mr. Forstall Being
the representative for Hope and Company, Mr. Forstall found
that he had to-deliver a protest to the president of the bank—
Mr. For s tall - -and to the Governor because of non-fulfillment
of a contractual agreement.

Mr. Forstall complained In the

"Memorial for Hope and Company in Behalf of the Holders of the
Citizens’ Bank State Bonds” that this protest was completely
ignored by the president of the Board of Managers (who was Mr.
Forstall).

Obviously, however, these absurdities were for

legal purposes and not too serious in nature*

Defaults oon-

lOSlbld. a p. 9 ; Leg. Doc.. 1843-1844; and R. C. Mo
Granc, op. cItT. p* 185.

£80

tilled and more protesta ware made without either group Indieating worry over the situation.

Nevertheless , that there

was pressure cannot he doubted for Mr* Far&t ,11 found it
104
nee* as cry to resign as president in 1644;.
April 5, 1843, the State passed an aot to facilitate

the liquidation of the Citizens* Bank, along with that of the
Csbs oildated Asaooia tlon.

Again the law str ted that the assets

of the bank were to go into the possession and exclusive managesent of the State, and the powers of the Board of Managers
were redefined and broadened*

To facilitate the payment

of

arrears cm loans a nd other debts, the act provided that these
debtors could offset or partly offset such loans or debts by
offering in payment any bonds of the State issued in favor of

banks*

10S

This provision, as has been discussed in detail

with respect to the Consolidated Association, permitted the
cotton factors end the planters with a means of breaking the

English boycott on American cotton*
the bank on a sound footing.

IOC

It did not, however, place

It did not provide the insti

tution with a badly needed portfolio— liquid assets*
Despite the management under the supervision of the
State, and despite the provisions of Act Ko. 92, losses con
tinued to mount— especially after Mr. Forstall ceased being
president.

By 1645, therefore, the Finance Consul ttee of the

10*IM.d.
Acta.
1063u£ra>

No. 92,

pp. 66-57.
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State Legislature was delegated to investigate the financial
situation of the Citizensf Bank*

They found the losses to he

considerable, but they felt that if the stockholders were as
sessed not more than twenty-five dollars per share, it would toe
sufficient to cover the bank*s liabilities adequately without
forcing the State to assume any loss whatever.

In order to

mate this assessment, the committee suggested, therefore, that

the stockholders toe allowed to elect members on the Board of
teasgen and Directors of the Citizensf Bank in order to repre
sent their interest in the liquidation.

Furtli©more, the com

mittee advised an extension for the bonds falling due in 1850
so as t o give the institution sufficient time to collect the
assessments from the stockholders. 107
Therefore, in 1847, the suggestions of the 'Finance Com
mittee were enacted Into law, and the State relinquished its
exclusive management in the affairs of the Citizensf Bank*
Instead of there being a Board of Managers for the Citizens *
Bank selected by the Governor, the State designed a Board of
Bank M a n g e r s which was to function in conjunction with the
Directors elected toy the stockholders; that is, three men selec
ted toy the Governor were to assist In the management but v;®ro
net to have exclusive administrative control: one member of the
board was to toe President of the Board of Bank Managers; the
107
leg. Doe.. 1846, "jReport of the Finance Committee,”
April 26, 1846; House Jour. . 1846, pp. 120-123; and it. G.
MeGrane, op* clt., p* 15^
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otfcw, Pwslfiiat of the Consolidated Association; and the
third. President of the Citizens* Bank*

The directors were

to he elected in the manner specified by the charter*^®
Hhlle this Aot Ho* 100 of 1847 did provide for an assess
ment, the amount was not stated, the only provision being that
the Instalments not extend beyond seven y e a r s T h e

amount

of the assessment was left to be ascertained by the managers
and directors of the bank, and it took them three years to
deeide.
per Share

TinaIly, in 1850, it was figured that seven dollars
payable one dollar per year

aeet all claims against the bank.

110

would ba sufficient to
That was considerably

leas than what the Finance Committee had suggested; but why
this assessment was placed so low Is difficult to visualize,
because the managers and directors knew that the fina was not
adequately prepared to meet even the current obligations from
111
the portfolio and the one dollar yearly instalment*
•?gfl11 as the ass6 3ament was, however, the stockholders,
for the most part refused to pay*

The reason given for the non

payment was that the property owners were facing onusual diffi-

112
eultiee during 1851 and 1852.
The real difficulty encountered by the bank in not being
able to » e t its obligations from the funds that should have
L a « Acts. 1847, Ho* 100, pp. 76-78.
109 “
Ibid*
11047 ja ^ AjMlt 1374, D_* JU Breard vs. Citizens * Bank.
1 U Leg. Poe*. 1850, *Keport of the Board of Bank Man
agers of the citizens * Bank*”
112Ibld* * 1851, op* pit*.

been available was not because the stockholders refused to pay
their instalments or assessments,

although that was a fac

tor that limited the working capital of the bank.

The more

basic cause of the difficulty was that the bank invested its
working funds in wfroreaM assets, instead of keeping the
funds liquid, or readily convertible.

The Board of Bank -im

agers gives an illustration of this fact in & report to the
Stats Legislature.

In the report is described the action

taken by the Directors when ihe St. Charles Hotel was
destroyed by f i r e . ^ 3
Included as part of the fixed assets of the Citizens*
Bank was the St. Louis building in Hew Orleans which had been
In a state of depriclation for several years and had been an
untenanted and unprofitable establishment— a "dead weight.”
When the St. Charles Hotel burned, it was though a good
opportunity to make a paying affair out of the St. Louis
building.

The directors converted the edifio© into a hotel,
114
and at a considerable expense.
The revenues therefrom
were not what hed been expected and the investment amounted
to another "sinking* of liquid funds in "frozen* assets, a
good example of whet the bank was doing with funds which
were to go toward the payment of interest and principal on
their bonds.

No wonder the institution

was not in

a

113Ibld.. 1851, OP. clt.
114
J The size of the building was enlarged, and it was
made completely modern in order to make it equal to or rival
any hotel in New Orleans.

£84
p » * p « r o a 8 situation; no condor the 3tat® became fearful of
having to pay the interest and principal on bonds it had
issued in favor of the bank; and no wonder plans were being
devised to change the characteristic nature of the firm in
order to establish & stock bank instead of a property bank*
Hew blood was Introduced when the Citizens’ Bank was reorganised by the provisions of Act No, £46

in 1853,

When the

sort gage stockholders accepted the plan of dividing the bank
into two separate departments
control of the institution.

they ceased to have exclusive
By the sale of 10,000 shares for

cash in order to create a banking department, the control went
to the new stockholders, with the mortgage stockholders re115
talnlng but cne-t ird active interest.
Thus,the cash stock
holders operated the firm to their best Interest in order to
keep the company solvent and reap profits,

"Furthe m o r e , the

yanking department wes anxious to rid itself of the obligations
It had assumed when it had accepted the resources of the prop
erty bank. Therefore, for a few years the apparently wild
scheme devised by the State Legislators v.aa operating to the
good interest of every party concerned.
The Banic of October 14, 1857, however, disrupted the
successful operation which had been in evidence since February,
1854, when the reorganized bank opened for business.

On Octo

ber 14, the banking department suspended payments on its de-

115xs la. Ann, 226,

Pollock vs. Citizens’ Bank,
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posits, but continued to meet payments on its circulation.
That suspension, fortunately, did not lest long*

Timely and

judloious assistance from the other New Orleans banks which
had been reestablished on a sound basis after the passage of
the Bank Act of 1842, enabled the Citizens’ Bank to resume
payments on all obligations by November 3*

Nevertheless, it

was evident that the financial status of the bank was not
such as to permit future payments of interest and principal on
the bonds*

The Board of Currency upon examining the affairs

of the institution found that very few bonds had been redeemed
from 1654 and 1857 and that there was the second series of
bonds coming due in 1659*

The Board of Ivlanagers felt that

assistance was necessary*1*^ An extension of the maturity dates,
therefore, was considered, but no extension was voted by the
legislature.
The Civil War disrupted all the activities of the Cit
izens’ Bank, and when it was over the revenue-producing proper
ties were virtually destroyed, or extremely deflated in value*
What was the bank to do to meet its obligations, past due and
coming due?

The State, therefore, made an effort in 1Q66 to

relieve some of the pressure by extending the maturity dates
of the bonds due in 1859 and coming due in 1868,1877, and 1886
117
to 1901, 1902, 1908, and 1911.
Nevertheless, the extension
did not solve the immediate problem of meeting current oblige-

U Sheg* Doc* * 1857-1858, "Report of the Board of Cur
rency t o t h e Legislature,” pp• 4-5•
1X743 L b . Ann. 730, Ho„e and Co* vs* Board of Liquida
tion*
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felons; Interest j h ymsnta and other debts wars paid whenever
1X6
possible, but the revenues were not always sufficient,
to obtain the necessary funds, therefore, the directors took
atroRger measures to force payments on the mortgage stock
loans; and when payments were not forthcoming, they insti
tuted foreclosure proceedings.
fhe bank's policy of foreclosing on mortgage loans
brought to the front many e ant rove rales.

Sour of the proper*

ties which carried with them mortgage stooks had been sold or
transferred and the new owners refused to recognize any obli
gation to the bank.

Other property owners

maintained that

*11 their obligations had been fulfilled and that they were
no longer responsible for any debt on the mortgage stocks: et
cetera.

Court action after court action, therefore, took
119
place between 1866 and 1830.
Finally, in 1380, the State Legislature passed an act
•to enable the Citizensf Bank of Louisiana to make a compromise
ans settlement with its mortgage stockholders; to enable said
stockholders to free t\ eir real estate from said mortgages; to
secure the application of the amount© realized from said mort-

llflLe^. Poo.. 1067, 1069, 1372, and 1374, "Keport of
the Auditor of rublic Accounts."
11Q
C f . . for instance, 22 La, Ann. 117, Citizens* Bank vs.
8. A. KnajTn: 23 Ln^ Ana. 275, C. K. Bryae re. Citizens* Bank;
TB La. Ann. 295, STtizens* Bank vs.B. 3tAaan»: 23 La. Ann. 567,
Citizens’ Bank vs. X. A. gluker; 24 La_. Ann. 273, mTA*.' feTlS
U . "Citizens * Bank; 26 La. Ann. 264, Citizens ♦ Bank v a T O . L»
Jlssisl 28 La'.' Ann. 771. citizens» Bank vs. G. M. Bailey.
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to the payment of the State bonds Issued in aid or the

Bank, and to the legal liabilities and necessary expenses of
120
m i d mortgage stock department; • ••"
That compromise was
reached in July,

and by its terms the mortgage stockholders

more to hare returned to them their titles on the mortgaged
property upon payment of their obligations to the tank, and
their stocks were to be returned and canceled* Also by this
*>

Compromise, which required the assent or the bondholders,
arrangements were made to hare Hope and Company of Amsterdam
be a m s as stockholder in payment of interest in arrears on
the beads*3, 3
Thus, the Compromise of 1380 with the mortgage stock
holders opened the way for the bank to free itself from the
bardaasa&e mortgage stock department, and by 1911, when the
bank was again reorganized, there were no longer any mort
gage stockholders *

CHAPTER VI
INFLUENCE AMD IMPORTANCE OF LOUISIANA PHOPHWTY BANKS

degree and emphasis that should he placed on the
influence end Importance of the Louisiana property banks in
Lonleianav the South, and the Nation is difficult to deter
mine or ascertain baeauee they were but a part of a far
greater movement which in itself was complice ted and not too
specific. These three Louisiana mortgage banks were neither
Use cause of the optimism and the Inflationary practices ex*
lading during that period, nor the cause of the crisis that
followedy seen though they were contributing factors in both
Instancies,

They were more the result of the general attitude

end behavior toward economic conditions.

These bank& existed

in a period of wild and speculative optimism when everyone—
farmers, business man, speculators,

and lawmakers included—

operated under tie assumption that prosperity was permanent,
amd each individual had, it appears, a different idea on how
te proceed to reap quick profits while expanding to achieve
greater

and more self-sufficiency*

Louisiana*s proper

ty banks represent one of these ideas; they are but an inci
dent out of a multitude of events*
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Trem X804 to 1824 Louisiana had beau somewhat moderate
1*

banting.

During this twenty-year period the State

granted but four charters for stock-banka, find of these only
too were in existence in 1824*

Ho state assistance had been

glean to say of these corporations; the capital had been sup

plied locally.
By 1884 eosBieroe had expanded so rapidly, largely be
cause the steamboat monopoly had been broken by the 1817
1
fibrous vs. Livingston case,
that the coumierelal interests
sad the lam a k e r s felt that the two banks with a nominal oapital
2
Of »* ,500,000 were extremely inadequate to m&et the existing
needs for development*

Inasmuch as local private capital was

insufficient to undertake a large banking program, and inas
much as there existed much hesitancy on the part of foreign
capitalists to acquire stocks which would entitle them to con
trol the affairs of the banks, the State was persuaded to
eater actively into the field of banking*

In order to entice

the foreign capital without relinquishing oontrol over the
proposed company, the State became a stockholder In the Bank
of Louisiana ami it Issued bonds for and in favor of the cor
poration in payment for tho stocks received; the bonds were
sold to provide the necessary funds for operation.
This Bank of Louisiana venture opened the avenue of
through which the State could participate for the pur-

i S H E S L P * 40 •
Supra*» pp. 16, IB
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The venturesome legislatere with hut a

hasy conception of economic and governmental problem® felt that

their young and growing State could be made self-sufficient
sad prosperous through Investments In various enterprises by

the media of banks * Their faulty conceptions concerning the
functions and purposes of banks led them to attempts at ©rest
ing wealth through the excessive use of banking privileges.
Their wild dreams told them that there could never be too much

capital; the proceeds from the sale of bonds could always be
employed at a profit* and the earnings from the use of the
capital f a d s would undoubtedly be sufficient to pay the inter

est on the bonds and eventually to retire the principal. Most
Of the experiments* however* proved to be costly and unduly
burdensome on the State and its people*
In so far as the oos&erclal interests were not the only

OSes witnessing the possibilities of large profits from the
expansion of eomaerce* and in so far as commerce

was not the

only activity In which the lawmakers were Interested* other
pressure groups were soon actively demanding assistance and
privileges• The state was induced to venture into fields now
considered to be reserved t o private enterprise and to be out
side the realm of - government function.
The most influential pressure group was the plantation
3
owners* especially the sugjar planters.
It was considered
-a
According to F. X, ifertln, Louisiana was furnishing at
the time almost half of the auger consumed in the United States
and it was bidding fair to supply a good portion of the remain
der. (Op * ©it., p. 43d.)

m
to* sdtl prosperous class la society sad tlie members tod ©onSidereblo influence In the Legislature; many of them were
leg! a la tors In one or the other branch of the legislative
tody*

It was not surprising, therefore, to have this group

exert its influence to obtain assistance, and it was not sur
prising sitter to see it obtain more privileges and assist
ance than say other group*
The other groups to demand State help were the improve
ment interests*

The railroad, canal, hotel, public utilities,

oft trade promoters were active in persuading the members of
toe legislature that their programs needed privileges and as
sistance to be carried into effect for the further develop
ment sad benefit of Louisiana.
privileges*

They, too, wanted banking

Some of the improvement companies were even suc

cessful in obtaining direct assistance by receiving State
bonds issued far and in their favor,

although the amount of

such bonds wee in no way comparable to the amount received
by the property banks,
from 1B27 to 1037 new banks were created for many
groups that promised to promote on improvement undertakingi
the majority of these institutions were organised between 1833
sad 1836.

During the decade prior to 1837 no 1©3S than thlr-

t o n ton** were incorporated, and three of these were property
beaks*

Thus, in 1837 there were no less than sixteen banking

eeapenies, all situated in Hew Orleans , and aojna of them had
severe! branches
in other important eities within the State *
f
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Altogether, these Institutions had a nominal capital of appremiss tely $55,000,000 and a paid-up capital of nearly
f 3 ® #O Q O , 0 0 0 The State became part owner in seven different

haute, and on their account had incurred a bonded debt of
aboat **4,000,000.

To determine the relative importance of the mortgage
teat log fiiaa, it is necessary to mate a comparison on other
bases than the number of banka .

Foremost, it is essential to

e e m p a w the capital of the institutions with that of the or
dinary stock corporations engaged in banking.

The nominal

authorised capital of the three property banks was:
Consolidated Association
TJhion Bank
CitIzens* Bank

I2,500,000
7,000,000
13,000,000
i21,500,000

Of this amount approximately £14,000,000 In bonds had been
negotiated by May, 1637,

On the other hand, the nominal cap

ital of the stock banks was:

4

There la no definite data which give3 the nominal and
paid -up capital of the sixteen banks a® of or before May,
1037• The nearest date for such information is December 33,
1037, at which time Edmund ,T. For*tall, chairmen of the Senate
Committee, presented a chart on the banks of Hew
Orleans (of- r s, A. Trufant, op» clt, > p. 8), For substan
tiating data eee also 34 Ceng• 8 Sess* ’>x. Doc, Ho, 65, pp,
188-103, and 25 Cong. 2 Sees* Fx, Doc. Ho. 79, pp. 654-655.

5cr.. S. A. GBiaw.ll, op. Clt., p. 82.
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Atehaffclaya Ball Bead and Banking CoK^ftay
O w n l and Banking Company
Carrollton Bank
City Bank
Commercial Bank
Exchange and Banking Coopany
B n tklaaas Gas Light and Banking Company
I t p i o i N n t and Basking Company
Beohsnloa and Traders Ba»k
Iterate nta Bank

,

42 000,000
4.000.000
3.000.000
2 000.000
3.000.000

.

.
,
2,000,000
2,000,000
^sssuaa&c
2 000.000

6 000,000

$27,000,000

Of thin amount authorized only about $10,000,000 was paid-up
by tfey, 1837•

Thus, the capitalization for the ten stock

banks created during the decade was slightly more than for the
property banks; it was J 5,300,000 more in the amount of au
thorised capital, and approximately 14,000,000 more in paid-up
capital•

For the purpose of comparison, however, it is neces

sary to include in the analysis the three stock banks in ex
istence prior to 1327, and their capital was:
Bank of Orleans
Louisiana State dank
Bank of Louisiana

i

500,000

,

2 000,000

A*v$Q*.°Q9
16,500,000

Host of their authorized capitalization was paid-up.
The relative importance of the three property banks
i s evidenced partially b y comparing their nominal and paid-up

capital with that of the thirteen stock banks.

The mortgage

b a n k i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s were capitalized at $21,300,000

the others had $23,500,000.
gage

while

On a percentage basis the mort

had nearly forty per cent of the authorized capg

S. A. Trufant, og. olt. . p. 6; 24 Cong. 2 Sess. Tv*«
Poe., Bo. 65, pp. 152-loS; and 25 Gong. 2 Bess. Lx. Doe.#
Bo. 79, pp. 654-655.
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ltal while the stock banks had slightly more then sixty per
ecmt;

roughly, one fifth of the Hew Orleans banks— the prop

erty bank*--had approximately two-fifths of the nominal cap
ital*

On the basis of what tod actually been paid-up, the

« « tgcge basking firms held about twenty-seven per oent, or
somewhere around three-eighths of the total paid-up capital.
The amount of capital of a particular group of institu
tions, however, does not determine conclusively their impor
tance in relation with other banking establishments.

More

convincing as a determining factor is the type and volume
of business of each group.
Foremost to remember concerning property banks is thitt
they employed a unique system to entice the capital for their
operations•

Tie stockholders did not supply the funds.

In

stead, they were the ones that wanted capital funds, and the
mortgage banks were organised to assist them and the other
property o n e r s .

All that these stockholders contributed

were mortgages that served as security for the bonds that were
issued to acquire the capital; the scheme was not an orthodox
sms whereby operating funds ore procured by the sale of
Meeks.
The other banks were regular stock corporations wherein
the subscribers supplied the capital, and the majority of
these institutions were chartered to foster seme definite iia-

V

The mathematical calculation is 39.09 and 60.91 per

eent.

*#5
prove nan t ^ r e g m «

Throat

Gas Light Company, How Or*-

l o n i mas equipped with a gas light system which gave the city
the heat street lights la the Halted States, and so successfal mas the enterprise that the State granted the company
bsalrlsg privileges to facilitate the establishment of a light

ing system la Springfield, Ha pole on vi lie # Ha rri e onburg, Alexasdvl*, and Port Hudson.

Through the Canal and Banking Com

pany a navigable canal was constructed from lake Ponehertrain
to B m p i t Street.

Through the Improvement and Banking Company

the Salat Louie Hotel was bnilt.

Through the Kxchange end

^

a

B a a n n g Company the Saint Charles Hotel was constructed.

The

AtChafklayn Bail Road and Banking Company was chartered to
build a railroad to act as a "feeder’ to the Mississippi
Blear txafflo.

Most of the other banka too were created to

faster particular developments.
The capital for the majority of these improvement
M n v * was obtained either In Louisiana or In the United States.
ftqainr&tlvely little came from abroad;

what was Induced from

Barope earns by means of the sale of bonds which had been Is—
Seed by the State for and in favor of the corporations , not
frue the sale of stocks.

The bonds, however, were not secured

la the same oszmer as for those of the property banks*

®s.

A. Caldwell, pp. pit.,

pp. 61-58.
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CAPITAL Or STOCK BAHKS— WHERE HELD

Held in
Europe

Haae
Atehaf&lay*
Canal
Carrollton
Oity
cwimlal
Sxehaage
Oas Light
XSPlOWMBt
Bank of Louisiana
Louisiana State dank
Maohsalts end Traders
Knotats
Orleans

Held in
Louisiana

Held in
United
States

767,885
381,350
1 ,285,300
928,300
1 ,959,300
559,510
872,045
1 ,597,732
2 ,375,580
602,300
921,440
35,000
214*000

none
#1,601,700
614,000
153,100
297,600
none
43,200
none
1,665,600
1,002,100
193,000
none
107.500

none
#2,016,700
176,550
918,600
742,900
833,560
937,210
none
56,500
325,040
883,950
965,000
102,900

#

$5,478,080

#7,358,710

$12 ,289,742

Banking privileges were desired by the Louisiana improve■eat companies chiefly as a means of obtaining revenue to foo
ter the development and as a means of facilitating payments on
the construction under way*

for the most part, they were in

terested in issuing certificates of indebtedness which could be
need as circulating notes

in discounting commercial paper, in

handling dcmastio exchange, and in accepting deposits.

The

p r l m r y interest of most of the improvement banking companies
was not in granting loans to people, except as such credit was
beneficial to the immediate building program* The ma jority of
fcifHfi did not deal extensively In foreign bills of exchange,

£97
at least not to the extent as did the commercial end prop
erty bank*
with the property banks circulation was less important
than it w«a for the improvement banks*

These Institutions

were primarily interested in granting loans and in discounting
e s w s w l a l paper offered by the cotton and sugar factors and
growers*

Dealings in foreign bills of exchange ware impor

tant for the mortgage banks because clients, whom they served
in an effort to encourage agricultural developments and im
provements, demanded an agency which dealt in foreign drafts
in order to facilitate the sale of their products abroad and
to provide the means of acquiring the equipment and the com
modities desired*
While there are no figures available to verify the be
lief that the property banks were more important than the
regular stock banks in the granting of loans and In the deal
ings in foreign exchange, the very nature of their organiza
tion and purpose indicates that they were*

There are figures,

however, to substantiate the fact that they were relatively
moere important than these other companies in the usual fields
of business activity— discounts, individual deposits, and
domestic exchange*

2*0

A COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OR THE BASES OF SEW ORISAHS,
September* 1606

Type of Activity
Ms e o t m t s
Dosestie Exchange
Circulation
Individual Deposits
OovenscBt Deposits

atock Banks ’
1 22,715,005
7,011,965
3,957,400
£,96ot628
1,892,516**

Property Banks
$ 13,415,879
3,211,000
1,966,000
1, 524 , 300
2,650,000**

q

♦includes ten of the eleven stock banks existing at said
date: no report from the Orleans Bank.
♦♦The Commercial Bank and the Union Bank ♦

The three mortgage establishments handled thirty-three
per cent of the discounts, while the regular banks handled
fifty-six per cent

Property banks dealt in twenty-nine

per cent of the domestic exchange* while the other banks dealt
11
in slxty-one per cent.
Property banks had thirty-four per
cent of the individual deposits and the other banking companies
had sixty-six per cent *

Thirty-three per cent of the bank

notes were issued by the three mortgage firms and
leaned sixty-seven per cent*

the

others

Sunmerlly, one-fifth of the

banking establishments in New Orleans— the three property banks
— handled about one-third of the banking affairs of the city.

*25 Cong. 2 Sess. Ex. Doc. X<o* 79* pp. 654-655.
10
The New Orleans Branch of the second Bank of the
Oil ted States handled eleven per cent of the discounts.
13-phe
Orleans Branch of the second Bank of th©
tfolted States dealt In ten per cent of the domestic exohang©.
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Beyond the State lines the Louisiana property banks
were also Important and influential*

Hie so banks along with

the other hanking establishment a in Mew Orleans served a
wide area and they were essential to the newer regions of
this country.

The cotton-grewlag region was spreading through

the Gulf States, and Hew Orleans cans to replace Charleston
as the leading cotton export center*
cocport crop, as far as

"Moreover cotton was an

the South was concerned, and the ser

vices of middleman and banker were a necessity to the plan-*
1£
taticn*"
Fewer settlers inhabited these newer regions, but
the demands for capital were heavy; Hew Orleans, as much as it
was able to do so, was called up to assist In some measure to
provide the necessary capital*
Cotton producers in surrounding states and territories
like Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Mexican Texas shipped
their cotton to Hew Orleans where they received bank notes for
their produce*

Cotton factors handled the cotton for export

through the financial assistance of the Hew Orleans banking
firms*

Cosnerelal, negotiable notes resulting from these

cotton transactions were accepted by the Hew Orleans banks for
discount*

Besides, because of the city's position as a center,

individmls

from without the state had substantial deposits

in the New Orleans banks*

Furthermore, the Inhabitants of the

regions about Louisiana Imported numerous European, Asiatic,

L. H. Jenks, o p . olt. . p. 76
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South Aiorlcaa, and Eastern products which came through How

Orleans and they were financed largely by the banks of this
elty*

Those imports were British manufactured goods, French

wines, Brasilian coffee, Hong Kong tea and silk, e& cetera,
and when cotton was not sufficient to balance the payments,
specie was called for find Hew Orleans was the source of sup
ply through a redemption of bank notes or a demand of the
payweat of the deposits In specie.^3

13For the period prior to 1337 Louisiana banks are
sobs times accused of Issuing excessive amounts of circulation
notes. Bad this been the case Hew Orleans banks would have
been forced to suspend specie payments much before May of
1837. For the most part the Louisiana banking companies were
careful not to flood the Southwestern region with their notes
simply because it m s more profitable and advantageous for
them to maintain sufficient specie on reserve for redemption.
Boras economic historians say that Louisiana learned
its lesson from an excessive issuance of paper money and passed
the Bank Act of 1Q4B to insure sound currency by providing
that Individual deposits and circulation be secured by at least
crae-third specie and two-thirds sound commercial paper* That
statement is partly true, but it infers that Louisiana made
no effort to control the issue of bank notes prior to 1342.
Louisiana banks did come to issue more paper notes than was
politic to do, but the banks did attempt voluntarily not to
issue too many notes and to maintain an adequate specie re
serve. Uhfortunately the voluntary action on the part of the
individual banks was not sufficient to behave properly when
over-optimism took sway. Even then, however, it was not un
controlled printing of paper money; the lack of control came
after the suspension of payments in specie after May, 1837.
Up to the end of 1836 the Hew Orleans banks cannot be
accused of "Greenbackisra” or fiat money inflation. The Bank
of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Bank, the Union Bank, the
Citizens* Bank, and the Consolidated Association were quite
ssrsful to maintain a safe and adequate specie reserve* The
other banks, either voluntarily or otherwise, found it expedi
ent to have a substantial reserve for redemption purposes; if
they had not,the stronger banka would have embarrassed them
financially, the Hew Orleans branch of the second Bank of the
(Continued on next page)
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New Orleans and Its banks not only served the cotton
states surrounding it, but it served, also, a large area in the
upper Mississippi basin,

although It failed to take proper

commercial advantage of this area and It was eventually taken
by the East*

Before the days of railroads the vvest was quite

dependent upon the Mississippi River and its tributaries with
Sew Orleans as the outlet for trade relations with the outside*
The capital olty of Louisiana found Itself at the center of a
large trading area which it took for granted*
•By 1621 the fgolden period of commerce* in New Orleans
14
was well wader way*"
At first the produce of the upper
Mississippi region came down in boats that were dismantled for
the lumber once New Orleans was reached because these boats
were not powered to make the return trip*

That meant that the

Western producers sold their produce for bank notes and a few
items which could be carried home easily*

Later, when the

steanfeoat was developed and perfected, the process did not
change;

the Westerners continued to get the bank notes and
15
their ships were allowed to return almost empty*
Louisiana
United 3?a4esBwaS?Sf^Aave done the same, and the State could have
forced them to forfeit tteir charters*
In 1835 the circulation and deposits totaled f8,248,382,
while the specie held was £2,749,300, or a thirty-three and a
third per cent reserve. Had the Louisiana banka continued this
reserve policy toward the end of 1836, during 1837, and after,
mo crisis would have depressed business to the extent It did from
1S57 to 1643* (Cf * * 25 Cong. 2 Bess. F>x. Doc. No. 79, ip .654-655* )
14
S. A. Caldwell, op. olt., p. 31.
XCIbld.,

p. 34.
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Played a part in the process of distributing the produoe, hut they failed to stimulate the import trade of that
nee region; they were more concerned with the export and
port trade of New Orleans and the vicinity-

im

Such a behavior

was caused by either a lack of foresight or a lack of banking
capital*
That .Louisiana la eked the necessary capital, to amply
encourage the course of Western trade through its port city
appears improbable according to the statistical data and the
economic historians*

The banking capital of New Orleans from

1035 to 18A2 exceeded that of any State in the United States
with the exception of Pennsylvania

if the capital of the

Uhited States Bank of Pennsylvania is included*^

Moreover,

BANKING CAPITAL OF CERTAIN STATES
January, 1338

Number

State

or Banks

New York
Massachusetts
Louisiana
Pennsylvania
Georgia
diabase
Florida
Arkansas
Mississippi

93
134
16
—

3

6
1
U

Capital
# 36,611,460
37,080,000
39,943,832
24,944,435
11,790,573
10,150, 528
2,387,585
413,105<t v*
19,231,123

^^Ibid.. p* 32; Financial Register of the United States.
Vol. II, 55387 P* 37.
lTFlnanclal Register of the Ufa!ted States. Vol. II,

1838, p. JSTl

SOS
Louisiana *s State debt for the purpose of acquiring capital
exceeded that of any State except Pennsylvania, and most of
that debt was incurred for banks* property banks in particular*

VT.BTS or CERTAIN STATES OP TO 1836

States
Alabama
Arkansas
Illinois
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Miry land
Massaehuse tt s
Mississippi
Missouri
Mew York
Ohio
Busnsy Iranis
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia

For Banks
$

7,700,000
3,000*000
3,100,000
1,390,000
3,000,000
33,950,000

7,000,000
3,500,000

3,000,000

Total

4

10,800,000
3,000,000
11,600*000
11,890, 000
7,369,000
33,385,000
554,976
11*493,960
4,390,000
7,000,000
2,500,000
18,262,406
6,101,000
27,306,700
5,753,700
7,148,166- _
6,662,189

According to the Niles weekly Register the bank capital of the
Southwest * of which the New Orleans banking capital was In
cluded* was 463*407,764 in 1837 and 461,943,086 in 1839* That
was comparatively larger than for the .aore densely populated
and industrialized regions

of the Eastern and Middle Atlantic

States.
IS
E . 1. Bogart, op. Pit., p. 326.
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BANK CAPITAL XH THE UNITED STATES

1830

StatM

I 35,297,879
43,791,200
26,830,703
1,688,417
1,834,386

Uitaia

Kiddle

Southern
Southwest
Western

1839

1837
$ 65,023,241
79,604,882
29,920,858
69,407,764
23,927,571

$ 62,534,026
79,024,708
57,033,436
81,943,086.31,154,620

nevertheless, there Is some justification for claiming
that Louisiana lacked the necessary capital to develop the
W e s t o n trade down the Mississippi River to New Orleans*

One

reason Is that the hanks in their optimism employed too much
of the available capital to encourage the development of sugar
and cotton at home*

The immediate prospects of profits fran

the sale of these produots

and the importation of slaves and

technical improvements concealed the losses t at were incurred
by neglecting the traffic of the Silsslssippi Valley*
Another reason is that the State employed a good por
tion of its credit facilities for the establishment of banks,
sad neither the state nor the batiks had the necessary facilities
to Improve the river navigation system and to establish a oys —
tarn of railroads.

The river by itself was not adequate to

mfee transportation of the Western exports and imports simple
~

■—

ig------

Niles Weekly Register, Vol. AVI, p. 54% m

50

S* A * Oaldwell, op_* cl,t-g.» p. 37*
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sad inexpensive*

According to an article In the ^Albany

Argus* quoted la Hunt’s Merchants * Magazine,
A farmer on the Ohio, at a point, any Clnelnnati, equally or farther distant from New York than
New Orleans, can transport his produce to New York
and net as amah profit as t o carry it to New Orleans•
In the one case, nature had provided him with a mag
nificent highway almost before his door, and art had
provided ample at earners ready to carry it to New Or
leans; yet, most perversely, he"goes up the Ohio to
Portsmouth; traverses a canal of throe hundred miles
by slow marches; comas to Lake Erie, unships his pro
duce, and bears it 150 miles, on a boisterous lake,
to Buffalo; unships It again, to a boat on the grand
canal, end then toils along 300 miles, through a river
4 feet deep and 40 feet wide, to the Hudson; and then,
after one more shipment, he floats It down to Its des
tination, the New York market* All this can be done,
and with as much profit to the producer* as to float
it down a single river to New Orleans * x
As long as

the price of cotton and sugar remained high,

and as long as the price of land remained inflated in value,
the banks of New Orleans appeared prosperous; there was hope
that the mortgage system of banking would be advantageous for
Louisiana.

Y/ben the bottom fell out of prices, however, the

property banks were found to be unsound, and the credit bridge
which they were maintaining between Europe and the Southwest
region collapsed*

After 1Q37, therefore, the Louisiana prop

erty banks ceased t o be of constructive importance*

The Con

solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana and the Cit
izens* Bank were reduced to a state of insolvency and they were

^ H u n t ' s Merchants * Magazine *

Yol* XXXX, p. 31*
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mnnbi© to eonf ozm with the more restrictive policies ©stabllahed by the Bank Act of

1842. Thus they

liquidation.

of the

In the case

were forced into

Citizens*Bank it was deemed

advisable to permit the creation of a regular stock depart
ment to take over the assets of the mortgage bank in order to
facilitate the settlement

of the

cern.

the one property bank which had been

The Union Bank was

affairs of the

original con

more prudent in its affairs and did not become insolvent.

For

s time it continued to operate as a property bank under the
provisions of the Act of 1842, but as soon es free banking
laws were passed it was reorganized as a regular stock bank.
Beginning with the Crisis of May, 1337, and continuing
until the time of final settlement or liquidation, property
banks materially hampered Louisiana *s recovery and advance
ment . They were a yoke which could not be removed and they
sapped the remaining vitality that could have rendered possi
ble the resumption of profitable activity; mismanagement
Including dissipation of funds by the officers of th© two in
solvent concerns was a burden on society*

The only two means

of blotting out their unwanted existence were not employed:
one would have been u repudiation on the State bonds issued
for and in favor of these companies; the other would have bean
to clsar the property owners from the mortgages hold by these
property banks.

The State, however, felt that it could do

neither.
Xf the bonds had been repudiated, th© credit of the
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State would ha we been seriously impaired*

If the mortgages

cm the properties had been cleared to permit a fresh start,
the banks would ha we lost t: elr source of funds to meet the
payments on the bonds, and the State would have had to
assume the debt or repudiate It*
By doing neither, however, the State of Louisiana per
mitted the over-capitalized, revenue-producing properties to
re— In in a state of cons taut debt*

If one property owner

could not carry cm with the burden, his property was sold*
With the property went the mortgage because the security behind the beads could not be impaired*

Such a situation, there

fore, further depressed land values, and It discouraged in
vestments*

Without being able to reduce the capitalization

the possibilities of profits were reduced if not eliminated*

CHAPTER VXI
31T4MARY ANP CONCLUSIONS

Inoaaistancy seems to appear between the study of the
theory and principles of property banking, and the actual
ease histories of the Louisiana mortgage banks*

In the dis

cussion of the theory and principles involved It was stated,
in Chapter I I , that property banks were not Inflationary in
end of theaselves, that they could not cause a
tiozu

spiral Inf la*

la the ensuing chapters it was indicated the Louisiana

mortgage hanks contributed to the existing inflation*

The

contentions seem contradictory, but they are not* Both are
true*

Property banks were not inflationary in their organiza

tion, but that does not preclude the existence or possibility
of inflationary activities*
The reason property banks were not inflationary In and
of t£iease Ives was that the appreciation In valuation of tan*
gihle property was not to serve as a base upon which they
eould Increase credit through the issuance of additional
mortgage stocks*

The adherents of mortgage banking accepted

the reasoning that property appreciated in value when It
served as security for a medium of exchange, either credit or
circulating notes, but they foresaw an inflationary spiral If
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the appreciated m l u e was permitted to serve as security
for additional credit or notes.

They devised their plans,

therefore, whereby the amount of appreciation on tangible
property serving as security for the mediums of exchange
could not increase the medium of exchange itself*

Once prop

erty was evaluated by appraisers it became the basis for the
acquisition m o r t a g e stocks and no additional stocks could be
Obtained on the same incumbered property because of any in
crease In. its value; in so far as credit was granted on these
stocks at a specified fraction of their face value, spiral
1
inflation could not result.
The amount of credit extended and circulating notes
Issued, however, might be sufficiently great to increase ap
preciably the medium of exohange, and If this occurred without
a corresponding increase in the amount of economic goods de
sired end available, prices had to rise and this in Itself
la inflation.
It must be remembered that the Louisiana property banks
asms into existence during a period of
considered to be a period of prosperity;

Inflation which was
the banks were cre

ated to assist the property owners to take advantage of the
prosperous, inflationary, economic conditions, especially the
land boom, and their creation and existence contributed to
the apparent prosperity and increasing inflation.
The "bard times" following the v ar of 1312 had barely
^ Supra. pp. 23—36.
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passed when the country entered a period of prosperity and
financial expansion, moderate at first with occasional minor
setbacks* but resuming with increasing intensity toward In
flationary optimism.

By 1829, when Louisiana's first property

beak**the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louis!ana— began operations* the mania was entering into a ©tag© of
speculative madness; lead values had begun to ©oar upward and
developments of numerous types were under way.
. • •Behind this financial expansion was the
irresistible surge of a nation that was in the
process of spanning a continent, that was al
ready thinking of Itself in terms of "manifest
destiny.” A glorious future constantly impinged
up cm an existing present.
"Normalcy" itself in
cluded a factor of acceleration that rapidly pro
pelled ell financial activity into "prosperity” ,
then into boom times.s
During this period the entire country succumbed to a
•bank smdness."

The number of banks increased from 329 In

1329 to 796 in 1837.

Vild banking sprung from every locality,

aa! It wee the chosen media for developments in the South. The
combined banking capital in 1829 was S110,200,000,

by 1334

It wee #200,000,000, and by 1337 it reached £290,000,000.

It

wee nearly a two hundred and aixty-two per cent increase
a span of eight years.
$46*200 ,000 to $ 149 ,200,000

The circulation increased from
and loans increased

from

$137,000,000 to ^525, 100,000 during these same eight years,

%.

J. Shultz and H. R. Caine, op. olt..

p. 189
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dm increase of o w r throe hundred per cent and approximately
three hundred ninety-cme per cent for each respective Item*^
Discounts more than doubled, and with some of the banks
amounted to twice the bank capital.

Furthermore, in paying

GRGsm car BAmzmP x a £ » - i Q 3 7 4

Banks
: Capital
Number Xncr.;; Amount Xncr.

C ireulati on :: i^oaaa ......
Amount Iacr.;: Amount:Xncr.

'110,300

329

*137,000

48,SCO

906

54*

•800,000

31*

778

66* : :290,800

49*

94,600; «7>
j149,200
«
a

>llar ttLgures are in tllousancIt

£

MIS

____________ __________

Date

:

:334 , 100 137 JS

57% j •528,100

62#

•
e
«
*

off its indebtedness the Federal Government released mi 11 Iona
of dollars available for investment or speculative placement.

5

All this caused prices to rise and a corresponding business
and speculative inflation*

lasy credit resulted in specula

tive aal business pyramiding to an unprecedented degree. This

SD. R. Dewey, op. olt.. p. *25.
*?red A. Shannon, Ecoaomio History of the Peoples of the
t s t a t e s
(Hew York: The » c m l l l a n Company, X 9 M ) , p. 3So7
5*. J. Shultz and M. R. Caine, 0£. oit^, pp. £21-222$
2. I*. Bogart, op. clt., p. 368. Contrary to some beliefs,
the United States Government had no heavy debt during this
period rather there was a surplus in the treasury with which
Congress did not know what to do.
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credit m

under the guise of wealth whan* in reality* it

wee nothing hut a *botch* of practically worthless promises.**
Louisiana ♦» property banks were no different from the
otter banks in their exuberance to foster developments and to
xuap profits and benefits from the prosperous times,

They

ben aim involved in speculative activities based on optimistic
aspectstlona.

They extended credit end froze their assets in

nane-too-llquid enterprises.
Precautionary measures had been devised by the organiz
ers of tease property banks to assure success.

Stockholders

were permitted to obtain loans equal to only one-half the face
value of their mortgage certificates.

This was because they

desired t o have more than adequate security behind any credit
extended.

Other property owners could obtain loans at only

Stte-telf the face value of their properties for the same
7

Ten a on.

Furthermore, to make certain that sufficient rev

enue would be available to .met obligations and to provide
far continuing and expanding activity, these organizers pro
vided for "reasonable” interest charges on loans and discounts
smft for the securing of capital funds at costs within the limit
M i by law in order that capital be repaid by the revenues
8
received.
The first precaution to assure success might have proved
efc. C. McGrene, The Panic of 1037,
7Supra» p. 29.
®3upra, pp. 55» 56, 189, 831.

op. clt. . p. 6.
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effective If the face value of the security or collateral
feed act been inflated*

As It w a s , however* the appraisal was

made on the existing and the anticipated earning power of the
tangible property; w l w

of a piece of land was determined by

comparing it with the price of similar properties and by es
timating the expected annual revenue of such property.

Both

the land prices end prices of agricultural product6 were es
timated at far above what they actually could yield, however.
Especially was this true toward the latter years of this in
flationary and speculative period.

By the closing months of

1836 the production of cotton and sugar, for instance* was
9
beyond the capacity of their markets.
Credit that had been
extended upon future hopes, found the security vanish.

With

the failure of the suctlt end cotton market, the banks were
* ~ r r « t . d .ith *n impossible situation.10

Conditions bad

ripened for collapse and failure instead of success.
fhe severe jolt of President Jacksonfa ominous Specie
Circular of July 11, 1836, burst the high prices of land, not
immediately, but within six months.

The speculative purchas

e r s found that credit could no longer purchase new federal

land, and since the movement of high prices had been fed by
credit

this threw land values as a whole spirally downward.

This, accompanied by a scarcity of 3pecie and foreign bills

®W. J. Shultz and M* H. Oeine, og« clt.. p. 2ZZ
10L. C. Hilderraaa, QP» clt** p. 93.
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11

ef exchange»

the raising of the discount rate by the

Bank of Sag land from two end a half to fire per cent, the
modified types of ecmercial paper to be u s e d , ^ and the fall
13
of the price of cotton by twenty-five per cent,
among nu
merous other contributing factors, threw the country into the
throes of the Banin of 1837*

The prosperity bubble Inflated

by fictitious wealth built on credit had been pricked and the
Imaginary security vanished.

Property which was taken to be

ever appreciating in value was no longer adequate security
for freely granted credit.

Louisiana9s mortgage banks act

ually did not possess enough real security to assure success.
Optimism had been so great and the demand for credit
had assumed such proportions that the officers of the Louialana property banks had acquired capital funds in as large
amounts as was possible

and as rapidly as they could be ob

tained, even if it was necessary to circumvent the stipulated
charter terms.

Though the cost of securing these funds from

abroad was considerable and though the sale of bonds usually
had to be at a substantial discount, it was considered prof
itable and beneficial enough to justify the procedure.

When

the optimistic expectations did not materialize the burden of
meeting the contractual obligations became a strain.

The

11«f. CABL, Consolidated Association to Baring Broth
ers, Hew Orleans , February 4, 1836. and to T. Wilson and Co.,
January 3, 1806 and June Z29 1S36 (Fr •).
lgs. a. Caldwell, op. o l t . . p. CO; C£HL, Consolidated
A s s o c i a t i o n t o Baring Brothers, New Orleans, March 30, 1837.
13
H. 2enks , op.* olt..» p. 87*
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revenues of two of the property banka— the Consolidated
Association end the Citizens * Bank— proved Inadequate to meet
these periodic payments and part of the assets was Impaired.
Insolvency Instead of success was their fate.
The fiasco of the Panic, however, did not end the exinternee of Louisianafs property hanks.

The Consolidated Asso

ciation and the Citizensf Bank, though insolvent, continued to
operate, unhampered by the State, until the end of 18432; after
wards they existed as liquidating banks until 1882 and 1902,
14
respectively.
The Union Bank continued as an operating
property bank until 18S7, when it was converted Into a rag1K
ular stoek bank. ** Despite the severe blow from the specula
tion and Inflation, these concerns continued to operate, ad- 7
he ring much to the same speculative and inflationary prac
tises; they did not revert to cautious banking.

The public

Still wanted easy credit: this time to curb the depress ion.
These Louisiana banks did what v?as asked of them, thereby
e cot Inning to enjoy general good will for several years after
the crisis.

It was not until later that their existence was

looked upon with disfavor, and many years afterwards when
the!r prolonged existence was severely criticized; then, however, the criticism was against tbs two mortgage banks in
the state of liquidation, not the Union Bank.

14:Supra. pp. 185, 286.
^ S u p r a , pp. 226-227.
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The general history of these Louisiana concerns is
here reviewed in order t o ascertain more concretely the restM M

for the change of attitude toward property banking in

Louisiana•

First, without presuming to give a complete and

conclusive answer, it may be stated that prospective debtors,
ntaa they deem it essential to have money or credit to achieve
e desired aim, usually look upon the credit or vith favor.

It

is when the creditor demands repayment, when the debtors

find

it difficult to meet their contractual obligations, or when the
debtors fail to achieve the desired alms from the funds receiv
ed that debtors arc more apt to have a disgruntled attitude
l o n r d creditors*
From 1827 to 1S37 the Louisiana mortgage banks enjoyed
the general good will

and the approval of the public, and their

existence seemed to be a solution to the State 9s perplexing
problems of providing the plantation end property owners with
much demanded capital.

Through the system of employing proper

ty as security for State pledged bonds, capital i.as flowing
Into Louisiana by the media of mortgage banks which granted
So their stockholders— the owners of the properties
serving as collateral foar the bonds— and to others.

Mortgage

Kinka assisted the development and purchase of land, the In
stallation of modern machinery and equipment, the acquisition
of more slaves, the building of beautiful homes, and the ©st&bllshs&nt of accessible markets for local and surrounding
products. It was a "rose c o i n e d glass” through which perpetue1 prosperity could be imagined.
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Prices la general were rising as result of economic
conditions partially abetted by the additional credit extended.
altuatioa gave rise to the belief that credit enabled the
people to benefit froa the good prices.

The spirit of op-

tiwlsw was eo general and the public so confident that prices
would m a i n high and profitable, that asany Louisiana property
o u s m sought ami obtained credit on the basis of the high
gstsoa for their products and properties. The cotton and sugar
planters, for instance, usually calculated the anticipated
revenues froa their plantations and used the inflated values
of land as the base In determining how much encumbrance was
Justifiable.
It did not tahe the Crisis of 1337 to indicate the
fa 11soy of such a procedure.

As early as 1831

the sugar

planters indebted to the Consolidated Association were un13
able to pay their interest on account of crop failure*
Jm

the revenues of these debtors were not what had been

anticipated and many had to default*

Again in 1333 the sugpr
17
a m p was a failure and more defaults followed.
The cotton
esap failure throughout a large portion of the South in 1333

was another severe blow; even with the good price and the indemand for cotton, the revenue was not forthcoming
be asst the current contractual credit obligations.

18

These

lftSupra. PP* 99-101; CABL Consolidated Association to
Bering Brothers, New Orleans, April 6 and 13, 1832 (Fr.).

tuprft. pp- 101,

22 2.

f.,25 Cong. £ 3esa. Ex. Doc. No. 79, p. 386.
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e&leal ties, i o w w r , were regarded aa temporary and the re
sets bllahoen t of "normalcy" was expected,

Ko undue pressure

was exerted upon the debtors to cause dissatisfaction*

These

famtei were able to extend the time Tor interest payment and
u s u a l Instalments because they continued to receive capital

froa Europe and the funds cm hand were sufficient to meet the
eerreat obligations on the bonds.

? urtheraore, the values

of the properties serving as security had not depreciated,

sad, apparently, they saw no os use for s l a m and no need to
alter their liberal credit policy,1*
When the Panic of 183? occurred

the property owners

f e u # their supposedly "ewer appreciating” properties depre
ciating and the prises of agricultural commodities insufficient
to provide adequate revenues to pay off burdening debts.

they

had no ehoioe but to beg for an extension of time on thalr
payment® or/and to become more heavily indebted In an effort
to sect or partially meet currant and past due obligations.
The mortgage banks could not successfully force paymasts for at least two reasons: the debtors had no means of
paying,

to force collections under such difficult circum

stances would bring forth irate criticism from both the public
and the State officials.
foreclosure

2van If the officers had attempted

thu results might not have been satisfactory;

the security behind the loans and the discounted note® had

^ S u p r a > pp• 104, 117, and £&&«

2519

fttpxtclaUd considerably, a w t l i B s to a w l u e which -was

less teas the amount of the debt*
Uhder these depressing circumstances the property

banks, instead of res trio ting the amount of credit extended ,
pursued a policy of gianting mors loans.

Both they and the

people calculated that if there was more lending it would

provide a M a n s of greater activity and better markets,
whlofe would stimulate business back to "noxssa1* and would

enable the debtors to acquire income for payments of debts
in fall*

The reasoning appears to be illogical; the idea

see me to b e , In pert, that if an additional loan
to the debtor so.as to pay off his first debt

was granted

it would ease

hie burden and enable him thereby to pay the entire debt*
nevertheless, the idea was practiced.

The result was an ae-

eestwstiea of depressing circumstances.
In so h r as the banks were able to continue selling
bends they did so in order to obtain the funds for more

leans and discounts• vhen they could no longer acquire sat
isfactory amounts of capital through this means, they resort
ed to the Issue of post-notes.
Debtors a nd stockholders of a property bank, desirous
Sr trader the necessity of borrowing more from the concern,

Offered mortgages on unencumbered property or/and on existing
future crops.

In return they received post-notes— one,

two* or three years Interest-booring notes— v;hich could be
used to pay off debts with the bank and as circulation•

mo
When in the bank's possession, these notes were usually
sent to Europe for sale In the hope of obtaining more cap
ital.

Post-notes, however, did not sell too well abroad,

furthermore, the debtors and stockholders did not benefit
Ort
from their credit as had been anticipated.
Trm. 1857 to 1342, therefore, when Louisiana fs prop
erty hsnlw might have reestablished themselves on a sounder
financial basis, they failed to do so.

Because of their easy

credit policies they continued to laaintain some degree of ap
proval from the debtors.

They behaved in hs.rs.ony with the

general belief of the period; people wanted more and easier
credit to conquer the depression and the mortgage banks com
plied with their wishes. Toward 1840, 1341, and 1342, however,
when the credit inflation failed to bring forth the expected
21
relief, opposition to their practices increased.
Prior to 1842 acrimonious disapproval of these and other
State beaks was expressed by those who wanted to achieve better
eeememic conditions through a sounder banking system and more
stable credit.

The banks, however, enthralled these reformers.

Vest of them were indebted to the banks and opposition to the
practices pursued was ordinarily met with foreclosure or a threat
to do so. Such action, nevertheless, accentuated the growing ac
rimony. In spite of the resistance on the part of the banks
the Bank Act of 1842 was passed.
^ Qsupra.
^ ^Supre.
2%>U£Ta,

pp. 116-117.
i>p. 117-121.
P. 122,
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The State became somewhat uneasy toward the proparty
banks for at least two reasons: on© wae that the fixed rate of
late rest on th© bonds ha d to b© paid Irrespective of the d©~
pressed economic and financial situation; the other was that
the financial affairs of these concerns were such that there
existed a strong possibility that the State night be called
upon to fulfill its pledge on a good portion of the bonds
Issued for and in favor of these companies, or at least on
tee interest payments *
Before 1837 the general feeling of the legislators was
that In spite of the fact that capital was secured from abroad«
these foreign ea pita lists could not receive more then a fixed
and specified rate of Interest out of the income realized from
the nee of the funds; the profits

over and above the interest

cost were to remain in Louisiana and benefit the property
23
earners*
But after 1637 when the revenues , if any, realized
were not great, the Interest charges were looked upon as a
burden.

When the property hanks were not making a profit, the

necessity of seating the semi-annual interest payments was con
sidered as a drain upon the assets and income that could otherwide be employed to relieve somewhat the existing distress.
The losses of th© Louisiana mortgage banks were mounting
daring the depression years;

some of these institutions were

or nearly were insolvent/. That worried the State.

^ 2 5 Cong* 2 Sean. 2x« Doc* I£o# 79, p* 612,

The State

yledgsd bonds of these corporations were certificates of Indebtednes s , not certificates of ownership.

Non-payment of

Interest and principal could not be exercised at will with a
e ini at that It was the result of an entrepreneur 11 risk assum
ed in organizing and operating the business. iion-payment of
et these obligations was a breach of contract*

Inasmuch as

Idle State was a party to the contract as a guarantor for its
fulfillment, any breach by the banks affected the State Therefore, the legislators were desirous of placing the prop
erty banks la a position where they could meet, the terns of
their contractual agreement and of ridding Louisiana as rapid
ly as possible of the contingent liability which was giving
Indications of becoming an actual debt of the State and
which was threatening its credit standing.
The general banking reform introduced In 1848 was not
24
directed specifically at the property banks,
but it served
to place the Insolvent ones— the Consolidated Association and
the Citizens * Bank-—in a

stats of liquidation.

The Union

was able to conform to the law, and, the ref or©, was en
titled to continue as an active bank*

These decrees of for-

felture rendered at the Instance of the State against the two
insolvent concerns was the first jbb jar effort by the State
to deal with Its contingent debt.

It took over th© assets of

the two companies and th© affairs were placed In th© hands of
la. Acta. 1342, No. 23, pp. 34-62.

£5

S u p r a . p, 122;

35 La, A m *, 425; and GBBM, 1843, p* 1*
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officials appointed by th© Oowornor with the advice and ©onsent o t the Senate*

Such a move, however, was resented by

th# stockholders, mainly because they feared that liquidation
would for## them to meet the payments on their debts Immedi
ately*

The bank officers were opposed to the action because

It deprived them

of

the profitable privileges they had ex

ercised in their administrative capacity.

European bond

holders were dissatisfied and they voiced strong opposition
to liquidation on the ground that these concerns were sound;
they disapproved, however, largely because the news of the
liquidation had reduced the market value of the bonds*g&
Upon assuming their duties in the liquidation of the
Consolidated Association and the Citizensf Bank, the managers
decided that these institutions had to default on their in
terest payment, and the defaults which came in 1343 placed
the State in a position of becoming directly responsible for
the debts*

It was evident, too, that there were possibilities

of having to become responsible for additional defaults on in
terest and probably on the principal*

A series of measures

wore taken, therefore, to assist in the payment of Interest,
to reduce and fund the debts, and to provide for better ©co
nsole conditions, especially In the cotton trade*

Son© of

these measures met the approval of all concerned, but several
were opposed by some group or other; disapproval of mortgage
ag began to spread and become more intense*
^ Supra, PP* 134-135*
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If measures were not taken to better the market for
cotton and thereby provide the banks with income whereby their
bfended debts could be reduced, the State felt it might have
a serious debt on its hands* Thus, in 1Q43 by an act to facil
itate the liquidation of property banks, the State provided a
means of improving the cotton market and a method by which
the amount of bonds could be reduced*
Measures had to be taken to better the cotton market in
order to provide th© banks with income whereby their bonded
debts could be reduced.

An act was passed in 1843, therefore,

to facilitate the liquidation of property banks, whereby these
insolvent firms could acquire and retire part of their out
standing State pledged bonds.27

Cotton which had been boy

cotted because of American defaults on bonds served in a large
measure to acquire the securities from the European bond
holders.

Debtors were permitted to present State pledged bank

bonds and have them accepted at face value in payment of debts
owed these banks.

The bonds had a market value which was sub

stantially less than their face value and it was profitable
to acquire them from European bondholders.

The exchange could

be effected by offering cotton and an incentive for the ex
change was to accept the Louisiana bonds at slightly above
their market value.

This policy helped the cotton interests,

provided the banks with a means of reducing their bonded
debts, assisted the State in reducing th© amount of Its con-

27i,a. Acts. 1843, No. 92, pp. 56-59.

m®
hi&geat liabilities, and quieted the European bondholders.
Cotton moved to Europe and part of the bonds returned to

SB
LflOltkBa.

The 1343 Lav, nevertheless, was not wholly »P-

p r e d a t e d by the English bond agents*

A storm of protests

arose and they advised the bondholders not to relinquish
their seeurities.

They criticized Louisianafs action in both

the American and English press*

It started a aeries of BngOQ
l i e h complaints against Louisiana's pledged securities.
.Profitable as the 1643 scheme was

it did not complete

the retirement and cancellation of the outstanding bonds is
sued for and In favor of the property banks*

By 1347

$5*354,616*13-worth of these securities had been retired*
leaving still outstanding a total of $12,395,333.37.50
The maturity dates of many of these outstanding State pledged
beads were soon approaching*

Lavs ware passed, therefore, to

or tend these dates of maturity*

Provisions were also made to

riStumn toe stockholders of the Insolvent Citizens' Bank and
51
Consolidated Association*
These assessments, however,
aroused the antagonism of the mortgage stockholders*
as

They

Supra.

pp* 133-137; L* K. Jenka, QP* clt. * p. 107*

3ttPX&,

pp.

go

134-137; R. C * UcGrane , op * clt*

*

pp. 103-184*
S0Th* debts stood at:
Union B a n k ------------Consolidated Association
Citizens' Bank --------

I 3,534,000*00
1,953,775*00
7,237,608*87

Leg. poe. 1647, ’Report Of the State Auditor, ’
January*, 1848, p. 16*
gZLa* Acts* 1647, No* 100, pp* 76-78.

and some of them refused to pay the d e l u d e d con32
trihut ions,
Those who protested most vehemently were the
property owners who claimed they were unaware that their pur*
eh&sed properties were mortgaged to the property bunks for
eg
atOchs.
General criticism was heard against the lengthy
liquidation and against the apparent mismanagement and dissi
pation of funds by th© bank managers *
In 1852 the Legislature enacted a plan for the relief
Of the Citizens’ Bank which provoked considerable controversy
end severe criticism.

This Act of $fereh 10, 1352, waive red

the decree of forfeiture rendered in 1342, and permitted the
ecneexn In the process of liquidation to resume operation as
34
a H o e k hank.
By so doing the state relinquished its right
to control the assets end effairs of the bank,

Several mem*

bare of the legislature, therefore, opposed the measure vigorlly, but they were in the minority. The bill passed even
35
over the Governorfs veto*
The stockholders, however,
did
% i
36
act approve the hill. They wanted more favorable terms.

Supra, pp. 143-154; Leg, goc. 1352, "Report of the
of Managers
the Citizensf Bank and the Consolidated
Association of the Planters of Louisiana."
Sapra, p. 163.
^ L a . Ante, 18S2, No. 141, pp. 109-111.
, Jopr.. 18SS, Pp. 8®t 47, 40, 38, 99, 111, 113,
•at 148; U w y o u r . . PP. 46-47; House Pet... 1852, p. 63;
l w . Poe., idea.
12 L b . Ann.. 220,

Polloclc TO Cltlaena’Bank.

3a?

A new bill was passed, therefor©, In 1853, and th® Citizens9
Bank was so averted into a stock bank with th© hanking departM a t assuming the bonds of the old mortgage bank maintained
37
&® •* s o r t ^ g © department of the Citizens9 Bank*
According
to court opinion the set was a benefit to th© State and tee

people. I'rom 1353 to 1380 the operating bank.ing~departm.eiit
paid off more than a million dollars of the mortgage departM a t 9e State pledged bonds*

More would have been paid off had

it not been for the disruption caused by the war between the

States*

The new stockholders were Interested In sound opera

tion motivated by the desire for dividends* As a result the
engendering practices of the former administrations w©are

abandoned. The criticism existing during the period of iiquld A t i m p m t i e c l l y ceased*

38

In 1853 the State also released

what control it had

over the assets and affairs of the Consolidated Association
because it was considered too expensive to maintain a State
Board of Managers solely for this bank, but the State did not
permit this insolvent coneaxm to resume operation*

The

Consolidated Association under Its new management was even

worse than it had been under State supervision*

ftith the

S7I*. Act*. 1853, fTo. 246, PP. 207-203.

38

106 La * Arm. , 315, Hope and C ompany vs* Hoard of
Liquidation *

# Acts*

1853,

WO* 113,

pp*76-77 •

m U i r a » 4 squandering of funds and the Civil war to disrupt
i t a i w U m U y ! U « 8 i this tank was unable to terminate its
liquids tioo la 1866 when it a extended bonds war® to mature*
Instead, the the headed debt stood at 1 64?,70S .40, and the ex
isting deficit amounted to |38f59B*9S.^

Another extension
41
had to he granted and another assessment had t o t e made.
Displeasure at the bankfa failure to terminate its liquidation
was intense*

The stockholders were vehement in their protest

against the additional assessment, especially since the court
tad granted the right of receivership to representatives of

bondholders*

Collectively, they took the matter of additional

assaaenante to court and eventually won a decision that they
could not to held for more assessments beyond the 1847 eon42
trihutlan demands*

The funding Act of 1874, accompanied with Its amend■flats, tad fcar its purpose to consolidate the many otitstand
ing direct debts of tte State incurred within the S25,000,00C
eons 11 tut 1one 1 limit*

The latent of the law was not to In

cites che contingent bands of the Consolidated Association
Citizens* Bank
cede**

as part of the bonds fundable into "con

fte framers of the law recognized the bonds of the

too tanks a s valid, but they felt that tbeir redemption should
to bandied by the banks still in the process of liquidation—

* 0GABL, forstall to Consolidated Association, Hew
Orleans, May 7, 1666*
4 1i^. Acts, 1866, No* 33, p. 66.
42supra*

PP* 184. 135*
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not a repudiation by th© State of its pledge#

When

the Louisiana courts rendered decisions requesting the Board
of Liquidation in charge of the funding to accept the State
pledged bonds of the two mortgage banks

for conversion into

•consols"— outright State obligations— strong disapproval was
expressed#

Xh© citizens felt that they w©r© being made to pay

e tebt which had been Incurred for a privileged few many years
previous sad far which they had received no benefit*
sode was

Th© epi

a bitter one. Over twenty years bad ©lapsed since

the liquidation of the two firms had begun and the bonds still
outstanding when the conversion was ordered amounted to
*4,*03 ,0fS3«33.^*

Once the conversion of property bank bonds

was settled, however, these banks ceased being an irritating
thorn#

The prolonged liquidation ended soon afterwards#

The

meetj i f i stockholders finally had their properties relieved
from mortgage#
The termination of the mortgage banking episode in
Louisiana was not a repudiation of bonded debt*

All the bonds

and interest thereon were honored, even if th© portion remain
ing In 1874 was redeemed by a conversion at sixty cents on th©
dollar#

The debts contracted during a moment of inebriated
4*L s » Acts * 1374, Ko# 3, PP* 39-40*

30
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La
Let

**The State pledged b&nk bonds outstanding in 1874 were;
Citizens * B a n k
~—-----~ ^ |4 ,296,633 .S-S
Consolidated association---506,400.00
Ana* 411* LegasSier and Binder vs Board of Liquidation*
f n & P 741« Hope aad coapeuftg v s 3our<S of Liaj51s$±aBLs.

$30
prosperity were eventually settled at no loss to the bondholders, but after many years of depressing effects up cm
Louisiana *

The semi-anhhal interest payi ents f repayments of

prinelpslt and the riotous misuse of funtfs by the bank offi
cers and managers were oppressive drains upon the debtors and
the State.

Laxity of the State of Louisiana was Largely re-

spemelble for sueh a state of affairs.
failure of the Louisiana property banks to achieve
d m aim for which they were designed can be summarised as
foHe»:
1. The credit extended to the property owners served to
eeoautuate the credit Inflation existing at the time
ratter then to provide the means for sound develop*
meat.
r

Louisiana needed capital, but it appears that

the acquired funds were diverted toward fostering
speculation instead of promoting sound and profitable
economic improvements •

8. The exitleed capital was acquired at a substantial cost
to the property banks.

The employment of this capital,

however, failed to yield revenues that enabled punct
ual and easy repayment*
S* Poor management and the dissipation of funds were prob
ably r e s p o n s i b l e in part for depriving these batiks
from being a success.
The r e a s o n s for failure appear neither to substantiate
a c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the Louisiana property banks war© inherently

nor to p r o w that they ware destined by nature to
fhll*

That the Louisiana experiments frilled can b© attrlbu-

tad largely to the conditions of the period and the erroneous
practices pisotioes of the? r nt&n&gers and officers Security is rn important factor to consider when lead
ing, hut it is not the essential and primrry requisite for
credit*

While it may Indloate the earning capacity of the

property upon which a loan Is granted, It is not necessarily
a good guide*

The character and capability of the debtors

ai© sore important then the security itself.
tion Ween paid to these two factors

Kad more atten

the history of Louisiana's

property hanks might have been quite different, although it
would not have assured success*
Furthermore, agricultural banka attempting to operate

b

on th© sane basis practiced by commercial banks find themselves
in difficult ciroTsastancea«

Agricultural banking does not af

ford the same degree of liquidity in portfolio*

This was

later recognized, but at the time the Louisiana property banks
were la existence

these two forms of banking were not sep

arated and were not recognized as having different functions*
The present Federal Land Banks and the agricultural cooperative
bento apply eotaswhet the general principles that were part of
the Louisiana mortgage banks, but they were not permitted to
operate as eoitn©rc ic 1 benks •
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